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Shaft v. Bullitt County Board of Education

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
Mar 1, 2000
Civ. No. 3:99-CV-748-H (W.D. Ky. Mar. 1, 2000)

Opinion

Civ. No. 3:99-CV-748-H.

March 2000.


MEMORANDUM OPINION


This case requires the Court to decide under what circumstances one having remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1998) (the "IDEA") may pursue those same remedies under other statutes without first exhausting remedies available under the IDEA. This Court concludes that one must exhaust any state administrative procedures before proceeding in federal court in search of remedies available under the IDEA. Whether those administrative remedies in this case might be futile presents a much closer question, though the Court ultimately concludes they would not be futile.

I.

Plaintiff Jason Shaft is a seventeen-year-old senior attending Bullitt Central High School in the Bullitt County Public Schools ("BCPS"). He suffers from Neurofibromatosis Type I, scoliosis, limited neck mobility, hearing problems, partial blindness, and partial learning disabilities. As a result of these conditions, Plaintiff is a qualified disabled child under the IDEA. As required by the IDEA, BCPS provides Plaintiff special educational and related services developed in an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP").

The Defendants are the Bullitt County Board of Education, the Bullitt County Public Schools, all members of the Bullitt County School Board in their individual and official capacities, and the superintendent in his official capacity. For convenience, this Opinion will refer to the Defendants collectively as BCPS.

On November 22, 1999, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging unlawful treatment, discrimination, and retaliation. His claims are made pursuant to Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1998); the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution by way of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 (1998); Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, 12182(a) (1998) (the "ADA"); and the Kentucky tort of outrageous conduct. He does not make a specific claim under the IDEA. The unlawful behavior alleged includes BCPS's refusal to follow the statements of Plaintiff's physicians regarding medication and restroom use, exclusion from classes, academic penalties for missing school days on account of Plaintiff's medical condition, different treatment relative to that of other BCPS students, negative attitudes and inappropriate statements by BCPS employees, failure to make reasonable accommodations, denial of disabled parking, and inaccessible and discriminatory provision of bathroom facilities. Plaintiff's central complaint seems to be that "[t]he needs of Jason's parents have been ignored by the Defendant District." The lawsuit seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.

II.

BCPS moved to dismiss the complaint because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies under the IDEA before initiating the lawsuit. Under the IDEA, states and local school systems must "maintain procedures . . . to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate public education by such agencies." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). These procedures must include "an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), and any complaints must be given "an impartial due process hearing," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1), and an appeal to a higher state agency if necessary. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g). If a person is dissatisfied with the outcome of such a hearing and appeal, he may file a civil action in federal court, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), but not until those administrative remedies are exhausted. See Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1989). The exhaustion requirement "furthers the substantive purposes of the [IDEA] by allowing the state to apply its expertise in an area where the needs of a handicapped child are better served by having the parents and local educational agencies work together," Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (6th Cir. 1989), developing facts, creating an administrative record, deferring initial decision-making to more expert fact-finders, and speedily resolving local educational issues. See Crocker, 873 F.2d at 935.

Questions about exhaustion arise, however, when a complainant alleges violations of federal laws other than the IDEA. The relevant section of IDEA states:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). The relevant question, therefore, is whether Plaintiff is "seeking relief that is also available" under the IDEA. Just last week the Sixth Circuit addressed the requirements of IDEA administrative exhaustion relative to other federal claims. See Covington v. Knox County Sch. System, No. 99-5210, 2000 WL 240809 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2000). In that opinion, the Court of Appeals discussed, without deciding, the extent to which a complaint "falls within the ambit of the IDEA or whether a plaintiff who has stated a claim independent of the IDEA must still utilize the state's administrative process before filing in federal court." Id. at *3. Its analysis is most instructive.

As discussed below, Covington ultimately expressed no opinion as to whether the complaint fell within the ambit of the IDEA or whether a plaintiff who stated a claim independent of the IDEA must utilize the state's administrative process before filing in federal court. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the administrative process would be futile. See id. at *4-*5.

Some of the IDEA's purposes are "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living" and "to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), (B). Consequently, some courts have found that "whenever [a claim] relates to the provision of a `free appropriate public education' to a disabled child exhaustion is required, whether or not the plaintiff characterizes the claim as one arising under the IDEA." Covington, 2000 WL 240809, at *3. In one case, the Tenth Circuit found that use of a "time-out room" in disciplining a disabled child was "clearly related to providing an appropriate public education for the plaintiffs," and therefore "within the purview of the [IDEA]." Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377, 877 F.2d 809, 813 (10th Cir. 1989). Another court framed the inquiry as whether the other federal claims have a "nexus to the IDEA" and "whether the claim arises under the IDEA" or is related to the school system's obligation to provide a free appropriate public education. Franklin v. Frid, 7 F. Supp.2d 920, 925 (W.D.Mich. 1998) ( cited in Covington, 2000 WL 240809, at *3).

Thus, a consensus exists among reviewing courts that "`when parents choose to file suit under another law that protects the rights of handicapped children — and the suit could have been filed under the [IDEA] — they are first required to exhaust.'" N.B. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1996) ( quoting Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 756 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Hope v. Cortines, 69 F.3d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1995) ( adopting lower court ruling, 872 F. Supp. 14, 19-22 (E.D.N Y 1995)). For the same reasons, most courts seem to require exhaustion even when plaintiffs bring § 1983 claims based on IDEA violations. See Covington, 2000 WL 240809, at *3. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit "expressed no opinion" on whether the facts in Covington required exhaustion. Id.

Though the allegations in the complaint may raise causes of action under independent statutes, most of the claims also fit squarely within the ambit of the IDEA. The challenges raised by Plaintiff in this lawsuit are directly related to the way that BCPS handles Plaintiff's disabilities and to the education that Plaintiff is receiving as a disabled child. Plaintiff has requested injunctive, declaratory, and remedial relief, all of which may also be available under the IDEA. This Court concludes that the general statutory scheme supports the specific statutory requirement of exhaustion prior to engaging the federal courts. Judge Moore's summary of the current case law and the policy arguments suggests that the Sixth Circuit would ultimately reach the same conclusion.

III.

Even though exhaustion is prescribed by the IDEA, courts have created a few limited exceptions to the requirement. Particularly, "parents may bypass the administrative process where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988) ( citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014 n. 17 (1984)). Although money damages are not generally available under the IDEA, see Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 386-87 (6th Cir. 1992), the Covington court held that "a mere claim for money damages is not sufficient to render exhaustion of administrative remedies unnecessary." Covington, 2000 WL 240809, at *4. Only "`where there is no administrative remedy for a wrong that the plaintiff has suffered'" can a party avoid the exhaustion requirement. Id. at *4 ( quoting Plasencia v. California, 29 F. Supp.2d 1145, 1150 (C.D.Cal. 1998)). Unless the relief sought for Plaintiff's injuries is "`retrospective only,'" he must go through Kentucky's established complaint and hearing procedures. Id. ( quoting Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999)).

In his response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff claims that he "seeks only monetary damages and declaratory relief." However, this argument contradicts Plaintiff's own Complaint and Prayer for Relief, in which he "respectfully demand[s] . . . this Court enjoin Defendants . . . from violating the statutory rights and duties owed to the Plaintiff. . . ." Plaintiff is still a student at Bullitt Central High School. His lawsuit seeks an injunction against future unlawful actions by BCPS. Plaintiff makes specific claims that he was injured by missing class, being excluded from certain curricular options, and subjection to emotional suffering. Therefore, he could be made whole, or at least partially relieved, by remedial action taken by BCPS as ordered by Kentucky's hearing officer. See Charlie F. v. Board of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist., 98 F.3d 989, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1996). The purpose of state administrative procedures is not just to avoid judicial intervention. It is to encourage problem solving. An administrative proceeding can actually resolve Plaintiff's complaints and create a better educational atmosphere. One should never lose sight of this objective. If that fails, the Court would also have an extensive factual record before a fact-finder more familiar with the educational and environmental issues at stake.

Plaintiff further argues that, since his parents have attended five meetings of the BCPS admissions and release committee ("ARC"), the administrative remedies have already been exhausted. The ARC is the local body charged with "develop[ing] an IEP for each child or youth with a disability before specially designed instruction and related services are provided." 707 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:180 § 3(2) (2000). The ARC meetings are required by Kentucky administrative regulations enacted pursuant to the IDEA, and they are a basis for creating the IEP, but they do not handle complaints about or objections to the IEP. The whole point of the complaint and hearing procedures is that parents may contest their child's IEP, its appropriateness, its implementation, and the way that the school district is handling the needs of their disabled child. ARC meetings are not a substitute for the clearly defined complaint and hearing procedures.

Plaintiff finally argues that, because he is a senior scheduled to graduate this spring, none of his requests for injunctive, declaratory, or remedial relief can be addressed by Kentucky's administrative hearing procedures. In Covington, the plaintiff filed his complaint more than two years after graduating from high school — when injunctive, declaratory, and remedial relief were all unavailable — and the Court of Appeals ruled that any resort to Tennessee's administrative procedures would be futile. See Covington, 2000 WL 240809, at *5. Ours is not so obvious a case. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in November of the current school year, and he was entitled to his administrative hearing within forty-five days of a formal complaint, see 707 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:180 § 11(11)(a), and to review by the Exceptional Children Appeals Board within thirty days of the hearing officer's decision. See 707 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:180 § 12(2)(g)(1). The proceedings would have been complete well before graduation. And even after graduation, BCPS could be required to provide remedial education, counseling, training, or other services to Plaintiff as part of the administrative relief. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, Plaintiff has not yet graduated from high school. The Covington court based its decision on the narrow instance of an aggrieved plaintiff who long ago finished the prescribed course of study, and this Court holds that as long as Plaintiff is a student in the BCPS, he must comply with the IDEA's exhaustion requirements.

IV.

Because the Court holds that Plaintiff's federal claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the IDEA, and because there is no diversity of citizenship among the parties, the remaining state tort claim for outrageous conduct should also be dismissed. Judicial and administrative efficiency will be best served by allowing the state hearing officer to develop all the facts and circumstances before beginning judicial review on any claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1998); Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993).

The Court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

cc: Counsel of Record

ORDER

JOHN G. HEYBURN II, JUDGE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Defendants have moved to dismiss this case. Being otherwise sufficiently advised,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion is SUSTAINED and Plaintiff's complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

This is a final and appealable order.

This ____ day of March, 2000.

cc: Counsel of Record


Summaries of

Shaft v. Bullitt County Board of Education

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
Mar 1, 2000
Civ. No. 3:99-CV-748-H (W.D. Ky. Mar. 1, 2000)
Case details for

Shaft v. Bullitt County Board of Education

Case Details

Full title:JASON SHAFT, BY AND THROUGH KEVIN SHAFT AND LINDA SHAFT, HIS PARENTS AS…

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

Date published: Mar 1, 2000

Citations

Civ. No. 3:99-CV-748-H (W.D. Ky. Mar. 1, 2000)

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