Filed April 21, 2010
In San Francisco Arts, the United States Supreme Court held that the USOC is a private citizen and that its conduct does not constitute “governmental action.” 483 U.S. at 542-547. The logic of this decision was then extended to NGBs in the Behagen case.
Filed January 13, 2017
50 Id. 51 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 967 (quoting S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 564 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) Case 2:16-cv-00191-DN Document 43 Filed 01/13/17 Page 13 of 15 90331564.2 0059210-00001 10 DATED this 13 day of January, 2017.
Filed February 26, 2016
Section 220506(a) of the ASA “directly advances” Congress’s interest in “promoting, through the activities of the USOC, the participation of amateur athletes from the United States” in the Olympic Games “by supplying the USOC with the means to raise money to support the Olympics and encourages the USOC’s activities by ensuring that it will receive the benefits of its efforts.” San Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 538-391; see also Intelicense Corp., 737 F.2d at 266 (“financing the United States Olympic team poses unique obstacles” and “[c]onsequently, the marketing of the Olympic symbol in the United States assumes great 1 The Supreme Court referenced the 1978 version of the Amateur Sports Act, which is identical in relevant part to the revised statute. Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 41 Filed 02/26/16 Page 8 of 23 Page 4 - Defendant United States Olympic Committee’s Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support 70082138.
Filed September 9, 2014
The same is true of San Francisco Arts, where the Court ruled that “[t]he fact that Congress granted [the U.S. Olympic Committee] a corporate charter does not render the USOC a Government agent.” San Case 1:12-cv-40032-JLT Document 67 Filed 09/09/14 Page 10 of 20 -7- Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 543. Again, the Court observed that private companies are liable as state actors if the government “has exercised coercive power or has provided . . . significant encouragement.”
Filed May 26, 2017
National Broad. Co., 860 F.2d at 1026–27 (citing San Francisco, 483 U.S. at 547, n. 29). Applying the first test for state action to the facts alleged in this case: 13. . . . the Defendants . . . while acting under color of law pursuant to a search warrant . . . entered onto the Plaintiff’s property and . . . permitted, requested and/or directed The Humane Society, an entity not associated with law enforcement, to participate in the seizure and to take actual possession of and remove from the property occupied by Plaintiff . . . 65 canines.
Filed January 13, 2016
However, it is well-established that a private entity’s mere receipt of public funds and use of government land does not somehow establish state action absent any additional showing that the state was involved with the activity that caused the purported injury. See Am. Atheists, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d at 331-33 (holding “there would be no state action” if “the only relationship between the [museum] and the government” was “the mere receipt of government funds and use of government lands”); see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) (“The Government may subsidize private entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for their actions.”); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1992) (private school receiving 90% of its operating budget from public funds not state actor); Arons v. State, No. 04 Civ. 0004, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9088, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2004) (“The receipt of public funds by a private entity, no matter how extensive, is insufficient in and of itself to establish state action”).
Filed January 8, 2016
As an initial matter, the First Amendment acts as a restriction on the conduct of state actors. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1987). All of the Defendants here are private parties; none is a state actor and Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise.
Filed September 30, 2015
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]hat programs undertaken by the State result in substantial funding of the activities of a private entity is no more persuasive than the fact of regulation of such an entity in demonstrating that the State is responsi- ble for decisions made by the entity.” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982); accord San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840. The salient question is not whether the State provided funding to the recipient, but rather “what control .
Filed May 16, 2014
Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461, , 72 S. Ct. 813, 4 CACH also asserts that the groundlessness of the RICO claim is evident from the fact that in the entire time this case has been pending Respondents have failed to file the RICO statement required by the Court’s Individual Rule V(C). -15- 96 L. Ed. 1068 (1952); accord San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542, 107 S. Ct. 2971,97 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1987). Similarly, the parallel Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state actors.
Filed January 25, 2013
The Fifth Amendment has long been interpreted to “apply to and restrict only the Federal Government and not private persons.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952); accord San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 (1987).