at 5 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 63). [16] 488 U.S. 563 (1989). [17] Class, 583 U.S. ___, slip op.
When a defendant enters a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, the nature and effect of the plea necessarily mean that the defendant gives up the right to a fact-finding hearing on the propriety of multiple charges. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 576 (1989).¶3 Our decision should not be understood to render guilty pleas impervious to double jeopardy challenges.
When a defendant enters a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, the nature and effect of the plea necessarily mean that the defendant gives up the right to a fact-finding hearing on the propriety of multiple charges. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 576 (1989).¶3 Our decision should not be understood to render guilty pleas impervious to double jeopardy challenges.
at 20 (quoting Conradt, 2015 WL 480419, at *1).United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).Id.
(Slip op. at 3-5).The basic rationale of the Menna-Blackledge doctrine is that a guilty plea can’t waive a challenge that goes to the power of the state to prosecute and punish the defendant for the crime, a point evident from United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989), which characterized the doctrine as allowing a claim to be raised on appeal despite a guilty plea “where on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.” (Slip op. at 6).Unlike the claims in Broce [where the defendants raised a dispute about the facts and sought to introduce new evidence after the plea], Class’ constitutional claims here, as we understand them, do not contradict the terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement.
This was so because the issue was not jurisdictional or a matter of vindictive prosecution or double jeopardy. In a footnote, this panel noted the recent opinion in U.S. v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2012), may have said something that conflicted with the S. Ct.'s decision in U.S. v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989), when the De Vaughn court held a double jeopardy claim must be evident from the face of the indictment, [as opposed to evident in light of the whole record] to avoid waiver by guilty plea. And, even if there was no waiver, while the officer's encouragement of the defendant to continue as a CI, despite knowing the defendant was participating in illegal activity, was "troublesome," there was no immunity agreement.