S.E.C. v. McCarthy

9 Citing briefs

  1. Feldman et al v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office et al

    MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support of 72 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction on Polling Place Allocation and Provisional Ballot Claims

    Filed June 10, 2016

    The term “jurisdiction” in the latter cannot mean the voter’s precinct, because the term “precinct” is separately used earlier in the very same sentence, indicating that the terms have two different meanings. See e.g., SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those words.”); McMaster v. United States, 731 F.3d 881, 893 (9th Cir. 2013) (different words used within statute presumed to carry distinct meanings).

  2. Allergan Inc et al v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc et al

    REPLY in Support of MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . Motion[160]

    Filed October 23, 2014

    15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(2) (emphasis added); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(g). Rule 14e-3 does not use the term “bidder” and does not cross-reference Regulation 14D. Similarly, Section 14(e) does not define the term “person” and does not cross-reference the broader definition of “person” in Section 14(d)(2). Instead, Rule 14e-3 introduces a new term (“offering person”) with a new definition (a person that “has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer”). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a). That Rule 14e-3 does not use the familiar term “bidder” refutes Defendants’ contention that the two terms are co-extensive. SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003) (different terms “demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning ”). Defendants contend (Opp. 36) that the SEC “rejects” any distinction between a “bidder” for disclosure purposes and an “offering person” for insider- trading purposes. This argument is belied by the regulatory history, and SEC comments in this very case. When the SEC first proposed the insider-trading ban, it had used the term “bidder” to describe the entity making the tender offer and Case 8:14-cv-01214-DOC-AN Document 206 Filed 10/23/14 Page 13 of 34 Page ID #:10418 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 AT T ORNEYS

  3. Hoang et al v. Reunion.com Inc

    Memorandum in Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

    Filed November 21, 2008

    TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FAC override “Congress’s explicit decision to use one word over another in drafting a statute.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003). Indeed, if Reunion.com’s interpretation of §7707(b)(1) were correct, it would be rendered entirely superfluous by the next section of the preemption provision, §7701(b)(2).

  4. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Vertical Fund Group, Inc.

    MOTION to Enforce Compliance with a Commission Order

    Filed April 8, 2020

    14. Proceedings under these provisions are summary in nature. See e.g., SEC v. Vindman, 2007 WL 1074941 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 5, 2007); SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 659 (9th Cir. 2003). In McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit held that “summary proceedings may be ‘conducted without formal pleadings, on short notice, without summons and complaints, generally on affidavits, and sometimes even ex parte.’” 15.

  5. Securities And Exchange Commission v. Imran Husain et al

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case Defendant Imran Husain's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12

    Filed December 22, 2016

    e Fin. Corp. of Am. S'holder Litig., 796 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1986) 14 Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 185 L.Ed.2d 297, 81 USLW 4142 (2013) 3, 17 Gebhart v. SEC., 595 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2010) 13 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 137 (2011) 19 Jarvis v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149 (9th Cit. 1987) 19 Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722 (9th Cir.2003) 13 Reddy v. Litton Indus., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990) 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 102196159 Case 2:16-cv-03250-ODW-E Document 36 Filed 12/22/16 Page 6 of 28 Page ID #:467 SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137-WHA, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D.Cal. Aug.1, 2011) 13 SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1996) 13 SEC v. Fraser, 2009 WL 2450508 (D. Ariz. 2009) 12 SEC v. Fraser, No. CV-09-00443-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 5776401, at *9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2010) 12, 15 SEC v. Graham, 2016 WL 3033605 (11th Cir. 2016) 3, 17 SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2003) 18 SEC v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149 (C.D. Cal. 1995) 16 Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., U.S.A., 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) 12, 16 Statutes 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q 13 § 78j, § 10 ("Securities Exchange Act of 1934") 13 § 78u(a)(1), (b) 19 28 U.S.C. § 2462 3, 16, 17, 18 Exchange Act Section 10(b) passim Section 12(k) 8, 18 Securities 12(j) 8, 18 - iv - 102196159 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:16-cv-03250-ODW-E Document 36 Filed 12/22/16 Page 7 of 28 Page ID #:468 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Securities Act Section 17(a) passim Section 17(a)(1) 2, 13, 16 Section 17(a)(2) 2, 13 Section 17(a)(3) 2, 13, 14, 16 Rules and Regulations 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a, b) 13 § 240.10b-5(a)-(c) 13 Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 13 Rule 10b-5(a) 2, 15 Rule 10b-5(a)-(c) 13 Rule 10b-5(b) 2 Rule 10b-5

  6. Securities And Exchange Commission v. Imran Husain et al

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12

    Filed August 10, 2016

    Page 5 of 21 Page ID #:101 - iii - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 D E N T O N S U S L L P 6 0 1 S O U T H F IG U E R O A S T R E E T ,S U IT E 2 5 00 L O S A N G E L E S ,C A L IF O R N IA 9 00 17 -5 7 04 (2 13 ) 62 3 -9 30 0 SEC v. Fraser, 2009 WL 2450508 (D. Ariz. 2009) ..................................................................... 10 SEC v. Graham, 2016 WL 3033605 (11th Cir. 2016)................................................................ 2, 14 SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................... 14 SEC v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149 (C.D. Cal. 1995).................................................................... 13 Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., U.S.A., 317 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 10 Statutes 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(e)(a), 77(e)(c), and 77q(a) .................................................2, 10, 12 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q..................................................................................................... 10 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j...................................................................................................... 11 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b), 78t(a) ....................................................................................... 2 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1), (b)......................................................................................... 15 28 U.S.C. § 2462......................................

  7. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Barclays Bank PLC et al

    REPLY

    Filed February 4, 2016

    See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (granting writ of mandamus where appellants appealed and petitioned for writ of mandamus “in the alternative”). 12 See SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656-57 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent express statutory authorization stating otherwise, there is no question that the Federal Rules govern all ‘actions’ before the district courts of the United States.”).

  8. Todd Burton v. Time Warner Cable Inc

    REPLY in support of MOTION to Dismiss Case DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 10

    Filed February 8, 2013

    No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2012 WL 2873847 (N.D. Cal July 12, 2012) ................. 4 McKenzie v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2011) .......................................................................... 7 Metrovision of Livonia, Inc. v. Wood, 864 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Mich. 1994) ............................................................................... 5 Resnick v. Avmed, 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................ 9 Rodriquez v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, No. C 11-4084 PJH, 2012 WL 4464563 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012) .................. 6, 8 Scofield v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Kan. 1990) ................................................................................... 5 Scofield v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., 973 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1992) ........................................................................................... 5 SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................... 13 Sterk v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 11 C 1894, 2012 WL 5197901 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2012) ............................... 3, 4 Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2012) ......................................................................................... 5, 6 Case 2:12-cv-06764-JGB-AJW Document 34 Filed 02/08/13 Page 4 of 19 Page ID #:229 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - iv - LOSANGELES 989090 TWC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, No. 11 C 1729, 2012 WL 3006674 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2012) ............................... 6, 7 Warner v. Am. Cablevision of Kansas City, 699 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kan. 1988) ........................................................................... 4, 5, 12 FEDERAL STATUTES 17 U.S.C. § 122(j)(6) ....

  9. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU CPA LTD.

    MEMORANDUM re MOTION for Order to Show Cause and for Order Requiring Compliance with Subpeona

    Filed October 13, 2011

    See SEC v. Sprecher, 594 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that SEC could enforce investigatory subpoenas “upon application” to a district court in summary proceedings without the filing of a complaint); cf. SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining the difference between a summary proceeding, such as an application to enforce a subpoena, and a full-blown civil lawsuit, and noting that “[s]ummary proceedings may be ‘conducted without formal pleadings, on short notice, without summons and complaints, generally on affidavits, and sometimes even ex parte’”