Strickler v. Greene

20 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Witness Coaching: Blurred Lines

    Carlton Fields Jorden BurtMichael S. PasanoMarch 12, 2015

    The D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, in D.C. Bar Ethics Opinion 234, stated that “a lawyer may not prepare or assist in preparing, testimony that he or she knows, or ought to know, is false or misleading. So long as this prohibition is not transgressed, a lawyer may properly suggest language, as well as the substance of testimony, and may—indeed, should—do whatever is feasible to prepare his or her witnesses for examination.”The seminal case Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) is instructive. Strickler is often cited for its discussion of a prosecutor’s duties under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its reaffirmation of “the special role played by the American Prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials:”Within the federal system…we have said that the United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.527 U.S. at 281 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)).

  2. Due Process – Exculpatory Evidence – Generally

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderFebruary 22, 2004

    The prosecutor has a duty to disclose this evidence although there has been no formal request by the accused. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999). Evidence is favorable to an accused, when, “if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal.”

  3. Capital Defense Weekly, April 24, 2000

    Capital Defense NewsletterApril 24, 2010

    (8) Had counsel sought and obtained the audiotape, he would have had all the facts needed to support High's current claims based on what he did and did not say during the filmed interview.High also seeks to rely on the prosecution's general representation, before trial, that it had complied with its obligation under Brady, arguing that that representation, combined with the inculpatory prosecution description of the tape, invited defense reliance. High further asserts that Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999) stands for the proposition that a defendant can rely upon the State's representation that it has revealed and produced all exculpatory evidence. We conclude, however, that Strickler does not control this case.

  4. Capital Defense Weekly, March 15, 2004

    Capital Defense NewsletterMarch 15, 2004

    "Such evidence is material 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " (Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 280 [144 L. Ed. 2d 286, 119 S. Ct. 1936], quoting United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682 [87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 105 S. Ct. 3375].)Petitioner argues that information regarding his behavior in prison was mitigating evidence, and thus the prosecution had a duty to disclose it at trial.

  5. Capital Defense Weekly, May 27, 2002

    Capital Defense NewsletterMay 26, 2002

    Recently, the United States [*23] Supreme Court, whose lead we followed in adopting the cause-and-prejudice test, observed:" 'Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule [of waiver], we note that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel *** would constitute cause under this standard.' " Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.24, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286, 303 n.24, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1949 n.24, quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 408, 106 S. Ct. at 2645, citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1, 15, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2910 (1984).The specific claim raised in Strickler, to which the cause-and- prejudice test was applied, was a claim that conduct by the State had impeded counsel's access to the factual basis for making a Brady claim.

  6. Capital Defense Weekly, August 28, 2006

    Capital Defense NewsletterAugust 27, 2006

    We find that Walker has satisfied this requirement.As a preliminary matter, it bears noting that in Strickler and Banks, the State confirmed the defendant's reliance during state habeas proceedings. Strickler, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286; [*18] Banks, 540 U.S. at 692-93, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1166. Walker, however, received the Brady material before his state habeas proceeding.

  7. Capital Defense Weekly, April 28, 2003

    Capital Defense NewsletterApril 28, 2003

    The panel’s “cause”determination is inconsistent with Strickler v. Greene In concluding that Mr. Banks failed to take sufficient steps to discover the Farr and Huff evidence while the case was pending before the state habeas court, the panel accepted the Director’s argument that the state had not interfered with Mr. Banks’ access to either witness and that there was an insufficient showing as to why Mr. Banks could not have spoken to Farr prior to the conclusion of these proceedings. But neither the panel nor the Director discuss the case that governs this issue, Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), nor explain why it does not require affirmance of the district court’s opinion on this point.In Strickler, a Virginia capital habeas petitioner attempted to raise a Brady claim in federal district court without having first presented either the claim or supporting evidence in state court. The claim was based upon a number of police documents Strickler obtained pursuant to discovery in the federal court that contained impeachment material concerning an important state witness.

  8. Capital Defense Weekly, July 2, 2001

    Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 2, 2001

    To meet this test, the defendant must prove: (1) the State possessed favorable evidence, including impeachment evidence; (2) the evidence was suppressed; and (3) there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the outcome would have been different. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2000). Hair EvidenceFirst, Hoffman argues that the trial court erred in denying his claim that the State violated Brady by withholding the results of an exculpatory hair analysis, an analysis which excluded Hoffman, co-defendant White and the male victim, Ihlenfeld, as the sources of the hairs found in the female victim's hands.

  9. Buffey v. Ballard: Prosecutors Must Disclose Brady Material at the Time of a Plea Bargain

    Thea JohnsonDecember 1, 2015

    prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).Favorable information is considered “material” under the due process standard where there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

  10. Brady - Perjured Testimony / Inconsistent Statement of Witness

    Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C.Don SamuelSeptember 1, 2015

    Strickler v. Greene, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999)The state presented an eyewitness that testified about a carjacking (which later led to the killing of the driver). The witness testified that she had an exceptionally good memory about the event.