McQuiggin v. Floyd Perkins, USSC No. 12-126, 5/28/13United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remandingPerkins v. McQuiggin, 670 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2012)In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U. S. 518 (2006), the Court held that a convincing showing of “actual innocence” enabled habeas petitioners to overcome a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of their constitutional claims. This case asks whether AEDPA’s time limit for filing federal habeas petitions—specifically, §2244(d)(1)(D)’s requirement that the petition be filed within one year of “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence”—can be overcome by a convincing showing that the petitioner committed no crime.
A bare innocence claim, or Herrera-type (1) claim "involves a substantive claim in which applicant asserts his bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence." Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995); Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 208). The other actual innocence claim, a Schlup-type claim, we explained "is a procedural claim in which applicant's claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief, but is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial."
The district court properly dismissed the petition as untimely because even if the limitations period could have been tolled until Gladney found out about his counsel’s failure to interview a defense witness, his petition would still have been filed well outside the adjusted limitations period. Nor can Gladney satisfy the narrow “actual innocence” exception under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), to disregard the time limits for seeking federal habeas relief.First, as to tolling the time limit based on the discovery of new evidence in support of a claim: Gladney’s only asserted basis for either statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) or equitable tolling is that he could not have filed a petition alleging the claims he does now until his February 4, 2010, discovery that his attorney failed to interview Calhoun, a potentially important defense witness, as part of his trial preparation. Even if all other criteria were satisfied, a new one-year limitations period would have expired on February 4, 2011, unless Gladney stopped the clock by seeking post-conviction review in state court.
But of those six, only two remain on the bench - Stevens and Kennedy.Another important point is that Herrera was decided before the AEDPA. While there still were challenges to raising an actual innocence claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding, they were not as insurmountable as the AEDPA's standard of review.A couple years after Herrera, but still before the AEDPA, the Court suggested in dicta in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995), that a Herrera-type substantive innocence claim could be asserted if the evidence of innocence is strong enough to make his execution “constitutionally intolerable.” Not sure what that means exactly, but it does imply that an actual innocence claim is floating somewhere in the Constitution.What is important to keep in mind is that, at the time of Herrera, the concept of actual innocence was more abstract.
pdf Decisions: Schwartz (writing), Cowen, and McKee (concurring) Background Defendant, convicted of murder and related charges, sought habeas corpus relief from his conviction based on actual innocence. Defendant argued that the Court should excuse his petition’s untimeliness based on the actual innocence exception to procedural default recognized in Schlup v. Delo(U.S. 1995). Holding Evidence of actual innocence that an ineffective counsel failed to present at trial is new evidence for purposes of appeal, despite the fact that this evidence was available to the defense at the time of trial.
In a fact-depending ruling, the Seventh Circuit holds he isn’t entitled to a hearing.Faced with “a request for an evidentiary hearing” to determine whether a convicted defendant should be given a chance to prove his innocence in a habeas corpus proceeding, “the District Court must assess the probative force of the newly presented evidence in connection with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 331–32 (1995). Bradford had his chance [in the state postconviction proceeding] and failed to present reliable evidence that would establish his innocence of the arson and murder.Changing course, Bradford argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in deciding to retain a fire expert named Barker Davie, who co-owned a fire-investigation business, attended training programs and wrote articles, and had testified many times as a fire and arson expert for the state—experience that gave him particular credibility as a defense witness.
The claim about the two new eyewitnesses is defaulted, the court finds, because it was raised in state court as a freestanding actual innocence claim, not an ineffective assistance claim. Nor does he meet the standard under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), for excusing the procedural default based on actual innocence. While acknowledging the high rates of error in the kind of eyewitness IDs the trial judge relied on, the two new eyewitnesses had problems of their own due to their limited opportunity to observe and the fact they first came forward eight years after the shooting.
February 1, 2010Jones v. Armstrong, 00-2527-prPanel: Katzmann, Lynch, Chin, DJDist. Ct Dec: Petition Denied; 99-cv-1545 (D. Conn. June 30, 2000) (CFD)COA: Second CircuitIssues: From the order granting a COA:In addition to any issues counsel deems appropriate, counsel should consider (1) whether on direct appeal Jones adequately presented the claims, which the district court determined were unexhausted, to the Connecticut supreme court based on the brief Jones filed in that court prior to the court's transfer of his case to the appellate court; (2) if not, whether Jones's unexhausted claims should be considered exhausted because of procedural default, see Bossett v. Walker, 41 F.3d 825, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1994); (3) if so, whether petitioner has shown (a) cause and prejudice for such procedural default, see Grey v. Hoke 933 F.2d 117, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1991) or (b) actual innocence, see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995); and (4) if so, whether to remand Jones's case the district court for further proceedings on the merits of Jones's claims.Notes: You are reading the docket number correctly -- this appeal was originally filed in 2000. It really is one of the wackiest docket sheets I have ever read.
She points out that it would necessarily have to be a very high standard -- the Supreme Court indicated as much in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). This would also have to be higher than the standard for a "gateway" innocence claim in order to overcome a procedural default , a standard set out in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The DJ concludes that petitioner had failed to meet even the lower Schlup standard.
(3) In circumstances in petitioner's case, was his claim of federal violation regarding denial of request for short continuance procedurally barred from federal court? (4) Has petitioner made substantial showing of actual innocence according to standard of Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), for his alibi witnesses to be explored further to prevent fundamental miscarriage of justice? McCarver v. North Carolina No. 00-8727 (cert.