March 16, 1971.
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Mattson & Mattson, Fred W. Mattson, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
William E. Kenworthy, Denver, for defendants in error.
This case was originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado and was subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals under the authority vested in the Supreme Court.
Plaintiff in error was defendant in the trial court, and the defendants in error were plaintiffs. We shall refer to the parties by their trial court designations. Shortly after the plaintiffs purchased a house from the defendant, the walls of the house began to shift and crack. Thereafter, plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant to recover damages upon a theory of implied warranty. Following a trial to a jury, a verdict was entered in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant has appealed.
The defendant first asserts that the trial court erred in allowing one Warner to testify as to the probable costs of repair to the house.
Warner testified that he had 27 years' experience in the construction business as a carpenter and maintenance supervisor and had personally supervised the repair of many houses. While it is true that Warner was not a licensed contractor and was not qualified as a builder or estimator, it is our opinion that the trial court correctly ruled that his extensive experience in the construction filed provided an adequate basis upon which to allow him to give an opinion as to the probable repair costs of the plaintiffs' house. Considering the witness' background of experience, we cannot rule, as a matter of law, that the trial court abused its discretion in this determination. The sufficiency of evidence to establish qualifications of a witness is generally a question for the trial court, and its decision is not subject to reversal unless clearly erroneous. Baldwin v. Schipper, 155 Colo. 197, 393 P.2d 363; Bridges v. Lintz, 140 Colo. 582, 346 P.2d 571; City and County of Denver v. Lyttle, 106 Colo. 157, 103 P.2d 1.
Defendant's other charge of error relates to the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence proof of two deeds of trust securing loans held by the defendant. We agree with the trial court's determination that these documents related only to a collateral fact and bore no relevancy to the issues of the case. Their admission was properly denied. See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Harryman, 41 Colo. 415, 92 P. 922.
Judgment is affirmed.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and ENOCH, J., concur.