Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd.

14 Citing briefs

  1. DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL v. S.C.

    Real Parties in Interest, Mayra Antonia Alvarado and Dylan Harbord-Moore, Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed February 21, 2014

    Isenberg y. California EmploymentStabilization Commission (1947) 30 Cal.2d 34, 25 39 [180 P.2d 11, 15]; California Compensation Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 861, 867 [195 P.2d 880, 884]. See, also, Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Employment Commission (1946) 28 Cal.2d 33, 44 [168 P.2d 686, 692] overruled on other grounds by People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468 [186 Cal.Rptr. 77]; Tieberg v. UnemploymentIns. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 943, 950 [88 Cal.Rptr. 175, 179]. The same definition is still in use.

  2. O'Connor et al v. Uber Technologies, Inc. et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof

    Filed December 4, 2014

    Where the parties have entered into a written contract, determining the extent of the alleged employer’s legal right to control “without full examination of the contract will be virtually impossible.” Ayala, 59 Cal.4th at 535; see also Tieberg, 2 Cal.3d at 952 (written agreements are a “significant factor” in assessing the right to control); Grant v. Woods, 71 Cal.App.3d 647, 653 (1977) (“Written agreements are of probative significance” in evaluating the extent of a hirer’s right to control.).

  3. DYNAMEX OPERATIONS WEST v. S.C.

    Petitioner’s Petition for Review

    Filed November 24, 2014

    (/bid.) Courts struggling to apply this limited test to “the infinite variety of service arrangements” eventually embraced the cluster of secondary indicia discussed above to guide resolution of these questions. (Ibid., citing, inter alia, Rest.2d Agency, § 220; Tieberg v. UnemploymentIns. Appeals Board (1970) 2 Cal.3d 943, 949-950; Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Employment Com. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 33, 43.) Borello, however, recognizedthat the control test arose to meet the needs of employers and was not focused on protection of their employees: To accommodate this conceptual distinction, the Court instructed that the common law “*control-of-work-details’ test for determining whether a person rendering services to 1] another is an ‘employee’ or an excluded ‘independent contractor’ must be applied with deference to the purposesofthe protective legislation. The nature of the work, and the overall arrangement betweenthe parties, must be examined to determine whether they comewithin the ‘history and fundamental purposes’ofthe statute.

  4. Thomas Atencio et al v. Tunecore, Inc. et al

    REPLY for Relief 206 PLAINTIFFS REPLY TO DEFENDANTS UNTIMELY OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR POST TRIAL RELIEF

    Filed February 8, 2019

    “Strong evidence in support of an employment relationship is the right to discharge at will, without cause.” S.G. Borello & Sons, 48 Cal.3d at 350 (quoting Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 2 Cal. 3d 943, 949 (1970)). Additional factors that may be considered depending on the issue involved are: 1.

  5. DYNAMEX OPERATIONS WEST v. S.C.

    Amicus Curiae Brief of California Employment Law Council and Employers Group, Supplemental Brief

    Filed February 21, 2017

    But it cherry-picks from Borello only those points it wishes to highlight. It omits entirely Borello’s recognition that “the right to control work details is the ‘most important’ or ‘mostsignificant’ consideration”in addressing the employee-independent contractor issue. (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350; see also ibid. [quoting Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 943, 946] [“[TJhe principal test of an employmentrelationship is whether the person to whom service ts rendered hasthe right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.”’].) Andit fails to acknowledge that further factors, while instructive, are “secondary”indicia only. (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350.)

  6. DYNAMEX OPERATIONS WEST v. S.C.

    Amicus Curiae Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and California Chamber of Commerce, Supplemental Brief

    Filed January 23, 2017

    These secondary factors, which are described in several of section 28’s provisions, are part of the Borello common law test and many of them are merely further indicia of hirer control sufficient to make the worker an employee. (See, e.g., Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 539 (Ayala) [explaining that certain secondary factors are “relevant to support an inference that thehireeis, or is not, subject to the hirer’s direction and control”]; Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bad. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 943, 953 [describing various factors for assessing whether workers are independent contractors or employees—like whether“their work involvesskill,” or whether “they do not work on the [hirer’s] premises,” or whether“they are paid by the job rather than by the hour’—and explaining “[t]hese factors are merely evidentiary indicia of the right to control”); DLSE Manual, supra, § 28.3.1 [explainingthat, “[p]rior to Borello, the leading case on the subject was Tieberg”(italics added)].) Thus, the DLSE Manual’s approachis entirely consistent with past Supreme Court precedent, which recognizes that Borello calls for a multi-factor assessment but emphasizes that “control over how a result is achieved lies at the heart of the common law test for employment” and thus “what matters under the common law is... how much control the hirer retains the right to exercise.”

  7. DYNAMEX OPERATIONS WEST v. S.C.

    Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits

    Filed November 15, 2015

    The Court stated it was declining to adopt “detailed new standards” to decide whether a workeris an employee or an independent contractor. Rather, the Court built upon prior cases (including Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp. Comm’n (1946) 28 Cal.2d 33 and Tieburg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 943), while also borrowing certain principles from the Restatement Second of Agency. By doing so, this Court intentionally chose flexibility, and made its approach adaptable to change.

  8. DYNAMEX OPERATIONS WEST v. S.C.

    Petitioner’s Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed May 11, 2015

    The “exercise control”test is therefore far broader than the common-law control test, which depends - 20 - primarily on the “right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.” (Ayala, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 531; Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350 [quoting Tieberg v. UnemploymentIns. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 943, 946].) All service recipients either explicitly or implicitly authorize the remuneration their service providers receive.

  9. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.

    REPLY

    Filed January 14, 2015

    Indeed, plaintiffs do not address Lyft’s lengthy and detailed discussion of the agreement between the parties, and ignore clear California Supreme Court precedent holding that written agreements are the necessary starting points for an assessment of the right to control analysis. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 535 (2014) (holding that the written agreement is the starting point for the analysis but affirming that the course of conduct is also relevant to determining whether an individual is an independent contractor or an employee); see also Grant v. Woods, 71 Cal. App. 3d 647, 653 (1977) (holding that written agreements are a significant factor in assessing the right to control); Tieberg v. Unemp’t Ins. App Bd., 2 Cal.3d 943, 952 (1970). Plaintiffs do not contest that they agreed to and accepted the Lyft TOS prior to Case3:13-cv-04065-VC Document80 Filed01/14/15 Page11 of 19 8 Case No. 3:13-cv-04065-VC DEFENDANT LYFT, INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MSJ AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MSJ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 accessing the Lyft platform as drivers.

  10. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed December 22, 2014

    Written agreements (such as the Terms of Service here, pursuant to which Lyft disclaims nearly all control over its drivers) are a significant factor in assessing the right to control. Grant v. Woods, 71 Cal.App.3d 647, 653 (1977); Tieberg v. Unemp’t Ins. App Bd., 2 Cal.3d 943, 952 (1970). Also, the mere suggestion as to detail is not enough but, rather, plaintiffs must show a complete or authoritative control in order to establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship.