Submitted May 7, 1996 —
Decided June 26, 1996.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 15657.
In 1984, appellant, David M. Jones, pled guilty to two counts of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of seven-to-twenty-five years and eight-to-twenty-five years. The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County subsequently reversed one of the sentences and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. State v. Jones (Dec. 18, 1985), Montgomery App. No. 9326, unreported, 1985 WL 4776. On remand, Jones was resentenced to concurrent terms of seven to twenty-five years. The trial court later overruled Jones's postconviction-relief motion to set aside his sentence, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. State v. Jones (Aug. 4, 1987), Montgomery App. No. 10204, unreported, 1987 WL 15246.
In September 1995, Jones filed a motion to correct his sentence. The trial court overruled the motion. Jones appealed the trial court's judgment and requested transcripts of the hearings concerning his 1984 plea and 1985 resentencing to be included in the record on appeal. In December 1995, after no transcripts had been filed with the court of appeals, Jones filed an action in mandamus in the court of appeals to compel appellee, Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and its court reporter to grant his request for transcripts.
The court of appeals denied the writ because Jones possessed an adequate remedy at law. The court of appeals determined that in Jones's appeal to that court from the trial court's judgment overruling his motion for correction of his sentence, Jones had filed a motion in the court of appeals requesting a copy of the same transcripts he sought in his mandamus action.
David M. Jones, pro se. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard W. Divine, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed for the reasons stated in its opinion. Jones possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to obtain the requested transcripts, i.e., his motion in the court of appeals in his pending appeal. See, generally, State ex rel. Howard v. Ferreri (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 587, 592, 639 N.E.2d 1189, 1194-1195.
Jones's contention that his mandamus action took precedence over his subsequently filed motion for transcripts is meritless. See State ex rel. Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 557, 653 N.E.2d 366, 370, quoting Oregon v. Dansack (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 623 N.E.2d 20, 22 ("[I]n mandamus actions, `a court is not limited to considering facts and circumstances at the time a proceeding is instituted, but should consider the facts and conditions at the time it determines to issue a peremptory writ.'"). In addition, the mere fact that the court of appeals subsequently overruled Jones's motion for transcripts did not render that remedy inadequate. See State ex rel. Nichols v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation Dev. Disabilities (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 205, 209, 648 N.E.2d 823, 827.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and STRATTON, JJ., concur.