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Stevens v. Omega Protein, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Jan 11, 2005
Civil Action No: 00-3326 Section "T" (2) (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2005)

Summary

pointing to no mental health issues

Summary of this case from In re Bopco, L.P.

Opinion

Civil Action No: 00-3326 Section "T" (2).

January 11, 2005


ORDER AND REASONS


The above-captioned matter was heard on February 13-14, 2003, before this Court, in Admiralty, without a jury. The Court, having considered the record, the evidence, the applicable law, and the memoranda submitted by the parties, now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To the extent that any conclusion of law is deemed to be a finding of fact, it is adopted as such; and likewise, any finding of fact that is deemed to be a conclusion of law is so adopted.

FINDINGS OF FACT

With regard to the Court's findings, if no exhibit is specifically referenced, that particular finding is based upon the testimony given by various witnesses at trial.

1. The Plaintiff, Lucky Stevens, was employed by Omega Protein, Inc., aboard the vessel F/V Amelia, on August 1, 2000, in the Gulf of Mexico.

2. The Plaintiff has worked off and on for Omega since 1978.

3. The Plaintiff was working aboard the mate's purse boat as a seine setter on August 1, 2000. During fishing operations, three vessels are utilized. A large vessel, the "steamer," and two smaller vessels, "purse boats." The two purse boats are referred to as the "captain's purse boat" and the "mate's purse boat." In the menhaden fishery operation, the company usually uses airplane guidance and the two boats encircle the fish and meet together to pull in the net.

4. As a seine setter, the Plaintiff's job is to make sure that the net turns out correctly and that everything is properly secured/tied down.

5. On August 1, 2000, the net was losing fish, and the mate suggested the crew take the net out of the block and cork it down. The corks hold the net on top of the water. The Plaintiff's job was to tie the net back. The crew took the net out of the block and corked it down.

6. The ring setter, Louis Reed, was told to pick up the block and move it out of the way. Reed operates the block by hydraulic lever.

7. The Plaintiff was not looking at the block at this time because he was bent down tying the net.

8. Calvin Mason, currently employed by Allied Towing Transportation, was employed by Omega on, and working as a mate aboard the mate's purse boat on August 1, 2002. [See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Transcript of Calvin Mason, p. 5, 14]. He described the block as a piece of galvanized steel that turns and pulls in the net. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p. 18].

9. Mason was a witness to the accident on August 1, 2000. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p. 15). Mason described how the Plaintiff had his back turned to tie the net back when Reed let the block down onto the Plaintiff's back. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p. 18].

10. According to Mr. Mason, there was nothing wrong with Mr. Stevens having his back turned to the block; instead, the fault was with the ring setter, Louis Reed.

11. Mr. Mason testified that the Plaintiff "had to turn around and tie the net back. Well, the ring setter, he should have had the block to the right side instead of bringing it straight down. He should have had the block and carried it to the right from him instead of bringing it straight down like he did." [Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p. 32, 1.17 through p. 33, 1.12].

10. The Plaintiff completed an accident report on August 1, 2000. In the accident report, the Plaintiff stated that he was still able to work. The Plaintiff did not mention any injury to his back in the report. [See Defendant's Exhibit 1, August 1, 2000, Accident Report].

11. After the accident, the Plaintiff finished that day's work and the next. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p. 24). After the next day, the boat returned to the dock, the Plaintiff went to a doctor and did not return to work after that time. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p. 22].

12. The Plaintiff was seen by Business Health Partners and was diagnosed with lumbar strain on August 2, 2000. The Plaintiff made no complaint of neck pain during the visit. [See Defendant's Exhibit 2].

13. The Plaintiff next sought treatment at Singing River Hospital on August 5, 2000. The Plaintiff's only complaints were of back pain. [See Defendant's Exhibit 3].

14. The Plaintiff came under the care of Dr. William Fleet, a board-certified neurologist, on August 17, 2000. [See Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 8]. The Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Fleet by his original attorney. He received treatment from Dr. Fleet from August 17, 2000, until November 17, 2000.

15. In his initial visit with Dr. Fleet, the Plaintiff described his pain as "constant lower back pain" and that it would "radiate into his legs equally and down to his feet." The Plaintiff also described pain that "would radiate up into his neck." [See Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 9].

16. The plaintiff had diminished range of motion, headaches, difficulty with prolonged standing, and numbness in both legs. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 8, 1.19 to p. 9, 1.12].

17. The Plaintiff made no direct complaints of neck pain or numbness in his arms and fingers.

18. Dr. Fleet prescribed Vioxx, an anti-inflammatory, and Carbatrol, an anti-convulsant used for pain. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 10].

19. Dr. Fleet ordered nerve conduction studies and an electromyelogram (NCV and EMG studies). The NCV test showed some minor abnormalities and Dr. Fleet suggested the NCV be repeated in a year or two. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 10]. The EMG showed some minor decreases in the amplitude in a couple of nerves in the legs. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 11].

20. Dr. Fleet also ordered an MRI on the Plaintiff's lumbar spine. The MRI was performed on September 7, 2000. The MRI was reported as normal.

21. Dr. Fleet did not perform an EMG on the cervical spine during the time the Plaintiff was under his care because the cervical complaints were intermittent and it appeared as if the lower back was a bigger problem. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 17].

22. Dr. Fleet next saw the Plaintiff on September 7, 2000. The Plaintiff complained of neck and back pain and was using a cane and limping. At this time, Dr. Fleet changed some of the Plaintiff's medications. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 12-13].

23. The Plaintiff continued to be treated by Dr. Fleet from September 2000 until November 2000. During this time, Dr. Fleet saw the Plaintiff on September 22, October 13, and November 17. The Plaintiff made no complaints of neck pain during these visits. [Defendant's Exhibit 4, and Defendant's Exhibit 13.]

24. In a letter dated September 8, 2000, Dr. Fleet noted that the Plaintiff was under his care for lumbar radiculitis and was unable to work. Dr. Fleet had the Plaintiff off of work throughout the time that he treated him, August through November 2000.

25. During the October 13, 2000, visit, the Plaintiff stated that he went to an emergency room and received Lortab. The Plaintiff requested that Dr. Fleet give him more Lortab. [See Defendant's Exhibit 13].

26. Over the next several visits, the plaintiff continued to complain of back pain; he said he sometimes had neck pain and had headaches occasionally. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 13, 1.7. through 16, 1.18].

27. The Plaintiff last saw Dr. Fleet on November 17, 2000.

28. By November 17, 2000, Dr. Fleet was of the opinion that Mr. Stevens had reached maximum medical improvement. There were no objective findings to substantiate the Plaintiff's complaints of pain. There were also no objective findings to prevent the Plaintiff from returning to work by November 17, 2000. [Defendant's Exhibit 13, p. 17-20]. At the time Dr. Fleet last saw the Plaintiff, Dr. Fleet believed the Plaintiff was unable to work due to his complaints of back pain. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 20].

29. The Plaintiff accrued a total charge of $1,420.00 from Dr. Fleet. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 5].

30. On November 28, 2000, the Plaintiff came under the care of Dr. Rassan Tarabein, a neurologist and pain specialist practicing in Daphne, Alabama. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, p. 1, 6]. Dr. Tarabein learned from Dr. Fleet that the Plaintiff's work-up had been inconclusive. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, p. 25].

31. On his first visit to Dr. Tarabein, the Plaintiff was placed on 40 milligrams of Oxycontin, twice a day. Although Dr. Tarabein testified that no one should be on Oxycontin for more than six months, he continued to prescribe it because the Plaintiff would become agitated when he tried to take the Plaintiff off of the Oxycontin. [Defendant's Exhibit 14, p. 40-41].

31. While Dr. Tarabein's report has a handwritten insertion indicating that Mr. Stevens had been hit by a baseball bat in August, 2000, Dr. Tarabein later noted this to be a mistake: "Actually, the nurse has mentioned the baseball bat. Mr. Stevens has actually mentioned that he was hit by a steel leverage" on August 1, 2000 — the date Mr. Stevens complains he was hit by a steel block while employed by the defendant. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, p. 14, 11. 1-6; p. 48, 11 2-17].

32. On December 5, 2000, Dr. Tarabein's testing revealed "two nerves in the neck and two nerves in the back that seemed to have some inflammation which is called radiculitis." [Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, p. 26]; the nerves were located in the lower part of the cervical spine and the lower part of the lumbar spine. [Plaintiff's exhibit 6, p. 26 II. 3018].

33. On December 18, 2000, Mr. Stevens visited Dr. Tarabein and complained that his neck hurt worse than his lower back. Dr. Tarabein performed a block on the neck at on that date. A block is the use of a 3 ½ inch needle that is inserted into the spine to inject steroid, a numbing medication and pain medication. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, p. 30, II. 5-17]. Mr. Stevens had alternating cervical and lumbar blocks every four to six weeks, the longest he may have gone without a block was about three months. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, p. 30, II. 20-23].

34. Dr. Tarabein testified that by January 26, 2001, Mr. Stevens could return to work. Mr. Stevens's restrictions were to lift no more than 30 to 40 pounds, push more than 60 to 70 pounds and do not do any repetitive lifting, stooping, bending, kneeling, or lifting. Dr. Tarabein reiterated these instructions to Mr. Stevens in June 2001 and December 2001. [Defendant's Exhibit 14, pp. 32; 35-36].

35. Mr. Stevens was also examined by Omega's independent medical examiner Dr. Gordon Nutik. [Defendant's Exhibit 15].

36. Dr. Nutik performed an independent medical examination on Lucky Stevens on April 23, 2002.

37. Mr. Stevens denied any accidents or injuries after August 1, 2000. However, Mr. Stevens did not report to Dr. Nutik the incident where he was assaulted by a baseball bat.

38. Dr. Nutik was of the opinion that Mr. Stevens suffered only from soft tissue injuries to the mid back and lower back. Dr. Nutik had great difficulty in making a direct relationship of Mr. Stevens' neck complaints to the August 1, 2000 accident. [Defendant's Exhibit 15, p. 5 (Report of Dr. Nutik)].

39. However, as Dr. Nutik's own report notes, he was unable to formulate a complete opinion until he reviewed additional medical records, and given his unfamiliarity with the case, this Court gives deference to the opinion of the treating physician.

40. In addition, the Court finds that any discussion of plaintiff's alleged use of Oxycontin by any physician irrelevant to the accident at issue or treatment of plaintiff.

41. On August 12, 2002, Mr. Stevens came under the care of Dr. Kenneth Vogel, a board-certified neurosurgeon in New Orleans, LA. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, pp. 3-4]. Dr. Vogel reviewed Mr. Steven's prior medical records and believed that Mr. Stevens had received appropriate conservative care through the time he was examined by Dr. Vogel. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 5, 11. 3-10]. Dr. Vogel does not believe it is unusual for complaint of neck pain due to disc injury to wax and wane early on; he testified that it is normal. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 5, 11. 11-18].

42. Dr. Vogel examined Mr. Stevens and revealed limitation of motion in the cervical and lumbar spine with spasm bilaterally, and a weakened grip test in the left hand. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 9 11. 8-23]. Dr. Vogel's diagnosis at that time was "that he had segmental lumbar instability, suspected, and a herniated cervical disc versus segmented cervical instability."

43. Dr. Vogel examined Mr. Steven on September 2, 2002. Mr. Stevens' complaints, exams, and diagnosis remained much the same, although plaintiff had an additional complaint related to his right hand. Dr. Vogel reviewed a cervical MRI dated 8/12/02. "That test revealed a Modic 2A herniation with spondylosis at C5-6 and C6-7." At that time, Dr. Vogel recommended that plaintiff undergo a cervical myelogram/CAT scan and a lumbar discogram with CAT scan. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 11, 1.14 through p. 14, 1.20]. The testing requested by Dr. Vogel was accomplished on January 7, 2003. According to Dr. Vogel:

The lumbar discogram revealed concordant pain reproduction at the L3-4, L4-5, and L5-s1, with fissures at each of those levels. The cervical myelogram/CAT scan revealed a small 2A herniation at C4-5, a 2A central right herniation, with spondylosis in the spinal cord discs too at C5-6, and a 2A herniation at C6, and plus bilateral sponylosis, right being greater than left. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 12, 11. 1-12].

44. Dr. Vogel offered Mr. Stevens an anterior fusion and a lumbar IDET annuloplasty, which were accomplished on January 8, 2003. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 12 11. 13-20]. Dr. Vogel testified that he IDET procedure on the lumbar spine thermally coagulates the nerve tissues, repairs the fissures and hopefully reduces any bulging in the disc. [Id. at p. 25, 11. 1-9].

45. At the time of his deposition, Dr. Vogel had seen Mr. Stevens in his office once postoperatively during which time Mr. Stevens reported mild low back pain with intermittent right leg pain, plus mild cervical and left arm pain. In addition, there was a mild spasm in the low back and bilaterally in the cervical spine.

46. In regard to the disability plaintiff suffers from, Dr. Vogel testified:

I would think that at one year he would incur a five (5) percent medical impairment of the body as a whole relative to his low back and ten (10) to fifteen (15) percent to his neck, giving him a total of fifteen (15) to twenty (20) percent permanent partial total body medical impairment. I would request that he avoid activities requiring him to lift, push, or pull greater than fifty (50) pounds on a permanent basis, avoid repeated bending at the waist and repeated hyperextension and flexion of his neck on a permanent basis.

[Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 13, 1. 25 through p. 14.1. 10].

47. Defendant's vocational rehabilitation expert, Dr. Cornelius Gorman, stated in his report that there were numerous occupations that Mr. Stevens could return to, and earn salaries ranging from $12,259.00 to $20,126.00 per year. Furthermore, Dr. Gorman stated that Mr. Stevens had the capacity to earn higher amounts if he was motivated to do so. [Defendant's Exhibit 16].

48. However, Dr. Gorman never met the plaintiff, never tested the plaintiff, and utilized assumptions which ignore plaintiff's present and future medical condition.

49. The plaintiff retained the services of G. Randolph Rice, Ph.D., an economic expert at Louisiana State University. In his report, Dr. Rice utilized two alternative bases for his income estimates. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 12].

50. First, Dr. Rice used Mr. Stevens' earnings as reflected on his W-2 form [Plaintiff's Exhibit 12] for 1999, plaintiff's last full year of employment. Those earnings totaled $21,916.21. Using this wage base, Dr. Rice calculated plaintiff's past wage loss since August 1, 2000, to be $56,944.00. Assuming total and permanent disability, Dr. Rice calculated future wage loss to be $289,244.00, for a total wage loss of $346,188.00. Even if plaintiff returns to some minimum wage employment, the losses still total $203,435.00

51. Dr. Rice also calculated wage loss using Mr. Stevens' 1999 income plus $200 per week that he would have received in unemployment benefits during the fishing off-season. Both Mr. Stevens and Mr. Mason testified that fisherman typically rely upon income from unemployment benefits because it is difficult to find seasonal, part-time work in the off-season. Using plaintiff's 1999 base wages plus unemployment compensation for 22.5 weeks, Dr. Rice calculated a real wage base of $26,416.21. Using this figure, past wage loss totals $66,477.00. Future wage loss/loss of earning capacity totals $345,530.00, for a total wage loss of $410,007.00. Assuming Mr. Stevens can return to minimum wage employment, the losses still total $267,254.00.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court has jurisdiction of this matter under its Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction and under the Jones Act, 26. U.S.C. 688.

2. Plaintiff, Lucky Stevens, is a "seaman" as defined under the Jones Act.

3. Under the Jones Act, negligence can exist when the shipowner's employee in charge of the operation fails to recognize impending danger and take corrective action. Marvin v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 554 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1977).

4. In addition, plaintiff has claims for unseaworthiness; a vessel's unseaworthiness may arise from many factors, including an unfit crew. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 91 S.Ct. 514, L.Ed. 2d 562 (1971); Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1989).

5. The law imposes a duty upon the vessel owner to provide a seaworthy vessel and that duty is absolute; vessel owners are liable for injuries resulting from failure to provide a seaworthy vessel, regardless of the nature of the condition or its cause. Holdan v. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980). The vessel owner's duty to prevent unseaworthy conditions is absolute, continuing, and nondelegable and lack of knowledge or of opportunity to correct such conditions does not mitigate the owner's duty. Allen v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 623 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1980).

6. A vessel, together with her gear and other appurtenances, must be reasonably fit for her intended use, and the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is a type of liability without fault, to be considered separately from its duty under the Jones Act to use reasonable care. Liner v. J.B. Talley Co., Inc., 618 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1980).

7. A vessel is unseaworthy when its crew is inadequate or incompetent. Kratzer v. Capital Marine Supply, Inc., 490 F.Supp. 22 (M.D. La. 1980). Employment of unsafe methods of work may also render a vessel unseaworthy. Burns v. Anchor-Wate Co., 469 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1972).

8. From the evidence presented, this Court finds that the defendant, Omega, was negligent through the actions of its employees, and that the vessel was unseaworthy. The actions of Lewis Reed, the ringsetter, in failing to wait for the plaintiff to turn around and signal to him to move his block is negligence. In attempting to move the block out of the way as opposed to down, Mr. Reed's actions in using the wrong lever are also negligent.

9. The remainder of the crew, including the supervisory personnel, is negligent for failing to warn Mr. Stevens of the impending danger. Mr. Reed's negligent operation of the block controls also demonstrate that the crew on the mate's boat was incompetent, and an incompetent crew renders the vessel unseaworthy.

10. In addition, this Court finds no comparative fault on the part of the plaintiff.

11. Mr. Mason, the mate and plaintiff's supervisor, testified that there was nothing wrong with the plaintiff having his back turned to the block. Instead, the fault was with the ring setter, Lewis Reed.

12. Under the general maritime law and the Jones Act, injured seaman are entitled to recover compensation for loss of future earning capacity, lost wages, medical expenses, and physical and mental pain and suffering resulting from injury caused by negligence. Allen v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 623 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1980); Wilson v. Western Oceanic, Inc., 540 F.Supp. 228 (S.D. Tex. 1982).

13. Awards are authorized not only for physical pain and suffering, but may include damages for the impact of the injuries on one's normal life routines. Crador v. Louisiana Dept. of Highways, 624 F.2d 1227, rehearing denied, 632 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915, 101 S.Ct. 3048, 69 L.Ed. 417.

14. The purpose of compensatory damages in a tort case is to place the injured party in the condition he would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. S/S Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1976).

15. The medical evidence in this case indicates that plaintiff is disabled, will have restrictions, and remains in need of medical care. He has demonstrated to this Court by a preponderance of the evidence that he was injured due to the negligence of the defendants and the unseaworthiness of this vessel.

16. While the defendant alleges the plaintiff had a pre-existing condition, this Court finds that under the Jones Act and the general maritime law, when the defendants' act aggravates or accelerates a preexiting condition and renders a plaintiff unable to continue his work or awakens a dormant condition that causes a plaintiff to experience pain when he did not suffer from pain or disability prior to the aggravation, defendant can be liable in full for the disability and pain caused. Milstead v. Diamond M Offshore, Inc., 663 So.2d 137 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 9/6/95), affirmed in part and reversed on other grounds, 676 So.2d 89 (La. 7/2/96); citing Milos v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 478 F.Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affirmed, 622 F.2d 574 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954, 101 S.Ct. 360, 66 L.Ed.2d 219 (1980).

17. A seaman's right to maintenance and cure is his form of "worker's compensation" benefits. "Maintenance" is the right of a seaman to food and lodging should be become ill or injured while in the service of the ship; "cure" is the right of a seaman to necessary medical expenses. Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1046, 116 S.Ct. 706, 133 L.Ed.2d 662 (1996). Payments may not be terminated unless the injured seaman has reached maximum medical cure. Johnson v. Marlin Drilling Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1990).

18. In Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 318 U.S. 724, 63 S.Ct. 930, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943), the United States Supreme Court recognized that "among the most persuasive incidents of the responsibility anciently imposed upon a shipowner for the health and security of sailors was liability for the maintenance and cure of seamen becoming ill or injured during the period of their service." Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 730, 63 S.Ct. at 933. In cases that involve disputed evidence, Aguilar held that the call goes to the seaman:

Certainly the nature and foundations of the liability require that it be not narrowly confined or whittled down by restrictive and artificial distinctions defeating its broad and beneficial purposes. If leeway is to be given in either direction, all the considerations which brought the liability into being dictate it should be in the sailor's behalf.
Id., 318 U.S. at 735, S.Ct. At 936.

19. A seaman is entitled to the reasonable cost of food and lodging, provided he has incurred the expense. Hall v. Noble Drilling (U.S.), Inc., 242 F.3d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff in this matter has shown no evidence of his expenses, therefore, this Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to $15.00 per day from the date of the accident. Plaintiff is also entitled to payment of all medical expenses as cure.

20. The plaintiff has requested an award of additional damages for the pain and suffering he has endured as a result of his employer's failure to authorize surgery. Alleging the employer's failure to pay is without good cause, the plaintiff claims he is entitled to attorney's fees.

21. However, the Court finds that, in this matter, the employer's denial of maintenance and cure benefits was not egregious, as the defendant had legitimate reasons for withholding surgery. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees.

22. Based upon the evidence and the law cited above, the Court orders that the plaintiff be awarded $175,000.00 in past and future pain and suffering, $66,477.00 in past wage loss, $267,254.00 in future wage loss/loss of earning, $18,720.00 in unpaid maintenance, and $102,205.64 in total unpaid cure.

23. With regards to interest, the Court exercises its discretion to not award prejudgment interest and to award interest from the date of this judgment. The Court exercises its discretion to not award interest in light of the Court's decision to reverse its earlier dismissal of plaintiff's case, as defendant would be prejudiced by the award of interest under the facts of this case. Reeled Tubing, Inc. V. M/V CHAD G, 794 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1986). Interest from the date of this judgment is granted.

24. Accordingly, defendant is ordered to pay damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $629,656.64, together with interest from the date of judgment forward.


Summaries of

Stevens v. Omega Protein, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Jan 11, 2005
Civil Action No: 00-3326 Section "T" (2) (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2005)

pointing to no mental health issues

Summary of this case from In re Bopco, L.P.
Case details for

Stevens v. Omega Protein, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:LUCKY STEVENS v. OMEGA PROTEIN, INC

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Jan 11, 2005

Citations

Civil Action No: 00-3326 Section "T" (2) (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2005)

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