Filed February 21, 2013
SIPA § 78eee(b)(2)(B). As recognized by the Supreme Court, “[t]he mere filing of an SIPC application gives the court in which it is filed exclusive jurisdiction over the member and its property, wherever located, and requires the court to stay ‘. . . any other suit against any . . . trustee of the [member] or its property . . . .’” Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 416 (1975) (quoting SIPA § 78eee(b)(2)). In a SIPA proceeding, regular protection of estate property under SIPA and the Bankruptcy Code is enhanced to carry out SIPA’s unique policy goals.
Filed May 8, 2012
In response to the number of brokerage failures in 1969 and 1970, Congress enacted SIPA to enhance section 60(e)'s protections. See S. Rep. No. 91-1218, at 2, 12 (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 91-1613 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 525; SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975); Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments of 1975: Hearing on H.R. 8064 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 193 (1975) (“It was the clear purpose of Congress in adopting the 1970 Act to supplement the single and separate fund by the use of SIPA funds, but not to make any basic changes in the concepts underlying Section 60e.
Filed April 1, 2011
Consistent with its placement within the securities laws, the purposes of SIPA are to "restore investor confidence in the capital markets" and "upgrade the financial responsibility requirements for registered broker dealers." SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975) (citing S. Rep. No. 91-1218, at 2-4 (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 91-1613, at 2-4 Case 1:11-cv-00763-JSR Document 14 Filed 04/01/11 Page 9 of 27 (1970)). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs urge the Court to depart from section 157(d)'s plain language by treating SIPA as if it were part of Title 11.
Filed November 11, 2016
In Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1 st Cir 1979), the First Circuit definitively determined that there is no private right of action consonant with the legislative scheme set forth under the National Housing Act: The overall statutory scheme suggests that no private right of action exists. Unlike the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the National Housing Act contains no "standards of conduct that a private action could help to enforce", nor does it contain any "general grant of jurisdiction through the District Courts". Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424, 95 Sup. Ct. 1733, 1740, 44 L.E.2d 263 (1975). The National Housing Act does not grant a private right of action under the facts as pled and therefore this Court is not empowered to act under this statute as to the Plaza Defendants.
Filed October 6, 2016
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? See, e.g., Amtrak, supra; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423, 95 S.Ct. 1733, 1740, 44 L.Ed.2d 263 (1975); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964). And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Filed July 7, 2011
(6th Cir. 2009).....................................................81 In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 181 F.3d 505 (3d Cir. 1999)........................................................81 Saboundjian v. Bank Audi, 157 A.D.2d 278, 556 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1st Dep’t 1990)............62 Saltz v. First Frontier, LP, No. 10 Civ. 964, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136140 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010).......................................................................................71, 72 SEC v. Cohmad Sec. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 5680 (LLS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8597 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010) .........................................................................................71, 72 SEC v. Madison Real Estate Group, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2009) .....................77 SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) ..............................................................................63 In re Sharp Int’l Corp., 403 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2005) .................................................. passim SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) ..............................................................................84 SIPC v. Morgan, Kennedy & Co., 533 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1976)......................................84 Steed Fin. LDC v. LASER Advisers, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) .............70 Stellar X Prods. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 03 Civ. 5739 (JSR), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22233 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2003)...............................................................................................89 Stephenson v. Citco Group Ltd., 700 F. Supp. 2d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ...............71, 72, 73 TNS Holdings, Inc. v. MKI Sec. Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 335 (1998) .........................................90 Thomas v. N.A. Chase Manhattan Bank, 1 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1993) ................................90 Case 1:11-cv-03605-JSR Document 21 Filed 07/07/11 Page 8 of 107 viii Thomas v. Whalen, 962 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1992)..............................................................87 Tiffany Inc. v.
Filed September 2, 2009
The Trustee operates under the “substantial supervision of . . . the SEC.” SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420 (1975); see also, e.g., 15 USC § 78ccc(a)(2)(B). In this matter, two federal regulators – the Trustee and the SEC – have each brought an action against Robert Jaffe to recover the very same monies from him, monies that Bernard Madoff’s bankrupt firm sent Jaffe as gains in a brokerage account.