Santobello v. New York

26 Citing briefs

  1. The People, Respondent,v.Wilson Feliciano, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed November 13, 2013

    The prosecutor's failure to allow appellant the benefit of his bargain and the court's failure to enforce the 30 plea bargain, therefore, violated appellant's state and federal constitutional rights to due process. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262; Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d at 978; People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d at 349. Even if the terms of the plea agreement could be characterized as ambiguous, a defendant's constitutional right to due process mandates that, ~[iln construing the promises made in return for the plea, a court must.

  2. PEOPLE v. ESTRADA

    Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed July 28, 2016

    Federal due process requires that, when a plea bargain is entered, the promises madeto the defendant be kept. ( See People v. Calloway (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 666, 676-677; Santobello v. United States (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 260-262 [92 S. Ct. 495; 30 L. Ed. 2d 427; “whena plearests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducementor consideration, such promise mustbe fulfilled.”] .) “Concomitant with recognition of the necessity and desirability of the [plea bargaining] processis the notion that the integrity of the process be maintained by insuring that the state keep its word whenit offers inducements in exchange for a plea of guilty.”

  3. The People, Respondent,v.Andre Collier, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed November 13, 2013

    Rather, the sentencing court had the option of giving defendant the benefit of his bargain. The choice of remedy rested in the discretion of the trial court (see Torres, 45 NY2d at 753; Selikoff, 35 NY2d at 239; Santobello, 404 US at 263), and under those controlling precedents, it could not possibly have been an abuse of discretion for the court to choose that remedy over vacatur. Here, the sentencing court chose the remedy of specific performance, which it had the authority to do.

  4. Choudhry v. Regents of the University of California et al

    RESPONSE

    Filed October 6, 2016

    They are formed and enforced only after strict procedural requirements and safeguards have been satisfied. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. A defendant negotiating a plea agreement must be represented by counsel, unless he waives that right, id.

  5. The People, Respondent,v.Wilson Feliciano, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed November 13, 2013

    Even if this Court were to find that the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether participation in an aftercare program was required, any Hon. Jonathan Lippman People v. Wilson Feliciano 19 August 5, 2013 ambiguity in the agreement must be construed in favor of appellant. Santobello v. New York, supra, 404 u.s. at 261-62; Spence v. Superintendent, supra, 219 F.3d at 167; Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d at 979. Even if appellant had been required to participate in aftercare, he did so successfully for 18 months and, again, on May 10, 2000, defense counsel informed the court that appellant had been in the program for about two and a half years and he was "looking for some closure, eventually."

  6. PEOPLE v. CLANCEY

    Respondent's Reply Brief on the Merits

    Filed October 18, 2012

    Ifthe governmental official does not - 26 - comply with the promise made, the defendant mustbe restoredto the status quoante(i.e. his plea must be withdrawn). (Santobello, supra, 404 U.S. 257, 262; Mancheno, supta, 32 Cal.3d 855, 860.) Second, the rule requiring withdrawal of the plea has been in place without controversy since 1976. (People v. Superior Court (Felmann), supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 270, 276.)

  7. JOHN DOE v. HARRIS

    Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed August 15, 2011

    Rather, a plea bargain is deemed to encompass the Legislature’s reserve powerto amend the law for public policy reasons. Thus, the typical plea bargain that is almost always silent about future changesin the law does not implicitly “rest[] in any significant degree on a promise or agreementofthe prosecutor”that the law will forever be frozen as to the defendant (see Santobello v. New York, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 262), and consequently does not create any implied binding agreementthat the defendantwill not be subject to statutory amendments. This conclusion is bolstered by People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367.

  8. PEOPLE v. GALLARDO

    Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed July 18, 2016

    ” (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930-93.) A criminal defendant has a federal due processright to enforce the terms of his plea agreement (Buckley v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2006) 441 F.3d 688, 694; Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 261-262, 266-267) and material deviations from the agreement are constitutionally impermissible. (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024.)

  9. R. (K.) v. S.C. (PEOPLE)

    Real Party in Interest, The People, Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed May 11, 2016

    1. Contract principles in plea bargaining It is settled that “when a plearests in any significant degree on a promise or agreementofthe prosecutor, so that it can be said to bepart of the inducementor consideration, such promise mustbe fulfilled.” (Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 262.) “Whena guilty plea is entered in exchangefor specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment,both parties, includingthestate, must abide by the terms of the agreement.”

  10. The People, Respondent,v.Andre Collier, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed November 13, 2013

    As the Supreme Court of the United States established in Santobello v. New York and this Court subsequently applied in People v. Selikoff, “the failure or inability to fulfill a promise requires either that the plea of guilty be vacated or the promise fulfilled”. See People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 634 (1974) discussing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In fact, this Court unequivocally stated in Selikoff, “Of course, a guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored”.