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State v. Pike

Supreme Court of Minnesota
Jul 3, 1996
551 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. 1996)

Summary

holding that an actual traffic violation is not necessary to justify a stop

Summary of this case from Cameron v. Comm'r Safety

Opinion

No. C5-95-1892.

July 3, 1996.

Appeal from the District Court, Freeborn County, Thomas R. Butler, Jr., J.

David J. Walker, Asst. County Attorney, Albert Lea, for Appellant.

Mark D. Nyvold, St. Paul, for Respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.


OPINION


This is an appeal from a court of appeals' decision which affirmed a pretrial suppression order in a criminal case involving two gross misdemeanor charges of driving under the influence, and one misdemeanor charge of driving after revocation. After a pickup truck passed a Minnesota State Trooper as the trooper was entering Interstate 35W from the shoulder, the trooper stopped the truck because the owner had a revoked driver's license. The district court and court of appeals found that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We reverse.

On December 21, 1994, at approximately 11:17 p.m., Trooper Matthew Donald Nelson of the Minnesota State Patrol was on routine patrol on Interstate 35, southbound. He was moving back onto the traveled portion of the roadway from the shoulder with his overhead rear-facing lights activated when he saw respondent John Keith Pike's vehicle drive by.

Trooper Nelson entered the right lane and turned off his emergency lights. He began to accelerate and noticed that he quickly approached Pike's vehicle which was driving slowly. Trooper Nelson testified that when Pike's vehicle passed him, it was traveling between 45 and 50 mph. However, Pike testified that when he passed the trooper, he slowed only to 50 mph.

Trooper Nelson testified that, after entering the interstate, he kept his rate of speed slow but the more he slowed, the more Pike's vehicle slowed. The trooper stated that "it was like [Pike] wanted me to go by him and get out of this." He also testified at trial that at this point, the two vehicles had slowed to "a pretty slow rate * * * 35 miles an hour." In his police report, however, he did not mention that Pike's vehicle was ever traveling this slowly. Further, Pike testified that he tried to keep an "even speed" and, after initially passing the trooper, was traveling at 55 mph.

Trooper Nelson testified that because of the vehicle's slow travel, he became suspicious and ran a computer check on the vehicle's license plate and discovered that the registered owner was John Keith Pike, a male with a date of birth of May 29, 1963. Trooper Nelson also testified that he saw a "lone male occupant in the vehicle that [he] believed to be in that right age category," by which he meant "about the age that the registered owner was." However, Pike testified that his truck was elevated on oversized tires and the headrest on the back of the seat covered the back of his head. Trooper Nelson ran a driver's license check on Pike and determined that his Minnesota driver's license had been revoked.

The trooper testified that based on the slow driving and the fact that the registered owner's license was revoked, he stopped the truck to investigate. Trooper Nelson also testified that he believed the registered owner was driving the vehicle because as a result of the driver's license check, he knew the registered owner to be a male in his early 30's and he recalled thinking that the driver was a younger male. Upon pulling the vehicle over, Nelson discovered that the driver was indeed the registered owner whose license had been revoked. Pike was later charged with two counts of driving under the influence in violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 169.129, 169.121, subds. 1(a) 3(c) (1994), and one count of driving after revocation in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2. (1994).

The district court found that Trooper Nelson's stop "was the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity." Thus, it suppressed evidence obtained as a result of the stop. It found, therefore, no probable cause for the charges and dismissed the case.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court. State v. Pike, 543 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.App. 1996). It found that the district court rejected Trooper Nelson's testimony that he became suspicious when the vehicle slowed considerably. Id. at 98. Thus, the court of appeals determined that the only basis for the stop was the fact that the registered owner of the vehicle had a revoked license. Id. It then found that the trooper failed to "articulate a reasonable basis" for the stop. Id. The state appeals this decision.

In an appeal of a pretrial ruling suppressing evidence, this court will only reverse the district court if the state demonstrates "clearly and unequivocally that the trial court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial." State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992) (quoting State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn. 1977)). The parties do not dispute that suppression of the evidence obtained by Trooper Nelson as a result of his stop will have a "critical impact on the outcome of the trial." Thus, the only issue before us is whether the district court was "clearly and unequivocally" erroneous in suppressing this evidence.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I of the Minnesota Constitution, proscribe unreasonable searches and seizures by the government of "persons, houses, papers and effects." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Subject to only a few exceptions, searches conducted outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). A limited investigative stop is lawful if the state can show the officer to have had a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). A brief investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). An actual violation of the vehicle and traffic laws need not be detectable. The police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

In his testimony, Trooper Nelson articulated three grounds warranting the stop of Pike's truck: the truck was traveling unusually slow and was being driven as though the driver wanted the trooper "out of there"; the license of the registered owner was revoked; and the driver of the truck appeared to be of the same age and sex as the registered owner. Of these three grounds, the parties do not dispute that the trooper knew the truck owner's license was revoked.

With respect to the other two grounds, though, the court of appeals held that the district court "discredited or rejected" both "Nelson's testimony that he believed the driver was a younger male," and testimony that he "became suspicious when the vehicle slowed considerably." Pike, 543 N.W.2d at 98. Pike argues that the court of appeals' interpretation of the district court's findings is correct. The state argues, on the other hand, that "the [district] court credited Trooper Nelson's testimony but simply concluded that he nevertheless acted whimsically when he stopped the defendant's vehicle."

The court of appeals stated that the district court rejected this testimony "based on Nelson's admission that he was unable to observe much about the driver because it was dark and because he only saw the driver from behind." Pike, 543 N.W.2d at 98.

The court of appeals found that the district court rejected Nelson's testimony on this point because Nelson admitted that "he never observed any unusual driving conduct." Pike, 543 N.W.2d at 98.

Fortunately, we do not need to reach the issue of whether the district court credited Trooper Nelson's testimony on the above two articulated grounds for the stop. Rather, we find that this case can be decided based on Trooper Nelson's undisputed testimony, namely, that he was aware that the owner of the vehicle in question had a revoked license.

In State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 1981), an officer stopped a truck based on the knowledge that a month prior to the stop, the owner of the truck had a suspended license. Id. at 867. This court found the stop to be constitutional.

When an officer observes a vehicle being driven, it is rational for him or her to infer that the owner of the vehicle is the current operator. Indeed, in Duesterhoeft, though it was not evident from the facts that the officer had any reason to believe that the owner was driving the vehicle, this court stated that "the officer * * * reasonably suspected that defendant was the person driving the truck." Id. at 869. Thus, we hold that the knowledge that the owner of a vehicle has a revoked license is enough to form the basis of a "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" when an officer observes the vehicle being driven.

This holding, of course, applies only while the officer remains unaware of any facts which would render unreasonable the assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle. Thus, for example, if the officer knows that the owner of a vehicle has a revoked license and further, that the owner is a 22-year-old male, and the officer observes that the person driving the vehicle is a 50- or 60-year-old woman, any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity evaporates. Absent other articulable facts which would give rise to such suspicion, it would be unconstitutional for the officer to make a stop in such a situation. We hold that it is not unconstitutional for an officer to make a brief, investigatory, Terry-type stop of a vehicle if the officer knows that the owner of the vehicle has a revoked license so long as the officer remains unaware of any facts which would render unreasonable an assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle.

In the current situation, it is undisputed that Trooper Nelson knew that the owner of the vehicle he observed being driven on I-35W had a revoked license. Further, the trooper had no reason to believe that the vehicle's owner, Pike, was not driving the vehicle. Thus, we hold that Trooper Nelson's stop of Pike's truck was not unconstitutional and that evidence obtained as a result of the stop should not be suppressed.

Reversed and remanded.


Summaries of

State v. Pike

Supreme Court of Minnesota
Jul 3, 1996
551 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. 1996)

holding that an actual traffic violation is not necessary to justify a stop

Summary of this case from Cameron v. Comm'r Safety

holding that suspicion is reasonable if stop is not result of whim, caprice, or idle curiosity

Summary of this case from State v. Poinsett

holding that "knowledge that the owner of a vehicle has a revoked license is enough to form the basis of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when an officer observes the vehicle being driven"

Summary of this case from State v. Reynoso

holding that "[w]hen an officer observes a vehicle being driven, it is rational for him or her to infer that the owner of the vehicle is the current operator"

Summary of this case from State v. Johnson

holding police officer's suspicion that a person is committing the misdemeanor offense of driving with a revoked license "is enough to form the basis of a `reasonable suspicion of criminal activity'"

Summary of this case from Rodell v. Commr. of Public Safety

finding officer's stop of vehicle thought to be driven by owner with revoked license was not unconstitutional because officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

Summary of this case from State v. Larsen

concluding that "[w]hen an officer observes a vehicle being driven, it is rational for him or her to infer that the owner of the vehicle is the current operator"

Summary of this case from State v. Seward

concluding that "[w]hen an officer observes a vehicle being driven, it is rational for him or her to infer that the owner of the vehicle is the current operator"

Summary of this case from State v. Candelaria

determining that regardless of whether or not trooper could actually ascertain a driver's gender before stopping him, stop was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment because "it is rational" for an officer to "infer that the owner of the vehicle is the current operator"

Summary of this case from United States v. Wissiup

upholding stop where police officer observed a vehicle whose registered owner's driving privileges were revoked

Summary of this case from State v. Thoensen

upholding as constitutional the stop of a suspect's vehicle based on a routine computer check of the suspect's license plates

Summary of this case from State v. Jackman

upholding stop when officer knew driver's license was revoked

Summary of this case from State v. Mattson

recognizing that where officer has reason to believe owner is not driving, rule does not apply

Summary of this case from State v. Richter

recognizing brief investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and not probable cause

Summary of this case from State v. Salas

noting that reasonable suspicion "evaporates" if officers become aware "of any facts which would render unreasonable" the assumption underlying their suspicion

Summary of this case from State v. Flowers

stating that a brief investigative seizure of any person is permissible upon a showing of reasonable suspicion

Summary of this case from State v. Kujava

noting that an investigative stop of a vehicle is lawful if the state can show that the officer had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting criminal activity

Summary of this case from State v. Larson

In State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919 (Minn.1996), the court held that it was reasonable for the officer to presume that the driver of a car was its owner, thus justifying the officer's detention of the driver based upon the owner's revoked license.

Summary of this case from State v. Bly

stating that an investigative stop is lawful if the state can show that the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity

Summary of this case from Thompson v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety

noting that an investigative stop of a vehicle is lawful if the state can show that the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity

Summary of this case from Peterson v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety

stating that "knowledge that the owner of a vehicle has a revoked license is enough to form the basis of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when an officer observes the vehicle being driven," and stating, "[t]his holding, of course, applies only while the officer remains unaware of any facts which would render unreasonable the assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle"

Summary of this case from State v. Stanina

noting that an investigative stop of a vehicle is lawful if the state can show that the officer had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting criminal activity

Summary of this case from State v. Hughes

noting that an investigative stop of a vehicle is lawful if the state can show that the officer had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting criminal activity

Summary of this case from State v. Bergland

noting that an investigative stop of a car is lawful if the officer had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting criminal activity

Summary of this case from Eck v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety

noting that an investigative stop of a vehicle is lawful if the state can show that the officer had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting criminal activity

Summary of this case from State v. Nelson
Case details for

State v. Pike

Case Details

Full title:STATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. John Keith PIKE, Respondent

Court:Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date published: Jul 3, 1996

Citations

551 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. 1996)

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