Judge Hardiman, writing for the court, relied on TRW Inc. v. Andrews, where the Supreme Court explained that courts must begin statutory analyses by analyzing the text itself and then consider context and structure. See 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001). Judge Hardiman further noted that the Court in TRW recognized that Congress may “implicitly” exclude a broader discovery rule by “explicitly” including a narrower one.
The issue, therefore, is whether Rotkiske – and other consumers who do not learn of a potentially unfair debt collection attempt for more than one year after the collection effort was made – lose their right to file suit notwithstanding their lack of knowledge of the allegedly offending communication. In ruling that the FDCPA was not subject to the discovery rule, the Third Circuit relied on TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001), a case in which the Supreme Court held that the Fair Credit Reporting Act's claim provision was not subject to the discovery rule because the statute of limitations was "embedded" within the statute, as opposed to being found in a general statute of limitations that applies to, for example, an enumerated list of state law tort claims. With respect to the argument that the result was fundamentally unfair, the Third Circuit noted that the doctrine of equitable tolling protected consumers where there was evidence that the debt collector intentionally misled the consumer and thereby prevented the consumer from acquiring knowledge sufficient to assert the claim.
That decision, and others like it, followed a rule of implying a discovery rule absent “a contrary directive from Congress.” But Judge Hardiman ruled that after TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001), it is no longer appropriate to presume the existence of a discovery rule. Instead, “we must parse each limitations period using ordinary principles of statutory analysis– beginning with the statutory text and then proceeding to consider its structure and context.”
Subsection (h) address governmental liability, whereas subsection (i) makes an “offer for sale” an act of infringement.  TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).  Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (2007).
See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 6 - See 534 U.S. 19 (2001). 7 - Psihoyos, 2014 WL 1327937, at *10.
See, e.g., Burgess v. U.S., 553 U.S. 124, 130 (2008) (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000)). Likewise, principles of statutory construction require statutes to be construed in a manner that prevents any words from being rendered superfluous (TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)). Therefore, courts should not read the phrase “to the Commission” in the definition of “whistleblower” out of the statute.
See Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001). But often the lender will indeed have a reason to think that you are the person applying for credit.