Filed February 28, 2017
Id. at 448. Framing the constitutional question, the Court explained that “[w]hetherthe First Amendmentprohibits holding Westboroliable for its speech in this case 8 Accord Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2014) (First Amendmentdoesnot permit “a State to compel personalcare providers to subsidize speech on matters of public concern by a unionthat they do not wish to join or support”); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (First Amendment scrutiny applied to regulation of utility company’s distribution of newsletter to customers where the publication “includes the kind of discussion of ‘matters of public concern’ that the First Amendmentboth fully protects and implicitly encourages”) (quoting Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101). 36 turns largely on whetherthat speechis ofpublic or private concern, as determinedbyall the circumstancesofthe case.
Filed February 19, 2014
See, Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (emphasis supplied). , Thornhill, supra, 310 U.S. at 103. Notwithstanding the image immediately called to mind when one hears the term, picketing is not merely a tactic employed by labor organizations to discourage public patronage of certain establishments.
Filed February 19, 2014
There, the Supreme Court considered whether an Alabama statute, 10 which prohibited picketing, violated the First Amendment. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 91. The statute in question provided as follows: Any person or persons, who, without a just cause or legal excuse therefor, go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business of any other person, firm, corporation, or association of people, engaged in a lawful business, for the purpose, or with the intent of influencing, or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have business dealings with, or be employed by such persons, firm, corporation, or association, or who picket the works or place of business of such other persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise of another
Filed February 19, 2014
See, Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468,478 (emphasis supplied). Thornhill, supra, 310 U.S. at 103. Notwithstanding the image immediately called to mind when one hears the term, picketing is not merely a tactic employed by labor organizations to discourage public patronage of certain establishments.
Filed January 31, 2011
B. Theissueis access. The statute before the Supreme Court in Thornhill, supra, 310 U.S. at pages 91-92 forbadeloitering or picketing “about the premises or place ”of business.” Byron Thornhill was convicted of a violation of that statute for peacefully picketing around the Brown WoodPreserving Company “on Company property,” on a private entrance for employees and not on a public road. (/d. at pp. 94-95.)
Filed September 15, 2016
Indeed, having failed to establish any link whatsoever between these statements and criminal conduct, these policies are pro- tected speech regarding “matters of public concern.” See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940). Thus, Plaintiffs’ suit is not only baseless as a factual matter, but also is an unconstitutional effort “to exact a cost” from “Nestlé” for its protected non- commercial speech. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336, 337 (2010) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964)). The Ninth Circuit directed Plaintiffs to amend in light of two cases involving 9
Filed October 9, 2013
That was the threat and that constitutes the prior restraint. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (“it is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the 28 pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion.”); Crue v. Aken, 370 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2004) (e-mail from University Chancellor to faculty and students seeking to have the University’s athletic director pre-approve certain communications deemed a prior restraint.)
Filed April 16, 2013
In particular, “[t]he freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embracesat the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters ofpublic concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.” (Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 101-02.) And “no rule can escapeFirst 21 Amendmentscrutiny by bearing an innocuouslabel.”
Filed March 22, 2011
Federal labor law abrogates common-lawtrespass and requires employers to grant employees worksite access to discuss unionization, but not other topics. (Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB (1945) 324 U.S. 793; Beth Israel ’ A third cited case, Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S.88, stands for the opposite of Ralphs’s proposition. There, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that effectively criminalized picketing an employer’s “premises or place of business.”
Filed September 15, 2010
Under federal law, it is only where some unique circumstance prevents nontrespassory methods of communication with employees 14 (a company town, a mine, a logging camp, a remote lodge) that a labor dispute may legally spill over onto private property. (Lechmere, 502 U.S. at p. 535; NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at p. 112; Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 104-106; NZRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp. (6th Cir. 1948) 167 F.2d 147; Alaska Barite Co. (1972) 197 N.L.R.B. 1023; NLRB v. S & H Grossinger’s, Inc. (2d Cir. 1967) 372 F.2d 26.) Of course, this is true even as to non-labor speech. (Marsh v. Alabama, supra, 326 U.S. 501 [Jehovah’s witness’s right to distribute religious literature in company town].)