Not overruled or negatively treated on appealinfoCoverage
Court of Appeals of IowaApr 28, 2005
698 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)

No. 5-317 / 04-0695

Filed April 28, 2005

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, Douglas S. Russell, Judge.

Troy A. Peska appeals from the district court's restitution order. AFFIRMED.

Dennis R. Mathahs, Marengo, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis McMeen, County Attorney, and Tim D. McMeen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.

Troy A. Peska appeals from the district court's restitution order entered following his guilty to plea first-degree criminal mischief in violation of Iowa Code sections 716.1 and 716.3 (2003) and reckless use of fire in violation of Iowa Code section 712.5. We affirm.

I. Background Facts Proceedings.

The factual and procedural background of this case generally follows the companion case of State v. Stull, No. 04-0696 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2005), available at 2005 WL 724160. On July 3, 2005, the State charged Peska, along with three other individuals, with second-degree arson in violation of Iowa Code sections 712.1 and 712.3 (Count I) and third-degree burglary in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.6A (Count II). The trial information alleged that Peska and his three codefendants unlawfully entered and set fire to an old school building located in Ladora, Iowa, on June 13, 2003.

At the time of the fire, Frederic Kinzenbaw owned the property.

On August 21, 2003, the State amended the trial information to include the charges of first-degree criminal mischief (Count III) and reckless use of fire (Count IV). On August 22, 2003, Peska pled guilty to Counts III and IV. In exchange for his plea, the State dismissed the remaining charges. At sentencing, the district court entered a deferred judgment on Count III and placed Peska on probation for three years. With respect to Count IV, Peska received a thirty-day suspended jail sentence. Additionally, Peska was ordered to pay victim restitution in an amount agreed to by the parties or determined following a hearing. Peska applied for a restitution hearing on April 2, 2003, alleging that the owner of the property would not agree to a reasonable amount of restitution. Following a hearing, the court determined the building had a fair market value of $100,000 prior to the fire. Accordingly, the district court ordered Peska and his codefendants to pay restitution to Kinzenbaw in that amount. It is from this order that Peska appeals.

This valuation was based on Kinzenbaw's testimony during the hearing.

II. Standard of Review.

Our review of a restitution order is for correction of errors at law. State v. Paxton, 674 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Iowa 2004). When reviewing a restitution order, we are bound by the district court's findings of fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Bonsetter, 673 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 2001).

III. Restitution Order.

On appeal, Peska asserts the district court erred in computing the fair market value of the building prior to the fire. He contends the fair market value of Kinzenbaw's property is the tax-assessed valuation of $4740 and that the restitution order should reflect that valuation accordingly. The issue raised by Peska in this appeal is substantially the same argument advanced by the defendant in State v. Stull, No. 04-0696 (Iowa Ct.App. Mar. 31, 2005), available at 2005 WL 724160. We deem it unnecessary to further review the facts of this matter or discuss the law in relation thereto. We adopt, in full, the analysis set forth therein and conclude the restitution award is within a reasonable range of the evidence presented during the hearing. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is affirmed.