State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.v.Smith

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUITMay 13, 2014
No. 12-35676 (9th Cir. May. 13, 2014)

No. 12-35676 D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00079-RRB

05-13-2014

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. STUART HOUSEL SMITH, Defendant - Appellant, and JUSTIN BISCHOF, Defendant.


NOT FOR PUBLICATION


MEMORANDUM

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.


Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Ralph R. Beistline, Chief Judge, Presiding

Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Stuart Housel Smith appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment against him in plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's diversity action seeking a declaratory judgment in connection with an insurance dispute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because under the plain language of the homeowners policy, the punching incident was not a covered "occurrence," and Smith's injuries were "expected or intended" by Bischof. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 942 N.E.2d 1090, 1097-98 (Ohio 2010) (in the insurance context, doctrine of inferred intent applies where an "intentional act and the harm are intrinsically tied so that the act necessarily resulted in the harm"); Erie Ins. Co. v. Stalder, 682 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (no covered "occurrence" where insured had acted in self-defense and intentionally punched a third party in the face); see also Randolf v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 385 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (Ohio 1979) ("[T]he word 'occurrence,' defined as 'an accident,' was intended to mean just that [-] an unexpected, unforeseeable event.").

We reject as unsupported Smith's contention that the district court mistakenly applied Ohio law and an objective intent standard.

AFFIRMED.