12 Shutts, 472 U.S at 812. 13 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 897 (2008) (citing Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 801-802 (1996)). 14 See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1995); Kamilezicz v. Bank of Bos.
Petition denied 1/11/16.CAFC Opinion, CAFC ArgumentSpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 15-461Question Presented:In Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), this Court confirmed that there are “'uniform federal rule[s]' of res judicata.” 553 U.S. at 891.
Issue preclusion, which applies “in the context of a different claim,” “bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). In the petition, Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc. and related companies (collectively, “Lucky”) argue that the Second Circuit conflated these two principles when it held that Lucky was barred from raising any defense to new claims raised by Marcel Fashion Group Inc. (“Marcel”) that could have been adjudicated in the earlier cases between the parties.This case arises from almost two decades of litigation between Lucky and Marcel.
at 12 (citing Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corporation, 897 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Taylor, 553 U.S. 880, 894-95 (2008)). Under that test, the PTAB determined that Seirus and Ventex had a preexisting substantive legal relationship in the form of two contracts—a Supplier Agreement with an obligation to indemnify and defend and an Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement”—and those agreements “directly related to the product accused of infringing the patent at issue in this proceeding because they governed the contracts between the parties that resulted in Ventex’s sale of fabric to Seirus.”
A “privy” for purposes of Section 315(b) is broader, and codifies the common-law doctrine of estoppel. Both the majority and the dissent appear to agree that, in theory, non-party estoppel can arise from any of the six categories set out in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893-95 (2008): (1)“agree[ment] to be bound”; (2)a “pre-existing substantive legal relationship”; (3)“adequate represent[ation] by someone with the same interests”; (4)parties who “assume control over the litigation”; (5)using a “proxy”; and (6)“a special statutory scheme.” The panel majority appears to have found that Wi-Fi waived any arguments concerning the other Taylor factors.
Other factors recognized by the Supreme Court as being relevant to deciding privity in the res judicata context, which serves as the rationale for the bar and estoppel provisions, include (1) agreements to be bound; (2) pre-existing "substantive legal relationships;" (3) adequate representation by parties with the same interests; (4) relitigating through proxies; and (5) special statutory schemes that "expressly foreclose successive litigation by nonlitigants." (See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893-95 (2008). However, these factors do not "establish a definitive taxonomy."