Sebelius v. Cloer

8 Citing briefs

  1. In the Matter of 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., Facebook, Inc., Appellant,v.New York County District Attorney's Office, Respondent. (And Another Proceeding.)

    Brief

    Filed February 7, 2017

    As in any case of statutory construction, this Court must start with the statutory text and proceed from the understanding that, unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are to be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Sebelius v. Cloer, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013); Capital Newspapers, Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Whalen, 69 N.Y.2d 246 (1987).

  2. Fields v. Twitter, Inc.

    RESPONSE

    Filed October 4, 2016

    Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014) (“It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that, ‘unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)); Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013) (“As in any statutory construction case, ‘[w]e start, of course, with the statutory text,’ and proceed from the understanding that ‘[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.’”) (quoting BP America Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)); Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 594 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We adopt the ‘common practice of consulting dictionary definitions’ to clarify the ‘ordinary meaning’ of terms used in a statute but not defined therein.”)

  3. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. David Gasparyan

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case

    Filed August 8, 2016

    See Russello v. U.S. 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (emphasis added), see also U. S. v. Naftalin (1979) 441 U.S. 768, 774. Sebelius v. Cloer 133 S.Ct. 1886, 1894 (2013); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting 563 U.S. 582, 636 (2011) ; Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29–30 (1997) (all holding that a law must be read as written and that when language is not included by Congress, the Court does not presume to add that language into the law). Because Congress rejected extending potential liability to related persons of a service provider, and prohibited using suit rather than rules to first notice what normal business activities are “violative of the provisions of 5531" Gasparyan was given unequivocal notice by the law that the instant action cannot be brought.

  4. In the Matter of Walter E. Carver, Respondent,v.State of New York, et al., Appellants.

    Brief

    Filed September 16, 2015

    ’” (Moskal v. United States, 498 US 103, 108 [1990].) (Accord Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S Ct 1886, 1893 [2013], quoting BP America Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 US 84, 91 [2006] [Court must “proceed from the understanding that ‘unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning’”]; DaimlerChrysler, 7 NY3d at 660 [“The statutory text is the clearest 12 indicator of legislative intent and courts should construe unambiguous language [in a statute] to give effect to its plain meaning”]; Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent.

  5. Craft et al v. Health Care Service Corporation

    RESPONSE

    Filed July 10, 2015

    , 439 F.3d 351, 353 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1895–96 (2013) (“[C]anons and policy arguments come into play only to the extent that the [statute] is ambiguous.”)

  6. Value Recovery Fund LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. et al

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re:

    Filed June 20, 2014

    Had Congress intended to override the antitrust laws in Title VII, it clearly knew how to do so – it did so very clearly in the four provisions addressed above. See generally Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1894 (2013) (“We have long held that ‘[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997)).

  7. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Barclays Bank PLC et al

    MOTION to DISMISS

    Filed December 16, 2013

    Therefore, the term must be “‘interpreted in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning.’” Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013) (citation omitted); accord Koshman v. Vilsack, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2012). The plain meaning of the term “entity” does not include natural persons.

  8. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Capital Restaurant Concepts, Ltd.

    MOTION to Strike 16 Answer to Complaint , MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment

    Filed May 19, 2017

    When the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, the Court’s inquiry should cease. See Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1895 (2013). Moreover, it is “improper to conclude that what Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its scope.”