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T. H. v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Sep 9, 2011
A132167 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 9, 2011)

Opinion

A132167

09-09-2011

T. H., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 0J10015142)

T.H. (mother) seeks writ review of an order terminating reunification services and setting for September 13, 2011, a plan hearing for her nearly two-year-old son, J.G. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) We issued an order to show cause, and deem the response of real party in interest the Alameda County Social Services Agency (agency) the return. Mother challenges reasonable-services and no-return findings. We find them to be supported, and therefore affirm.

All further unstated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

B ACKGROUND


Prior History

J.G. was born in July 2009 to then 36-year-old mother, who had herself been a dependent child, had a long history of drug abuse involving crack cocaine, crime, incarcerations, mental health problems, and violent and hostile behavior, had given birth many times before (starting at age 11) and, as far as our record reveals, had never been gainfully employed. Mother was initially vague about the number of her children, but her husband, and an extended family member (the aunt) who had adopted one of her other children each put the total number at 22. The San Francisco Human Services Agency (agency) had records for 10 to 14 children, six of whom were born with cocaine in their systems. Most had been adopted, and none were in mother's care. She had failed to reunify with any of them and, for some, had been bypassed for services (see § 361.5, subd. (b)). She had been in residential treatment programs multiple times.

J.G. was born drug-free at St. Luke's Hospital in San Francisco, but a referral was made to the agency, whose child protective services unit (CPS) had extensive experience with mother over the years, including 29 referrals for neglect, substantial risk, caretaker absence, and physical abuse. Mother identified the biological father as Bobby G., but said the relationship ended early in her pregnancy. He was required to register as a sex offender, having convictions for assault with intent to commit rape, and annoying or molesting children. She had gotten a restraining order against him after a domestic violence incident; and he moved to Seattle, Washington. After that relationship, and five months into her pregnancy with J.G., mother began living with Daniel M. of San Francisco (the stepfather), who married her before the birth and accepted the child into his home.

The referral at J.G.'s birth, despite agency concerns about mother's CPS history, mental health issues and substance abuse, resulted in her being allowed to take J.G. home under a voluntary services plan. Nancy Frappier, a social worker who had known mother from 15 years of work providing support services at the Homeless Prenatal Program (HPP) in San Francisco, felt that mother had made a turn-around in her drug problem, was motivated to succeed as a parent, and that being able to take the baby home surprised mother and strengthened her resolve. The case plan, overseen by CPS worker Katy Gaddess, was closed after six months, when it seemed to have been successful. Frappier, who had earlier helped mother find stable housing, helped with Compass Family Center to eventually move mother into transitional (18-month) housing in Oakland. At the Tenderloin Outpatient Mental Health Clinic In San Francisco, mother also had continued with "years"-long group therapy with Linda Zaretsky for substance abuse, recovery, and trauma, and longtime medication monitoring through Dr. Yates-Brown. Mother seemed to be clean and sober. Frappier had positive feedback on a 16-week parenting class mother was attending. J.G. seemed well cared for, and mother interacted well with him, and could treat his asthma symptoms and recognize when he needed medical help. The stepfather was a source of support and strength in mother's efforts. Frappier deemed mother very guarded but able to learn to trust people and, while loud and demanding when she felt she needed or wanted something, not angry at people.

Current Proceedings

The current case began with a CPS referral on April 1, 2010, for caretaker absence, when no one came to pick up eight-month-old J.G. from daycare at the Holy Family Daycare Center in San Francisco. Staff and police could not contact mother or the stepfather, and the child was taken into shelter care later that evening. The aunt (related by marriage) called an agency social worker the next day to say that she had adopted the older sibling and, if the situation required it, was interested in adopting J.G. The aunt was assessed and approved for placement in time to take foster care at detention on April 9. Mother never regained custody. The aunt remained a foster parent throughout these proceedings and eventually gained de facto parent status.

The agency had to work from conflicting information from the stepfather and mother. The stepfather, who said he loved and often cared for J.G., said four days after the incident that mother was supposed to pick up J.G. but failed because she was " 'again doing drugs.' " This had happened twice before, he said, with him having to retrieve the baby once and a neighbor stepping in the other time. He said mother's use of cocaine made her forget the baby, that she was "in 'denial' about her drug use," and that " 'she [was] in denial about everything.' " Mother, who called the same day to say she was on a bus coming back from Sacramento, said there had been a " 'misunderstanding' " between them and that the stepfather was supposed to pick up J.G. Two days later, insisting that she was not using drugs, she agreed to do random drug tests but said she and the stepfather no longer lived together and that she had been " 'set up' " by him. She said she would ask the court to let her give the aunt "legal guardianship." The apartment manager where the stepfather lived related that mother had been having problems at the building, knocking at people's doors asking them to let her stay the night, being hostile toward others, and forgetting to pick up her child from the care center. Mother's account later changed to having been, not in Sacramento, but in Los Angeles, where she went to a swap meet. Further inconsistent was her claim that she had no phone at the time.

The agency filed a dependency petition in San Francisco a week after the incident, and the child was formally detained. As amended and sustained at a jurisdictional hearing of June 24, 2010, the findings as to mother were (§ 300, subds. (b) [failure to protect] and (j) [sibling abuse]) that: (B1) she had a history of substance abuse problems for which she required assessment and treatment; (B2) she failed to supervise the child by failing to ensure that he was picked up from child care, and not contacting the agency until four days later; (B4) she had "numerous children," none of whom were currently in her care; and (J1) she had at least six other children who were prior or current dependents of the court, with whom she failed to reunify, and for whom her parental rights were terminated (naming and giving the status of each child).

A sustained allegation as to the father, Bobby G., was that (B8) he had an anger management problem that impeded his ability to safely parent. He submitted on the petition, waived services, stayed in Seattle, ceased contact with the agency, and does not challenge the orders before us.
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Days later, the juvenile court in San Francisco transferred the case to Alameda County for disposition, given mother's residence in Oakland. Alameda County accepted the transfer on July 15, 2010, and Alameda County Social Services Agency (SSA) took over the San Francisco agency's role. Documents received from San Francisco indicated that mother's two-bedroom apartment in East Oakland had been visited and found to be clean, safe and well furnished. Mother had lived there for six months but had spent half of her time at the stepfather's unit in San Francisco, where she had J.G. in daycare and was receiving her community support services. While statutory provisions for non-reunification clearly applied (§ 361.5, subd. (b)), services had been recommended because mother had made positive changes in her life. San Francisco Child Welfare Worker (CWW) Lillian Yee explained to her Alameda County counterpart, as to why reunification services were offered, that the reason for removal was deemed "a less severe neglect incident more on the level of a fluke incident . . . ."

A disposition report from San Francisco described mother as cooperative and receptive to services. Mother (described elsewhere in the record as "very heavy") said she was in bad health, with physical and neurological problems, past strokes, and several brain surgeries due to domestic violence. She walked with a cane, but could get around, and received SSI benefits that helped with her rent. She was in the parenting class, had clean results for recently begun "random drug testing," had agreed to have a substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations, and continued to see longtime therapist Zaretsky at the Tenderloin Mental Health Clinic. Given "a lot of unknowns about [her] mental health history," the report recommended a neuropsychological evaluation to help identify appropriate services. Supervised visits were going well, with J.G. comfortable and the stepfather participating, and unsupervised day visits would be recommended if mother kept testing clean for drugs. Her relationship with the stepfather was "shaky," but he was deemed a positive influence for J.G. Mother found it convenient to stay overnight sometimes at his San Francisco apartment, and she preferred to continue with her San Francisco services if possible. She was advised that failure to reunify would mean adoption for J.G., and the aunt, in whose home J.G. was doing very well, remained willing to adopt if necessary.

An SSA acceptance report relates much the same information, plus that mother continued to see Dr. Yates-Brown for mental health medications identified by mother as Xilar and Zoloft. The report relates CWW Yee's concerns that mother had relapsed and that her relationship with the stepfather was on and off. Report author CWW Kim Yancy had met with mother, and mother was back with the stepfather. The San Francisco court had not required a psychological evaluation as such, but ordered mother to continue her psychiatric care and follow recommendations, including compliance with prescribed medicines. She was also ordered to visit regularly, complete a parenting education program, and complete a substance abuse assessment plus any recommended treatment, including residential or outpatient drug treatment and testing. Mother was testing just once a week, due to her living in the East Bay and having many appointments, but the schedule was subject to change. She had seven-hour visits from noon to 7:00 p.m. on Wednesdays, Fridays and Saturdays, and they were unsupervised because the aunt was unwilling to go to mother's home, feeling that it was unsafe. The worker had discretion to allow overnight visits, but no date was set for them, as visits would need to be observed first.

The acceptance report assessed mother's efforts and progress as "partial," and the court so found in accepting transfer, also finding that SSA had made reasonable efforts. The court continued the case plan and services as recommended in the report and set a six-month review for December 2010.

Delay meant that no review was held at six months, and this made a contested evidentiary hearing ultimately held from mid-March to mid-May 2011 a combined six-and 12-month review. One cause for delay was mother's absence. She was once again pregnant—with her 23 d child, by her own count. She required some bed rest, and then had medical problems surrounding the birth, five weeks early, in mid-March 2011. The record reflects that she had knee pain and pregnancy complications of bladder infection, post-birth bleeding, incontinence, and surgery for the incontinence.

A status review report and several updates accrued as the case continued, each authored by CWW Lindella Wilson, recommending terminating mother's reunification services and setting a plan selection hearing (§ 366.26) for terminating parental rights and setting a plan of adoption. Wilson had taken over the case from Yancy and reviewed the transferred material. The status review and updates (collectively reports) were explored in testimony from Wilson, clinic case manager Frappier, and mother in the hearings producing the order we review. For ease of presentation, and because one judge (Hon. Kimberly Briggs) heard all of the evidence, we summarize the reports and testimony together by subject matter, mindful that we must view the record favorably to the judgment (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018).

Substance abuse. A key concern, given mother's decades of drug use and the already-noted reports of her relapsing, was whether she truly was, as she claimed, clean and sober. Of added concern was that, while mother told initial CWW Yancy that her drug problems were long in the past and that she had been clean and sober "[a] couple years," discharge records from St. Luke's Hospital belied this. She had tested positive for cocaine during her first trimester of pregnancy, and reported daily use of alcohol. The aunt further reported that, when J.G. was not picked up from daycare, the stepfather was angry with mother for "seeing and getting high with another guy."

Getting proper drug assessment, testing, and professional input proved to be an elusive task. To start, San Francisco case manager Frappier, despite long knowledge of mother's past drug abuse and drug-exposed babies, seems to have relied on gut feelings and optimism more than objective analysis. She reacted to the San Francisco agency's case plan with minimal effort to examine drug abuse. There had been no drug tests at the clinic itself, and Frappier knew nothing of the St. Luke's Hospital reports of cocaine and alcohol use. At agency request, she conducted an assessment but, as she explained in testimony, used an ASI (Addiction Severity Index) of 30 to 40 minutes length that was a "short form" series of questions about the person: "They are answering you. You are not getting documentation of anything. It's their answers to the questions, and then you kind of try to assess if you feel that the person is being truthful with you." The assessment led Frappier to recommend continued support services, continued therapy (which had always in part addressed sobriety), and to start drug testing. No substance abuse program (outpatient or residential) was recommended, Frappier recalled, "because it seemed that [mother] was coping well with that issue, and it wasn't—didn't appear to be absolutely necessary for that to have happened." What to require was, of course, up to the agency, and the agency did require an outpatient program for alcohol and drugs. Mother started one in San Francisco but then stopped it.

Upon transfer to Alameda County, mother insisted to Wilson that she did not have to do an alcohol or drug program because San Francisco had not required it. Wilson learned that this was false, and that supposedly "random" drug tests mother had begun at a San Francisco facility were, in fact, tests on the same day each week—so that anyone could defeat them by timing their drug use to test "clean" on the appointed day. Wilson thus doubted the usefulness of clean test results from that facility and told mother she would have to test somewhere else. Wilson also had trouble getting information from the facility given that hers was not the agency contracting for the testing. So she directed mother to the East Oakland Recovery Center (EORC) in Alameda County for outpatient alcohol and drug treatment that would include relapse prevention and random testing. Mother balked and at first refused to have any services in Alameda County. She also refused to sign consent forms to allow Wilson information from her treating psychiatrist and doctor. Mother finally did go to EORC but was so angry and belligerent about what she would and would not do that EORC was poised to discharge her for not cooperating. EORC urged that she needed an anger management course "to help her regulate her emotions," and had to have two staff persons present for drug testing because mother was often angry and hostile. When Wilson spoke to mother about these concerns, mother denied having any anger "issues" and said she spoke loudly because of poor hearing (in one ear, according to her testimony).

Mother's tests at EORC were all clean insofar as she did them, but the case plan specified that missed tests counted as dirty. Testimony on the number of tests is in conflict. Mother claimed she did 12 from September through December 10, 2010, going each time she was called but getting no calls after that. Wilson said mother tested "sometimes and sometimes not," yielding "[n]ot that many" results, and that there were "more missed appointments" (perhaps meaning more missed than done), with just seven clean results through December 10. A letter to Wilson from EORC Interim Director Carla Wright also shows, contrary to mother's account, that mother was called in late December and twice in early January to submit further tests and that she expressly refused on two occasions. Mother did not test again until late April 2011. Having been terminated from EORC for missing more than just the testing, she had been allowed by Wright to return so long as she had no more than three absences. Wilson had secured that second chance by re-referring mother and speaking with Wright, and this allowed mother to add three further clean tests by the time of the final hearing date of May 12.

The end result, however, was that SSA was never able to rule out drug relapse. This left unverifiable mother's evolved account that, while she did use cocaine in the first trimester of pregnancy with J.G., she had not known then that she was pregnant and, two days after learning ceased all use of cocaine. Lack of verification was a hard result for SSA given that, during the pendency of the case, J.G. was assessed to have developmental delays and behavior problems typical of a drug-exposed fetus. According to Wilson, mother never did participate regularly in a relapse prevention class.

Nor was SSA able to rule out alcohol use. Mother claimed that St. Luke's Hospital misunderstood her in reporting that she admitted daily alcohol use. Her denial but also countered emerging information from the aunt. On an occasion in November 2010 when the aunt came to the SSA offices to pick up J.G. at the end of a visit with mother, mother was in the company of a woman whom Wilson explained was an "aunt" mother hoped to have approved to supervise her visits with J.G. in mother's home. The foster-parent aunt hit the roof, revealing—and offering to testify in court—that the companion was not mother's aunt, but "mother's 'drinking buddy.' " This was not only another report of alcohol use but, crucial to gauging her overall plan progress, an exposure of an attempted deception of SSA—and not the only one inferable on this record.

Physical health. Despite the already-noted physical problems mother had, no party in these proceedings urged that mother was physically unable to care for J.G., at least with proper assistance, but her minimizing of her physical limitations problems raised concerns about her judgment, ability to accept needed help, and ability to safely care for a child—particularly since, with the birth of a new baby, she would have two very young children to manage. One example is knee trouble observed on two occasions to make her stumble and her legs "lock up" without warning. She would not to reveal the diagnosis for her knee condition. In her view, she had just "a few minor problems," and "her health condition had nothing to do with her ability to care for the child." The latter statement was, of course, untrue and unrealistic. On one of the two stumbling occasions, she was seen to lose her balance while walking out of an office holding J.G., and her clinic case manager had to take the baby and have her sit down in a fortunately close chair. The other time she was seen to stumble while holding J.G. during a supervised home visit. Mother insisted that the baby was strapped into a stroller in the first instance. She said she had stumbled "a few times" while holding J.G. but said she always tried to stay close to something to grab or a place to sit down, and had never dropped him. She also said that the problem was her inability to take cortisone shots to ease her knee pain whenever she is pregnant, yet added, oddly, that she did not know she was pregnant on the specified occasion with J.G.

As an example of mother's reluctance to accept help, not to mention evasiveness, Wilson reported at the six-month mark that she had tried to help mother by ensuring that she had adequate help in the home and that mother had reported having an in-home aide. Mother then refused, however, to allow the aide and Wilson to meet and ultimately gave four versions of who the aide was. First it was her husband, then someone else, and then her aunt, but when Wilson contacted the aunt, the aunt denied being an in-home aide. Lastly, mother told Wilson that her in-home aide was someone named Peggy but that she no longer provided the service "because Alameda County did not pay her."

As of the last addendum, mother had indicated that she would need "a few more surgeries" but would not reveal what they were or when they would occur.

Visitation. From before the transfer until early October 2010, mother had unsupervised visits three days a week, from noon to 7:00 p.m. (according to SSA) or 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. (according to mother). They were at mother's unit in an apartment building in Oakland, attended also by the stepfather, mother's own mother, and a daughter, and the caretaker aunt transported J.G. back and forth each time. The visits were problem free except that the aunt said J.G. returned somewhat agitated and smelling of cigarettes, and that the stepfather often smelled of alcohol when he put the child in her vehicle at the end of visits.

After an incident on October 9, SSA changed the visits to supervised and reduced them to four hours, noon to 5:00 p.m., on each of the same days. Visits never returned to unsupervised, and much testimony focused on whether the October 9 incident was a sole or sufficient basis for the changes. Wilson's position was that it was the catalyst but not the sole reason. The hours had to be reduced to give mother time to participate fully in other services, and supervision was needed due to the stepfather reportedly smelling of alcohol and so that interactions between mother and child could be assessed. Wilson wrote that she explained this to mother, who grew angry; mother claimed she never got an explanation.

The problem on October 9 is that mother called police to the building to remove an agitated young man who had been intimidating residents there for a couple of weeks. When mother confronted the man, he spit in her face and tried to fight with the stepfather. It was a Wednesday for J.G.'s regular visit, and the aunt arrived with him toward the end of the drama, while police were there. Concerned about the safety of leaving J.G. there in the circumstances, the aunt ultimately did so when a CWW advised that the visit was court ordered and that Wilson would follow up. Police had to have mother calm down before taking the child. Mother's concern at the review hearing was that, the way the incident was relayed to Wilson, via police and reports, led her to infer that the man lived in or was causing trouble inside her unit, whereas the man lived with people in a different unit and never entered hers. She summoned the police out of concern for building security.

Visits proceeded thereafter as supervised initially by Wilson and staff from Terra Firma. Terra Firma raised concern that mother was unsteady on her feet and might drop the child, and Wilson grew concerned that mother dealt with J.G.'s fussing by stuffing way too much food in his mouth (despite warnings from her own mother). Mother could not bring herself to tell the child no (to stem tantrums), and showed limited ability to stay engaged in play with him. Mother said she could not "handle all the noise from the toys and stuff," but this was normal for a toddler, and she would pass him off to the stepfather. Wilson accordingly referred supervision of the visits to Alternate Family Services (AFS).

Over the next months, mother missed or canceled many visits, would go weeks without seeing the child, often tried to change times or dates at the last minute (despite reminders that this was not possible or practical), and showed a general lack of follow-through, plus a quick temper. Visits grew inconsistent and sporadic, even though AFS had them set up, in the end, only twice a week and for just two hours each.

Mother's reasons for the changes and missed visits ranged from complaints of ill health to it being "not a good day" for her. There was a period ending in mid-December 2010 when, during her new pregnancy, mother had a doctor's order (part of our record) for "light duty" and bed rest, but this was only for a month, and mother did not call for two weeks after the prescribed period. (Mother testified, without any written support, that the period was two months, ending in January.) Wilson also found it odd that, when mother called to change or cancel visits, she was never home, but always out somewhere. Wilson questioned what stability mother could offer a young child. Only in the last few weeks before the final hearing date did mother resume regular visits.

Coursework. Mother did complete the parenting course as originally directed by San Francisco. She initially refused to participate in services at EORC, convinced that she did not need them, and after she did enroll in parenting and early relapse classes at EORC, did not follow through and, as already noted, was terminated from EORC for a time. She was eventually allowed to return to EORC and at that point began coursework on anger management and outpatient drug treatment, and resumed drug testing, but this was very late in the 12-month process.

J.G.'s needs. The above discussion has alluded to mother's ability to deal with J.G.'s asthma but her limited ability to deal with the ordinary stresses of a toddler. J.G. was doing well in the aunt's care, but concern arose early in SSA's handling of the case that J.G. had special needs manifested by anger and tantrums, speech delay, and an inward cupping of his hands that suggested physical development problems. Multiple service providers had raised concerns about them, and J.G. was ultimately assessed for the problems and referred to specialists who confirmed them. SSA's concern was not so much the special needs as that mother persisted until the very end of the 12 months to deny that J.G. had them. She attributed any concern to care he had received since leaving her own care, and said the aunt was making them up "so she could get social security." Only very late in the 12 months of services did mother begin to articulate that J.G. actually had problems, and the court specifically commented on this in its ruling.

Mental health. Far more troubling for SSA was its inability to secure concrete information about mother's mental health. Never in the entire reunification period did mother sign the necessary consents to allow SSA or other services providers to contact Dr. Yates-Brown, who had treated her and prescribed her mental health medications for years, and she never had a medication evaluation done, as she had been directed. This left it impossible to determine, beyond mother's own lay reports, what was prescribed, what she took, what diagnosed conditions it addressed, and whether the amounts she took were therapeutically effective. Yates-Brown obviously had all of that information, but mother would not allow access to it.

Mother's uncorroborated lay account was that the only mental condition she had ever been diagnosed with was depression, but this was suspiciously incorrect for many reasons. First, the discharge papers from St. Luke's Hospital mentioned mother having a schizophrenia diagnosis (which mother denied). Second, mother testified she had been on Risperdal, Zoloft, and Seroquel, and she conceded that Seroquel was commonly understood as used to treat schizophrenia. She asserted, however, that it was also used for a sleep disorder. Third, she reported having taken Haldol toward the end of her pregnancy, but just for sleep trouble and because Yates-Brown thought it was safer than Seroquel for pregnant women who would breastfeed. Mother presented no prescriptions for any of these medications. Fourth, in lieu of consent to contact Yates-Brown, apparently, mother had the doctor write a brief note that said she had been prescribed Zoloft and Haldol, and that Seroquel had to be stopped due to side effects. It said nothing about the dosage or mother's compliance. Fifth, the same note indicated past diagnoses for a posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a psychotic disorder (apparently unspecified). Sixth, EORC suspected medication noncompliance because those medicines should have shown up in urinalysis they did for the drug testing. None at all showed up.

SSA did persuade mother to have a psychological evaluation, and one was done by Dr. Komal Ramchandani based on a series of five one-hour sessions she had with mother. One problem for Ramchandani was that, like SSA, she was denied consent to speak with Yates-Brown, although mother did allow her to speak with Linda Zaretsky, her longtime therapist from San Francisco. Ramchandani worked otherwise from information from mother, SSA, and the results of standard psychological tests she administered. Another problem was that mother went reluctantly, "like pulling teeth and nails," Wilson said. She resisted and would show up angry.

Of interest to the question of medicine compliance, Ramchandani wrote that mother said she took (besides Zoloft) Cetraline and " 'Elixir,' " which Ramchandani construed as meaning Effexor. On the question of mental disorders, Ramchandani learned that Zaretsky diagnosed mother with PTSD and "Cluster B traits such as emotional dysregulation and erratic interpersonal relationships," also describing her as manipulative. Zarestky apparently did not tie these diagnoses to any medications mother took or no longer took. Ramchandani tentatively diagnosed mother with depression— perhaps a depressive disorder not otherwise specified, and perhaps a major depressive disorder—but did not indicate what medications might be appropriate. Because mother reported having a brain aneurism and coma in 2002 that required eight months in a hospital, Ramchandani was interested to know whether her symptoms of depression predated that trauma or whether they might indicate brain damage. She also questioned whether mother's guardedness and paranoid thoughts were the product of experience and drug use, or perhaps a thought disorder given the prior diagnosis of schizophrenia. Ramchandani also diagnosed an Axis III personality disorder not otherwise specified, with borderline intellectual functioning.

Various questions led Ramchandani to strongly recommend a neuropsychological examination. She deemed this "imperative in determining how best to support [mother] and help her cope with her difficulties, especially if she regains custody of her son . . . ."

General. Common themes emerging from the testimony and reports, in various contexts, were that mother did fine as long as she was getting her way and doing things she liked, but was unwilling to fully engage in services, despite her assurances to the contrary. She hid information like her mental health history and medical problems, deflected with anger any unwanted help, could even doctor writings if convenient (like a note from the doctor as to whom she would not sign a release of information), and otherwise manipulated service providers.

Ruling. The court followed report recommendations, terminating services and finding in part that SSA complied with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to return the child, that reasonable services had been offered or provided, that mother's progress had been minimal, and that there was no substantial likelihood that the child could be returned to her with another six months of services.

DISCUSSION


I. Reasonable Services

The court had to find that SSA offered mother reasonable services, reasonable being defined as services designed to aid the parent in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (e), par. 8.) A case plan must be appropriate and tailored to the individual parent. (In re Misako R. (2002) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the finding, ensure that substantial evidence supports it and, where two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, find support for any such resolution. (Ibid.)

The record should show that SSA " 'identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parent[] during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parent[] in areas where compliance proved difficult.' " (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1011.) "The appellate court 'construe[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile court's findings regarding the adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of [SSA] efforts.' [Citation.]" (Sara M. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1018.)

Mother challenges the reasonable-services finding not by identifying anything needed but omitted from the case plan or services offered, but by stressing that, upon transfer from San Francisco to Alameda County, her thrice weekly unsupervised visits with J.G. were cut from eight hours to four hours each and made supervised. She assails the change as based on misinformation regarding the incident with the troubled young man at her apartment building, but we find neither error nor prejudice. " '[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .' " (Mark N. v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011.)

Mother makes no effort to analyze the record more broadly on those points, focusing entirely on the one change in hours and supervision. It is preposterous to suggest, on this record, that 12 hours of visitation spread over three days each week was a deficient amount of visitation time, and mother does not show this. The record shows, moreover, that mother missed visits, thereby deprive herself of the 12 hours allowed. This was also not an instance of a parent failing to maintain or develop a relationship with a child. That was never a problem identified in this case. Nor does mother offer any argument that things would have come out better in her overall case plan compliance had the first schedule been maintained. The court could reasonably accept Wilson's view that supervision and reduction in hours were necessary for SSA to assess her interactions with the child and to afford mother enough time to address her other case plan requirements.

II. No-Return Finding

Mother challenges the finding that return of J.G. would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being. This argument is mounted entirely on a page and a half of briefing, half of which is boilerplate. The sole point appears to be that the court could not reasonably rely on her anger as directed at service providers because there is no evidence that she directed her anger at J.G. The argument fails. Risk of harm to J.G. from mother's anger was, as far as we can discern, not even a partial basis for the finding. The argument also ignores numerous implied bases for the finding, including the masked state of her drug use and mental health history, and varied physical and emotional obstacles to mother providing a safe level of care for the toddler (and an infant half-sibling) with his special needs.

The no-return finding is supported.

D ISPOSITION

The petition is denied on the merits. (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894 [barring later challenge by appeal]; § 366.26, subd. (l)(1).) This decision is immediately final as to this court.

Lambden, J. We concur: Kline, P.J. Haerle, J.


Summaries of

T. H. v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Sep 9, 2011
A132167 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 9, 2011)
Case details for

T. H. v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty.

Case Details

Full title:T. H., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

Date published: Sep 9, 2011

Citations

A132167 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 9, 2011)