Filed August 12, 2011
C. Conclusion In sum,the totality of factors involved in the present case combined 32 to establish that appellant’s resulting confession was involuntary. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 226.) Accordingly, the court below erred in denying appellant’s motion for suppression.
Filed March 21, 2017
mhese situations are still immeasurably far removed from 'custodial interrogation' where, in Miranda v Arizona . . . we found that the Constitution required certain now familiar warnings as a prerequisite to police interrogation." (Schneckloth, 412 US at 231-32.) In a footnote, the Court made the limitation of its ruling explicit: "the present case does not require a determination of the proper standard to be applied in assessing the validity of a search authorized solely by an alleged consent that is obtained from a person after he has been placed in custody."
Filed July 30, 2010
’” Id. at 287, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). Nor may ICE agents misrepresent the purpose of the home visit in order to obtain consent.
Filed December 13, 2006
However, police “need not always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search.” (United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 206-207 [122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242], citing, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 227 [93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854].) Furthermore, that Trudeau was holding appellant’s licenseis irrelevant given that Painter asked appellant if he “would mind” being searched (3/30/92 RT 114), thereby indicating to a reasonable person that he or she would befree to refuse.
Filed June 17, 2005
The relevant circumstances embrace “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; Lucerov. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998).
Filed February 24, 2015
If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him.If it is not, if his will has been overborne andhis capacity forself- determinationcritically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.” (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S.218, 225 [93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854].) “A statement to be voluntary of course need not be volunteered.
Filed November 10, 2014
This consent exception balances the “values reflecting the concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone,” with the reality that “[i]n situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228, 242 (citation omitted). When seeking to admit evidence obtained as a result of a consent search, “the government * * * bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was voluntary.”
Filed November 10, 2014
This consent exception Case 2:14-cr-00249-APG-PAL Document 260 Filed 11/10/14 Page 38 of 53 32 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 balances the “values reflecting the concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone,” with the reality that “[i]n situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228, 242 (citation omitted). Courts routinely uphold searches where law enforcement officers (or individuals working with law enforcement) gained consent to enter through the use of trickery or deception.
Filed June 13, 2011
Warrantless searches may be permitted without probable cause where an officer has legally obtained adequate consent. (See People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218 [93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854].) “A consensual search maynotlegally exceed the scope of the consent supportingit.
Filed December 19, 2010
In making this determination ofvoluntariness, the court must look at “all of the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Schneckcloth, supra, 412 U.S. at p. 226; In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200, 208-09. Voluntariness does not turn on any onefactor, but on is judged underthe “totality of the circumstances.”