Filed November 2, 2015
Here, the statements refer to a conversation CW-1 and the CEO had with Senator Skelos in the past, and as such, is testimony that “face[s] backward and not forward” and is not covered by Rule 803(3). Shephard, 290 U.S. at 98. Similarly, in United States v. Biaggi, the statement that the witness “testified that he promised [co-conspirator] $50,000 and that he told [another co-conspirator] about the promise” which was allowed into evidence only to show the witnesses’ “intent to pay the $50,000.”
Filed October 31, 2007
They have their source very often in considerations of administrative convenience, of practical expediency, and not in rules of logic. When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out. (Shepard v. US. (1933) 290 U.S. 96, 104 (citation omitted); see also People v. Talle (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 671 [error in admitting "voice from the grave" evidence not cured by limiting instruction].) Here, Armstrong's words, beyond the reach of attack or impeachment, improperly and 75 prejudicially supplied the jury with the motive for his death by appellant Bryant's hands.
Filed February 18, 2011
This particularly prejudicial aspect of admitting prior crimes evidence as impeachmenthas often been addressed by reviewing courts. (Shepard v. United States(1933) 290 U.S. 96, 104; see also People v. Collins (1968) 68 Cal.2d 319, 330-33 1.) (People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal3d 79,at pp. 98-99, overruled on another point in People v. | McCoy (2001) 25 Cal 4th 1111.) Appellant respectfully submits that the 23 error necessitates review by this Court.
Filed July 27, 2007
Rule 803(3) does not apply where “testimony…face[s] backward and not forward.” Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) Therefore, “the trial court must determine whether a statement relates to a then existing state of mind or to a past memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered or believed.” United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 487 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
Filed April 19, 2006
“There must be ‘a settled hopeless expectation’ that death is near at hand, and what is said must have been spoken in the hush of its impending presence.” Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 100 (1933). Notably, defendants have not disclosed to the Court exactly when Ms. Vetter passed away after making this alleged statements.
Filed March 29, 2006
“Fear or even belief that illness will end in death will not avail itself to a make a dying declaration.” Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 99 (1933).3 “There must be ‘a settled hopeless expectation’ that death is near at hand, and what is said must have been spoken in the hush of its impending presence.” Id.
Filed December 15, 2004
Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624 393 • Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S. 36 411 Shepardv. United States (1933) 290 U.S. 96 180 Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154 411,412 • Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535 434 Smalls v. Batiste (2d Cir. 1999) 191 F.3d 272 310 • Smith v. Murray (1986) 477 U.S. 527 442 Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209 232 Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97 193 • Spain v. Rushen (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 712 252,260 Spencer v. Texas (1966) 385 U.S. 554 73, 160 • Stanfordv. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 428,440 Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 395,400 • Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 U.S. 222 359,368 Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275 94,260,373,403,404 Sumner v. Shuman (1987) 483 U.S. 66 335 , Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 815 428,430 • xxvii • Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293 406 Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86 429,434 • Tucker v. Kemp (lIth Cir. 1985) 762 F.2d 1480 276 Tucker v. Zant (1Ith Cir. 1985) 724 F .2d 882 276 • Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 569 360,388,423,431,432 Ulster County Court v. Allen (19