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Stanger v. Her-Fic, S.A.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut
Jul 2, 2002
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-00-CV-1986 (JCH) (D. Conn. Jul. 2, 2002)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-00-CV-1986 (JCH)

July 2, 2002


RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 111]


In this case, the plaintiff, Alfred Stanger ("Stanger"), claims a prior suit by the defendants constituted vexatious litigation. On May 22, 2002, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff requests that the court reconsider its May 22 Ruling. The plaintiff argues that the defendants did not present aprima facie showing that the defendants had probable cause to believe that piercing the corporate veil would involve minimal fact-finding.

The Second Circuit has stated that reconsideration is appropriate only under certain conditions: an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. United States v. Sanchez, 35 F.3d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1994). "The standard for granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A motion to reconsider "should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Id.

The plaintiff has not argued that intervening law or new evidence require reconsideration. The court construes the plaintiff's request as claiming that the court committed clear error when it concluded that the plaintiff did not raise a material issue regarding probable cause with regard to whether piercing the corporate veil would require minimal fact-finding. The plaintiff argues that he only has the burden to oppose properly supported motions for summary judgment and that the defendants did not present evidence to make a prima facie showing that the defendants had probable cause to believe that piercing the corporate veil in this case would require only minimal fact-finding.

The plaintiff has cited case law that prohibits courts from routinely granting unopposed motions for summary judgment. See Lopez v. Corp. Azucarera De Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (1st Cir. 1991);accord Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 680-81 (2d Cir. 2001). The court considers this precedent inapposite because the plaintiff in this case filed an opposition, but chose not to dispute the issues he now seeks to raise.

In the motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that the undisputed facts supported a finding that the defendants had probable cause to believe the underlying action would not require extensive fact-finding. Memo. of Law in Support of Mot. for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 91], at 23-24 (citing Defs. Rule 9(c)(1) Stmt. [Dkt. No. 92], ¶¶ 40-51). As noted in the court's Ruling, the plaintiff did not raise an issue about the defendants' belief with regard to the need for fact-finding. Ruling on Defs. Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 110], at 5 n. 1 (citing Pl. Memo. in Opp. [Dkt. No. 103], at 6 ("Whatever Her-Fic may or may not have believed . . ., Her-Fic could not have had probable cause to bring a piercing complaint against Stanger combined with its petition to confirm its arbital award against Turbo-Tech.")). Implicit in the court's footnote to the prior Ruling, the court considered the facts presented by the defendants sufficient, on their face, to support a finding of probable cause on the issue. Therefore, the plaintiff only seeks to relitigate an issue already decided because he failed to dispute the issue when he had the opportunity.

In preparing a response to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff requested that the court waive the Local Rules, which require a detailed response to the moving party's statement of undisputed facts. Motion for Leave to File Abbreviated 9(c)(2) Statement [Dkt. No. 99];see D. Conn. Loc. R. Civ. P. 9(c). In that motion, the plaintiff sought to avoid any dispute about whether the defendants had probable cause to believe in certain facts. Motion for Leave, ¶ 6, at 2. The court denied that motion, but the plaintiff sought reconsideration, arguing that his proposed approach would be "beneficial to all." Motion for Reconsideration [Dkt. No. 101], ¶ 4, at 2. The court granted reconsideration and allowed the plaintiff to file an abbreviated Local Rule 9(c)(2) Statement. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the May 22 Ruling on summary judgment, in essence, rejects the court's Ruling because the plaintiff apparently did not appreciate the consequences of his stipulation of facts and insistence that the court waive the Local Rules.

For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Further, in light of this Ruling and the court's May 22, 2002 Ruling, the court considers the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike [Dkt. No. 114] moot.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Stanger v. Her-Fic, S.A.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut
Jul 2, 2002
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-00-CV-1986 (JCH) (D. Conn. Jul. 2, 2002)
Case details for

Stanger v. Her-Fic, S.A.

Case Details

Full title:ALFRED T. STANGER, Plaintiff v. HER-FIC, S.A., et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, D. Connecticut

Date published: Jul 2, 2002

Citations

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-00-CV-1986 (JCH) (D. Conn. Jul. 2, 2002)