Tennessee v. Street

14 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. HOPSON

    Respondent’s Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed May 23, 2016

    (Reid, supra, 971 N.E.2d at p. 357, internal quotation marks omitted.) “To avoid such unfairness and to preserve the truth-seeking goals of our courts [citation to Street, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 415], we hold that the 36 admission of testimony that violates the Confrontation Clause may be properif the defendant opened the doorto its admission.” (/bid.)

  2. The People, Respondent,v.Joshue DeJesus, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed February 17, 2015

    This makes perfect sense, since, when testimonial statements are not admitted for their truth, it is not the veracity or accuracy of the statement that is at issue, and the defendant therefore has no need to cross-examine the maker of the statement. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. at 414. Thus, even if a defendant has not opened the door to an out-of-court statement, it is not barred by the Confrontation Clause if admitted for a purpose other than establishing its truth.

  3. PEOPLE v. RICCARDI (JOHN A.)

    Respondent's Reply Letter Brief

    Filed July 26, 2011

    But, as discussed above, this Court must assume that the jury followed the court's instruction not to consider Young's and Detective Purcell's speculation about what may have occurred. (See Street, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 415, fn. 6; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Ca1.4th at p. 537 [jury presumed to follow trial court's limiting instruction concerning use of out-of-court statements]. ) Appellant alleges that the trial court's "errors" "not only violated state evidentiary rules against hearsay, but also constitute prejudicial error under the federal constitutional [sic] and analogous provisions of the California state constitution[," and thus is subject to prejudice analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705]. (Appl't Supp. Ltr. Br. at p. 15.) But, as discussed above, the audiotape did not present any federal Confrontation Clause issues, and thus Chapman analysis would not apply.

  4. The People, Respondent,v.Joshue DeJesus, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed February 17, 2015

    In Crawford, the Supreme Court briefly stated, in dictum, that the Confrontation Clause "does not bar the use of testimonial 46 statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985). Review of Tennessee v. Street shows the case hardly stands for the proposition that the Crawford Court recognized that there is no confrontation implication for so-called background evidence.

  5. PEOPLE v. HOPSON

    Appellant’s Reply Brief on the Merits

    Filed July 28, 2016

    The jurors would have had to accept Thomas’s statements for their truth (which they were free to do) in orderto believe that they disproved Ms. Hopson’stestimony about Thomas’s admissionsto her. In one paragraph, responding to Ms. Hopson’s analysis of Tennessee v. Street, supra, 471 U.S. 409, respondenttries to posit a scenario in which the jurors could have both (1) disbelieved Thomas’s statements to the police and (2) used those disbelieved statements to conclude that Thomasnever told Ms. Hopson 17 that he killed Brown. (ABM 32-33.) Suffice it to say that this scenario is implausible.

  6. PEOPLE v. EDWARDS (ROBERT)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed February 28, 2008

    Even if the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Richards constitutes testimonial evidence, the Confi-ontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements "for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." (Id. at p. 59, h. 9; see also Tennessee v. Street (1985) 471 U.S. 409,414 [lo5 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 4251.) Accordingly, Crawford does not undermine the long- standing rule that experts can testify to their opinions on relevant matters, and relate the information and sources upon which they rely in forming those opinions.

  7. The People, Appellant,v.Keith Johnson, Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed February 9, 2016

    “indications” that defendant purported to set up a drug deal (A.7-8), Bruton still 44 should not apply. Initially, every Supreme Court case addressing a Bruton issue involved a facially-incriminating confession that was equivalent to trial testimony of a codefendant taking the stand and pointing the “accusatory finger” at defendant. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 188, 194 (confession to participating with others, identifiable as including defendant); Cruz, 481 U.S. at 188-89 (confession to robbery with defendant and others); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 66 (1979) (jointly-tried defendants confessed, implicating each other); Schneble, 405 U.S. at 429-30 (codefendant’s “confession” incriminated defendant in murder); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969) (codefendants’ confessed and incriminated defendant, the “white guy,” as participant in robbery-homicide); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124 (“confession” that codefendant and defendant “committed the armed robbery”); cf. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415-16 (1985) (approving introduction as rebuttal evidence the separately-tried accomplice’s confession incriminating defendant as active participant in murder, where not introduced for its truth). The rationale for these decisions rests on the fact that the credibility of a co-defendant’s confession is “inevitably suspect” given the declarant’s clear “motivation to shift blame onto others,” and that such unreliability is “intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice . . . does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination.”

  8. The People, Respondent,v.Joshue DeJesus, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed February 17, 2015

    Thus, in Rivera, the defendant himself directly alleged to the jury that the police had acted arbitrarily in 7 arresting only him. This Court’s Rivera ruling follows the classic example of opening the door, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985)(Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by introduction of an accomplice's confession for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting defendant's testimony that his own confession was coercively derived from the accomplice's statement). In an effort to draw close to Rivera, Respondent argues that the defense below sought to mislead the jury by suggesting that “Carrasco had orchestrated the placing of defendant’s photograph in the photo array” (RB59).

  9. The People, Respondent,v.Derrick Hill, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed October 16, 2014

    However, the purpose of a criminal trial is to answer the factual question of whether the defendant is guilty of the charged crimes, and it is therefore “important that both the defendant and the prosecutor have the opportunity to meet fairly the evidence and arguments of one another.” United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988); see also Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (criminal trials have a “truth-seeking function”). Thus, a defendant, through his conduct at trial, may effectively waive his constitutional rights and “open the door” to otherwise precluded evidence.

  10. PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ

    Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed September 22, 2014

    t. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705]. 2.1.0... eee, 69 Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [124 S.CT. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177] ..... 46... passim Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308 [94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347]. 2.2... eee 17 Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 560]. ........ 54, 62, 64 Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986).475 U.S. 673 [106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674]. 2.0.22... 69 Dutton v,. Evans (1970) 400 U.S. 74 [91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213]. ..........-0.. 53, 59 Marks-v. United States (1977) 430 U.S. 188 [97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d. 260]. .....0.0 0 cece eee 27 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 [129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314]. ..... 51, 53, 54, 56 Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 . [100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L-Ed.2d 597]. 2... eee, 18 Palmer v. Hoffman (1943) 318 U.S. 109 [63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645]. 0... eee 54 iv Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400 [85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923]. ...........0.0.. 17 Tennesseev. Street (1985) 471 U.S. 409 [105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425]. ............04. 21 White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346 [112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848]. .... 0. cece 35 Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89]. ... 25, 26, 28, 40, 55 OtherFederal Cases King v. Palmer (D.C. Cir. 1991) 292 U.S. App.D.C.362 [950 F.2d 771]. 2... ee eee ee 53, 54, 58, 60 United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.(2d Cir. 2003) BIS F.3d 179. 2 occceees 69 United States v. Arnold (6th Cir. 2007) 486 F.3d 177. ..... 18-20, 59 United States v. Brown (11th Cir. 2006) 441 F.3d 1330. ........°17 United States v. Charles (11th Cir. 2013) 722:F.3d 1319. . 54, 62, 64 United States v. Jackson (Sth Cir. 2011) 636 F.3d 687. ......... 69 United States v. Johnson (4th Cir. 2009) 587 F.3d 625....... 53, 59 United States v. Lombardozzi (2d Cir. 2007) 491 F.3d 61. ...... 27 United States v. Mejia (2d Cir. 2008) 545 F.3d 179. 18, 51, 53, 54, 56 United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148. ....... 18 California Supreme Court Cases Gomez v. Superi