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In re J.C.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Oct 31, 2019
No. D076024 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2019)

Opinion

D076024

10-31-2019

In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.C., Defendant and Appellant.

Rosemary Bishop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SJ13391) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Edlene C. McKenzie, Judge. Affirmed. Rosemary Bishop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

For over one year, 17-year-old J.C. has been continuously placed at San Pasqual Academy (Academy), a residential educational facility. Nine months after her placement there and within one year of turning 18, she filed a petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (section 388 petition), seeking the ability to earn "passes," or permission, to spend unsupervised time off campus consistent with Academy policies. J.C. was an excellent student and resident, and she wanted to build a social and support network off campus as she transitioned to adulthood. Following a contested hearing (trial), the juvenile court granted her section 388 petition.

Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

C.C., J.C.'s mother (Mother), appeals. Mother argues the court erred when it granted J.C.'s section 388 petition because there was an insufficient showing of changed circumstances or that allowing the passes was in J.C.'s best interests. She further argues the court should not have (1) excluded J.C. from testifying at trial and (2) excluded several photographic exhibits from evidence on foundational/authentication grounds. We conclude the court did not err on any asserted ground and accordingly, affirm the order granting J.C.'s section 388 petition.

J.C.'s father (Father) is not a party to this appeal and our discussion of him is therefore limited.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This court is well acquainted with J.C.'s dependency history given this is our fifth occasion reviewing her case. To summarize, her dependency case began in 2017, following excessive discipline by Father (§ 300, subd. (a)), and she could not be successfully placed with Mother. In addition to threatening suicide, needing hospitalization, and suffering other psychological issues, J.C. went absent without leave (AWOL) from her placement for a few months in 2018, rather than live with Mother. The parents waived reunification services, and J.C. was placed at Academy in mid-2018. We refer to and adopt the factual and procedural backgrounds set forth in our prior opinions and provide further background as needed. (E.g., In re J.C. (Aug. 22, 2018, D073496) [nonpub. opn.; affirming jurisdictional finding]; In re J.C. (May 16, 2019, D075049) [nonpub. opn.; affirming order denying petition to remove J.C. from Academy].)

In late June 2018, the court appointed Kendall Swanson (a court-appointed special advocate or CASA) and Mother as J.C.'s joint educational rights holders, and J.C. began her placement at Academy. There, she lived, studied, played team sports, worked, and generally thrived. J.C. exceled in school and had positive relationships with adults and peers alike. She would not visit with Mother but interacted regularly with her CASA and social worker. By the fall of 2018, it came to light that J.C. had engaged in a consensual sex act with her friend, a minor boy, who recorded the act without her consent and caused a distribution of the video to several other students. The nonconsensual recording (incident) was socially and emotionally upsetting to J.C.; however, in a relatively short timeframe, she regained her composure, participated in therapeutic support services, and continued to thrive.

These events are described in greater detail in our prior opinion, In re J.C. (May 16, 2019, D075049), at pp. 8-10, 14.

In the incident's aftermath, Mother requested that J.C. not be permitted to go off campus. In October 2018, pending the section 366.26 hearing (permanency planning hearing), the juvenile court ordered that J.C. could not receive "self-passes," or the ability to leave campus by herself (no self-pass order), but she could leave campus for school-sanctioned outings.

J.C. had two self-passes prior to October 2018, to attend outdoor birthday parties with her boyfriend and his family. No problems occurred during these events.

A month later, on the date set for the permanency planning hearing, the court determined it would need to reschedule the matter for a contested hearing because the parents no longer agreed with the Agency on J.C.'s placement at Academy. Mother requested a continuation of the no self-pass order. She had learned J.C. was recently permitted to leave campus with her boyfriend's mother and sister serving as chaperones. Mother was concerned about J.C.'s safety both on and off campus, and questioned J.C.'s judgment, with the video incident in mind. Mother's counsel also highlighted J.C.'s past instance of going AWOL with an unknown person or persons, as support for the position that the adults responsible for J.C. needed "to know at all times where [the] minor is."

For their part, the Agency and J.C.'s counsel (minor's counsel) argued that J.C. should be allowed to receive self-passes in the same manner as other Academy residents. Academy followed a "prudent parent standard" in deciding whether to grant self-passes, and its philosophy was "to allow teenagers to have a normal life." The Agency and minor's counsel reported to the court, without any serious dispute, that J.C. was extremely busy with school, sports, and her campus job, and rarely even had time to leave campus.

After considering the parties' arguments, the court was persuaded to leave the no self-pass order in effect, while permitting J.C. to leave campus accompanied by Academy staff or her CASA. The court stated its concerns about J.C.'s safety and judgment, particularly if she associated with untrustworthy people off campus, i.e., those who would support her disregard of court orders. In that vein, the court noted it did not know J.C.'s whereabouts when she went AWOL, which J.C. refused to disclose. Addressing J.C. directly, the court commented: "[Y]ou have issues that you need to work through . . . when you're off on self-passes, you're not able to safely regulate your behavior. And there are issues that need to be worked on in that regard."

About two weeks later, on November 30, 2018, the court selected J.C.'s permanent plan to be continued placement at Academy, which is a licensed foster home. The court confirmed the no self-pass order was still in effect.

The Challenged Section 388 Petition

In mid-March 2019, J.C. filed a section 388 petition to modify the no self-pass order and allow Academy to grant her (1) passes to go off campus with a specified list of preapproved individuals, or (2) self-passes. As changed circumstances, J.C. pointed to her excellent performance for many months (in school, sports, work), absence of behavioral issues after the incident, and her approaching 18th birthday. J.C. alleged that a change of order was in her best interests because she could develop an off campus support network as she transitioned to adulthood, would remain motivated at Academy, and it was "normal" for well-behaved teenagers to have unsupervised time in the community.

J.C.'s written section 388 petition was orally modified on April 25, 2019, to include a request for self-passes. J.C. was not requesting the court grant her automatic off-campus privileges, but rather, for the court to no longer preclude her from earning passes if she abided by Academy requirements. Thus, J.C. was asking to be treated like other residents.

The juvenile court, with a new judge presiding over the case, found a prima facie showing had been made on the section 388 petition and set a trial date. In the interim, the court conducted a review of hearing transcripts in which "passes" were discussed by the prior judge, to ascertain whether the prior judge intended any modification of the no self-pass order to be contingent on J.C.'s disclosure of her AWOL whereabouts. After carefully reviewing the relevant excerpts with counsel and considering all counsel's arguments, the court explained that the no self-pass order arose from various concerns about J.C.'s safety and behavior and did not hinge solely on her unwillingness to disclose her AWOL location.

In addition, minor's counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude J.C.'s testimony from trial, based on detriment to the child's mental health if she was required to testify and the limited relevance of her testimony in light of the disputed issues and other admissible evidence. The motion was accompanied by letters from two of J.C.'s therapists, which described the increased anxiety, mental disturbances, and physical symptoms J.C. was suffering at the prospect of having to testify in court. Minor's counsel also pointed to J.C.'s prior mental health conditions, as described in her juvenile case file. On May 22, 2019, the court granted J.C.'s motion in limine and excused her from testifying at trial. This motion will be discussed in further detail, post.

Trial over the section 388 petition proceeded on May 28, 2019. At the outset, minor's counsel moved in limine to exclude from evidence several photographic exhibits proffered by Mother, on grounds of insufficient foundation/authentication and hearsay. The photographs were obtained from a social media account of unknown origin and which J.C. denied was hers. Mother's counsel argued essentially that strict authentication was not necessary insofar as certain exhibits were photographs of J.C. The court stated that laying a proper foundation and establishing authenticity under the rules of evidence was still required, given the various unknowns behind online account creation, e.g., who created/posted under the account, when, and why. The court deferred ruling on admissibility of the exhibits until after the Agency presented its case-in-chief, while advising Mother's counsel that he had to think about how to authenticate the exhibits.

The Agency presented its case-in-chief. The court received the section 388 petition, four Agency reports, and CASA report, into evidence without objection. The court also heard testimony from CASA Swanson and social worker Deluca, who were both subject to cross-examination.

The Agency's reports fully supported J.C.'s request for self-passes, including a detailed description of her academic, work, and sports achievements; her stable, positive behavior since being placed at Academy; her compliance with Academy rules; the Agency's opinion that it would benefit J.C. to develop an outside support network as she transitioned to adulthood; and J.C.'s desire to apply for Academy's "Honor's House," a prerequisite of which was obtaining self-passes. In addition, the reports explain Academy's rules and requirements relating to self-passes, including how passes are earned or revoked. The Agency's reports were based on social worker observations, conversations with J.C., and inquiries made of other people who had direct contact with J.C., such as her therapist and "house parent." In the Agency's assessment, the no self-pass order was singling out J.C. with differential treatment compared to other Academy youth, J.C. was aware of the unequal treatment, and the restriction was detrimental to her well-being and development.

According to the Agency, a self-pass is "something that youth earn [at Academy] after demonstrating safe and responsible behavior over a certain amount of time where they are able to have unsupervised time in the community."

Likewise, the CASA report was fully supportive of J.C.'s request for self-passes. The CASA had spoken to J.C., her house parent, school counselor, teacher, and residential director. J.C. was consistently characterized as "extremely responsible," "hard working," and a "leader." The CASA noted that J.C. was college-oriented, and in the CASA's opinion, "if [J.C.] continues to be highly restricted, her transition to college will be overwhelming and unsuccessful. I feel that a better approach would be teaching [J.C.] these skills while she is still at [Academy]."

Furthermore, the social worker and CASA, who authored the written reports, testified consistent with their reports. They explained the reasons behind J.C.'s request for self-passes. Neither of them was aware of or had any concerns about J.C. using drugs, ditching school, running away, or having any recurrence of issues akin to the 2018 video incident. Both witnesses were cross-examined by opposing counsel, and minor's counsel rested her case.

At that point, Mother's counsel sought to introduce evidence of J.C.'s social media activity—exhibits A through N—without foundation or authentication evidence. Minor's counsel did not object to admitting exhibits obtained from J.C.'s verified social media accounts but objected to exhibits obtained from an unverified account titled, "j . . . u." The court admitted the exhibits except for exhibits A, D, E, F, and G, which were excluded on authentication/hearsay grounds. This ruling will be discussed in further detail, post.

After hearing closing arguments, the court granted J.C.'s section 388 petition, finding changed circumstances in that J.C. had an "incredible improvement" in her behavior, a sustained period of stability and good judgment, and was turning 18 years old in less than nine months. Moreover, the court found that allowing J.C. to earn self-passes was in her best interests given her approaching adulthood and need for unsupervised time in the community. The court commented, "We have to give her an opportunity to fly, so to speak . . . . I certainly don't think it's a good idea to continue to restrict her in such a way that when she goes off to college, she's learning everything on her own without making these efforts sooner and having the experience to fail and get guidance and support . . . ."

Mother's appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Section 388 Petition

Mother contends there was no material change in circumstances to support J.C.'s section 388 petition. Specifically, Mother argues J.C. still would not disclose her AWOL whereabouts, which was a basis for the original no self-pass order. Mother also argues it was not in J.C.'s best interests to be allowed off campus without supervision and the court should have ordered a "transitional approach."

Under section 388, a party may petition the court to change, modify, or set aside a previous court order. The petitioning party has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, there is a change of circumstances or new evidence, and the proposed modification is in the child's best interests. (§ 388; In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415; In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.)

The change in circumstances under section 388 must relate to the purpose of the order and indicate that modification of the prior order is appropriate. (In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 870.) Moreover, the petitioning party must establish that changed circumstances necessitate modification of the existing order to serve the child's best interests. (§ 388, subd. (d).) The best interest analysis looks at the totality of the child's circumstances, based on current information. (In re Vincent M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 943, 960.)

A petition for modification of an order in a child dependency action is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) A court exceeds the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (Ibid.)

In this case, we conclude J.C. met her burden of demonstrating a change of circumstances and that modifying the no self-pass order was in her best interests.

Contrary to Mother's position, the no self-pass order arose from several concerns about J.C.'s judgment and safety, underscored by her refusal to disclose her AWOL location. The prior judge left open the possibility that J.C. might work on her "issues" in a way that modification of the no self-pass order might be appropriate in the future. We agree with the subsequent judge's interpretation that modifying the order was not conditioned on J.C.'s disclosure of her AWOL whereabouts.

Further, J.C. sufficiently demonstrated a change in circumstances to necessitate modification of the no self-pass order. By the time of the hearing, J.C. had experienced many months of strong academic achievement, compliance with rules and regulations, an absence of behavioral issues, and good decisionmaking. Importantly, J.C. was approaching 18 years old. It was J.C.'s approaching adulthood that drove her need for greater independence.

J.C. also demonstrated that modifying the no self-pass order, so she could earn self-passes, would promote her best interests. As the court indicated, juvenile courts are not typically involved with granting permission for outings on a day-to-day basis; this task is normally left to a caregiver and/or foster parent who has better knowledge of the child's daily schedule and behavior. J.C. showed it was developmentally appropriate for her to spend periods of unsupervised time in the community consistent with her foster home's policies, it was detrimental for her to be barred from earning self-passes, and she was able to act responsibly.

Mother claims J.C.'s social media posts showed that her pattern of unsafe behaviors had not changed. We disagree and conclude Mother's assertion is speculative. Based on our review of the record, the social media posts provide little insight into J.C.'s real-life behavior. Nor may we speculate that J.C. will be sexually exploited, as Mother suggests. The record evidence strongly supports that J.C. sustained an extended period of healthy, positive behavior. Witnesses with whom she had routine, direct contact had no concerns about any unsafe behavior.

For example, one exhibit appeared to be a message from one of J.C.'s social media accounts, wherein she claimed to be listening to music while "ditch[ing] school for the second day in a row." We cannot reasonably infer from this post that J.C had a school attendance problem. The CASA testified that J.C. is excused from class with the rest of her softball team when there are conflicting game times, the social worker testified that the school principal recently reported "no concerns" about J.C.'s attendance, and J.C. occasionally had excused medical absences. Of course, J.C.'s excellent grades are an indicator of regular attendance.

Mother further claims that it would have been best for the court to "transition" J.C. to independence by initially allowing her to go off campus with only preapproved individuals. Whether a different approach was preferable is not the issue before us. The juvenile court acted within its discretion by allowing Academy to grant self-passes in accord with its policies and procedures. Giving discretion to the Academy to grant self-passes was, in a sense, a transitional approach since it did not guarantee J.C. would be allowed off campus without supervision. If J.C. suffered setbacks, she would have the benefit of guidance counselors and support services at Academy. The court did not abuse its discretion in granting J.C.'s section 388 petition. II. Exclusion of J.C.'s Testimony

Mother contends the juvenile court erred in granting J.C.'s motion in limine to exclude her testimony from trial. Mother argues J.C.'s testimony was necessary to the trial issues, and to the extent J.C. would be traumatized by testifying in front of her parents, she could have testified outside of her parents' presence. The Agency responds that Mother has forfeited her argument about alternative means of testifying and that the court conducted a proper balancing test. The parties agree the court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

"Unlike a criminal defendant, a parent in a dependency proceeding does not have a right 'to full confrontation and cross-examination' under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution or article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. [Citations.] A parent does, however, have 'a due process right to a meaningful hearing with the opportunity to present evidence,' including a right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses." (In re Daniela G. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1092 (Daniela G.).)

A juvenile court has "discretion to exclude the testimony of a child in order to avoid psychological harm to the child, even though that testimony is relevant, the child is competent to testify, and the child is both practically and legally 'available' to testify," including under Evidence Code section 240. (In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1088 (Jennifer J.).) Given "the overriding objective of the dependency hearing[,] to preserve and promote the best interests of the child[, i]t would be a perversion of the procedure to impose upon it a requirement that the child's testimony always be presented, regardless of the trauma resulting to the child therefrom, and regardless of the necessity of such testimony in the resolution of the issues before the court." (Id. at p. 1089.)

Jennifer J. held that in considering whether to exclude a child's testimony, a court must engage in "a careful weighing of the interests involved," including a parent's right to call and cross-examine witnesses. (Jennifer J., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086; see also Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1146 ["Due process requires a balance"].) The child's testimony can be properly excluded where "the child's desires and wishes can be directly presented without live testimony, where the issues to be resolved would not be materially affected by the child's testimony, and where it is shown that the child would be psychologically damaged by being required to testify." (Jennifer J., at p. 1089.)

Applying the foregoing test, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding J.C.'s testimony from trial. Modification of the no self-pass order was not conditioned upon J.C.'s disclosure of her AWOL whereabouts. When the juvenile court conducted its weighing test, it explicitly assumed J.C. would refuse to disclose her AWOL location if she was called to testify. With that assumption in mind, the court stated it could resolve the disputed issues encompassed by the section 388 petition (e.g., changed circumstances, interest in obtaining self-passes) without J.C.'s testimony in light of other admissible evidence. We agree with this assessment. (Cf. In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 867-868 [abuse of discretion to exclude child's testimony where key disputed issue was his emotional harm to support jurisdictional finding and his testimony was likely to have resolved that issue].)

The court rationalized that J.C.'s testimony on direct examination would mostly duplicate the CASA and social worker's testimony, and J.C.'s cross-examination testimony carried a significant risk of psychological harm. The record supports the court's analysis. J.C. was suffering psychological and physical disturbances at the mere thought of testifying in court. Given her history of suicidal ideation, depression, and anxiety, the court could reasonably find that any benefit of J.C.'s testimony was outweighed by the risk of psychological damage. Mother's due process right was protected insofar as she could and did cross-examine the CASA and social worker and had the opportunity to call additional witnesses, if needed, who had direct contact with J.C. Notably, J.C. interacted with numerous people on a daily basis (teachers, counselors, housemates), who could testify to their observations of her behavior.

We additionally conclude Mother forfeited her argument regarding J.C.'s ability to testify outside of her parents' presence. Mother did not make such a request or suggestion at trial and may not raise it now. (Daniela G., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1090 [claim forfeited].) In any event, even if Mother had made such a request, the court would not have been required to grant it. On this record, the court could have reasonably concluded that cross-examination and scrutiny by Mother's counsel would seriously harm J.C. with little concomitant benefit.

III. Exclusion of Photographic Exhibits

Mother contends the court erred in excluding exhibits A, D, E, F, and G from evidence at trial. Each exhibit was represented by Mother's counsel to have been taken from an online account entitled, "j . . . u," as follows: Exhibit A is an undated photograph of J.C. Exhibit D was represented to be an undated photograph of a "pre-rolled marijuana joint in a plastic wrapper." Exhibit E is an undated photograph of a "young woman with some earphones on and fingers held up . . . lips are pursed." Exhibit F is an undated "photograph of a young woman with a thumbs up." Finally, exhibit G is a post of a "handwritten letter dated Friday, April 19, 2019, at 10:47, signed, 'You depressed piece of shit, you.' "

Mother's brief at one point argues that Exhibits A, E, F, and G, were erroneously excluded and at another point that Exhibits A, D, E, F, and G, were erroneously excluded. We conclude the inadmissibility argument is not forfeited and proceed to address all five exhibits.

The photographs in exhibits A and B appear to this court to be similar and of the same person. Exhibit B, posted on J.C.'s verified social media account, was admitted in evidence without objection, and no party disputed that exhibit B was a photograph of J.C.

In juvenile court hearings, "[t]he admission and exclusion of evidence shall be pursuant to the rules of evidence established by the Evidence Code and by judicial decision." (§ 701.) Under the Evidence Code, authentication of a writing is required before it may be admitted in evidence. (Evid. Code, § 1401.) Authentication means "(a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law." (Evid. Code, § 1400.)

A "writing" includes a photograph. (Evid. Code, § 250.)

"As with other writings, the proof that is necessary to authenticate a photograph . . . varies with the nature of the evidence that the photograph . . . is being offered to prove and with the degree of possibility of error. [Citation.] The first step is to determine the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. The purpose of the evidence will determine what must be shown for authentication, which may vary from case to case. [Citation.] The foundation requires that there be sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that the writing is what it purports to be, i.e., that it is genuine for the purpose offered." (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 267 (Goldsmith).)

Authentication is not limited to witness testimony but may be by any means provided by law. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 268; see People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1434-1435 [authentication of posts from social-networking internet web page].)

Here, we conclude the court did not err in excluding exhibits A, D, E, F, and G from evidence. Mother failed to authenticate the exhibits, that is, present evidence sufficient for a fact finder to conclude the exhibits were what Mother claimed them to be. There is no independent evidence in the record to support counsel's description of exhibit D as a pre-rolled marijuana joint. Moreover, Mother was effectively offering the social media posts as an indicator of J.C.'s judgment or behavior. However, there is no evidence in the record that J.C. owned or posted under the "j . . . u" account, and minor's counsel denied the account belonged to J.C. The exhibits were irrelevant unless the photographs, comments, and posts were made by J.C. For example, if a friend (or stranger) took the picture of, and/or posted comments about, the purported marijuana joint, then it would not reflect upon J.C.'s judgment. It was thus incumbent on Mother to make a prima facie showing that J.C. made the posts. Mother might have offered her own testimony, that of J.C.'s friends, or any other evidence, about the account in question, but that was not done. (See, e.g., In re K.B. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 989, 997-998 [investigating officer testified he routinely monitored social media account, and pictures from the account matched incriminating photographs obtained from a seized cell phone].) The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the specified exhibits.

Even assuming some of the photographs of J.C. were admissible for a more limited purpose, we would conclude their exclusion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In granting J.C.'s section 388 petition, the juvenile court fully acknowledged Mother's concerns and indicated that J.C. might falter, but they had "to let [J.C.] exercise her own judgment now and be there to support her if she fumbles and help her get back up so that she can continue to grow." Mother has not established any basis to reverse the court's rulings.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: IRION, J. GUERRERO, J.


Summaries of

In re J.C.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Oct 31, 2019
No. D076024 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2019)
Case details for

In re J.C.

Case Details

Full title:In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Oct 31, 2019

Citations

No. D076024 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2019)