Statev.Maguire

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWOJun 10, 2019
No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0295 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jun. 10, 2019)

No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0295

06-10-2019

THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. KIMBERLY ERIN MAGUIRE, Appellant.

COUNSEL Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Appellant


THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See
Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).

Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County
No. S0200CR201800076
The Honorable James L. Conlogue, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Emily Danies, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Espinosa concurred.

EPPICH, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Following a jury trial, appellant Kimberly Maguire was convicted of forgery and attempted fraudulent scheme and artifice. The trial court sentenced her to a ten-year prison term on each count. Counsel has filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530 (App. 1999), stating she has reviewed the record and has found no "arguable question of law" to raise on appeal. Counsel has asked us to search the record for fundamental error.

¶2 Maguire has filed a pro se supplemental petition in which she argues that she should have been allowed a new attorney and that counsel was ineffective in various ways. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be raised on appeal; therefore we do not consider them. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, ¶ 9 (2002).

¶3 Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, see State v. Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 2 (App. 2013), the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt, see State v. Denson, 241 Ariz. 6, ¶ 17 (App. 2016); see also A.R.S. §§ 13-1001, 13-2002(A)(3), 13-2310. The evidence presented at trial showed Maguire, who had several prior felony convictions, gave the Douglas water department two vouchers from a church in a nearby town in order to restore her water service, but the church had not issued the vouchers. Maguire had made them from material she found on the internet. We further conclude the sentence imposed is within the statutory limit. See A.R.S. §§ 13-703(C), (J), 13-1001, 13-2002(C), 13-2310(A).

¶4 Pursuant to our obligation under Anders, we have searched the record and considered Maguire's pro se claim as to her requests for a change of counsel, for fundamental, reversible error and have found none. Therefore, Maguire's convictions and sentences are affirmed.