State v. Nelson

5 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. GHOBRIAL

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed May 26, 2011

    Still another judge, Justice Zazzali of the New Jersey Supreme Court in his concurring opinion in State v. Nelson, (N.J. 2002) 803 A.2d 1, relied heavily on Atkins when he contendedthat the defendant’s “irrationalities” lessened her culpability. Justice Zazzali reasoned, if the culpability of the average murdereris insufficient to invoke the death penalty as our most extreme sanction, then the lesser culpability of [defendant] Nelson, given her history of mental illness and its connection to her crimes, “surely does not merit that form ofretribution.” (803 A.2d at p. 47 (dis. opn. of Zazzali, J.), quoting Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 433.) In her concurring opinion.

  2. PEOPLE v. BOYCE

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed May 17, 2010

    The question under the Eighth Amendmentclaim raised herein is whether, apart from the brutality of the crime, appellant’s culpability for the capital offense is sufficiently reduced due to the fact that he is brain-damaged, significantly impaired intellectually, and severely mental ill. (See State v. Nelson, supra, 803 A.2d at pp. 41, 49 (conc. opn. of Zazzali, J.) [“in some instances a defendant’s diminished cognitive or reasoning capacities may bar the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors because the defendant’s diminished culpability, by itself, removes execution as a possible punishment’].) As in Atkins and Roper, appellant’s culpability for the capital offense is so limited by his brain damage, significantly impaired intellectual functioning,and severe mental illness, that the death sentence is disproportionate and excessive, and makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of capital punishment.

  3. PEOPLE v. GHOBRIAL

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed February 25, 2014

    In addition to the European Union’s oppositionto inflicting the death penalty on any person with a serious mentalillness cited in the opening brief (AOB 85-86), the United Nations Human Rights Committee has held that the execution of a mentally disturbed but not “insane” individual amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatmentin violation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a treaty ratified by 149 countries, including the United States. (See Francis v. Jamaica, Communication No. 606/1994 U.N.H.C.R. (12 August 1994) available at (as "Justice Todd also expressed support for the opinions against executing the severely mentally ill of Justice Evelyn Lundberg-Stratton of the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Ketterer (Ohio 2006) 855 N.E.2d 48, cited in the opening brief (AOB 83-84, 86), along with the concurring opinion of Justice Zazzali in State v. Nelson (N.J. 2002) 803 A.2d 1, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Rucker in Corcoran v. State (Ind. 2002) 774 N.E.2d 495, both also cited in the opening brief (AOB 82-83). 27 of February 11, 2014).)

  4. PEOPLE v. BOYCE

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed December 31, 2012

    [Atkins and Roper| imply that in some instances a defendant’s diminished cognitive or reasoning capacities may bar the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors becausethe defendant’s diminished culpability, by itself, removes execution as a possible punishment. ... Aggravating factors, while increasing our outrageascitizens in response to a crime,are irrelevant for capital sentencing purposesif the culpability of a defendant,at the time of his or her crimes,is sufficiently diminished... [I]f the culpability of the average murdereris insufficient to invoke the death penalty as our most extremesanction, then thelesser culpability of [the defendant}, given her history of mentalillness and its connection to her crimes, surely does not merit that form of retribution. (State v. Nelson (N.J. 2002) 803 A.2d 1, 49 (conc. opn. of Zazzali, J.).) I too question whether[deterrence or retribution] applies to severely mentallyill offenders... .There seems to belittle distinction between executing offenders with mental retardation and offenders with severe mentalillness, as they share many of the same characteristics.

  5. PEOPLE v. MENDOZA (HUBER JOEL)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed November 28, 2011

    Other courts around the country have recognizedthe substantial overlap between mental retardation and other mental impairments with parallel implications. (Bryan v. Mullin qo" Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 1207, 1237, Henry, J. concurring and dissenting [logic of Atkins is just as applicable to other severe mental deficiencies]; State v. Nelson (N.J. 2002) 803 A.2d 1, Zazzali, J. concurring [history of defendant’s mental iliness and the nexus betweenthat illness and the crime committed should makeher level of culpability insufficient to impose the death penalty for the samereasonsas in Atkins]; People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 322, Moreno, J. concurring and dissenting [the diminished capacities ofthe mentally ill are so similar to those with mental retardation, as recognized in Atkins, that they should weigh against the imposition of the death penalty]; Corcoran v. State (Ind. 2002) 774 N.E.2d 495, 502-503, Rucker, J. dissenting [citing Atkins and the evolving standards of decency rationale as a rationale for a categorical prohibition ofthe use ofthe death penalty for the significantly mentally ill].) Underthe rationale ofAtkins and Simmons, a death sentence imposed on a severely mentally ill offender such as appellant is disproportionate to his moral culpability and lacks moral justification under a policy of deterrence or retribution.