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In re E.B.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Apr 20, 2017
E067207 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2017)

Opinion

E067207

04-20-2017

In re E.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.B., Defendant and Appellant.

Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Jamila Bayati, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J258084) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Christopher Marshall, Judge. Affirmed. Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Jamila Bayati, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant J.B. (Mother) has a history of abusing drugs and domestic violence that led to the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (CFS) removing her two-year-old son E.B. (the child) from her home. Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to the child. Mother argues that the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applies and that the juvenile court should have ordered legal guardianship instead of adoption. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we reject Mother's claim and affirm the judgment.

All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

The father of the child, R.A. (Father), is not a party to this appeal. Because Father is not a party to this appeal, the factual circumstances relating to Father will not be discussed at length.

II

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The family came to the attention of CFS in December 2014 after the child was born positive for methamphetamine, and admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) with breathing problems and withdrawals. Mother had also tested positive for methamphetamine at the child's birth. Mother had a history of using methamphetamine on and off for the last 12 years. She knew she would harm the baby if she used methamphetamine but claimed she was stressed, associated with the wrong people, and used it despite being pregnant. She admitted to having a recent history of domestic violence. Mother had a criminal history involving drug possession, domestic violence, and driving under the influence. Mother did not know Father's whereabouts.

On December 31, 2014, CFS filed a petition on behalf of the child pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support).

The subdivision (g) allegation was dismissed after Father was located.

At the January 2, 2015 detention hearing, Mother was present. Father had not yet been located. The child was formally detained and the parents were provided with supervised visitation.

CFS recommended that the allegations in the petition be found true and that Mother be provided with reunification services. Mother's proposed case plan required her to attend a domestic violence program, general counseling, a parenting education program, substance abuse treatment, and drug testing. CFS recommended services to Father be denied.

Mother began using drugs in 2001. She resided at one point with a boyfriend, who was extremely violent with her. Mother had been visiting the child twice a week for an hour and the visits reportedly went well. Father was married to another woman and had two adult children. Mother's relationship with Father began as a one-night stand. Father was not named on the child's birth certificate and CFS recommended he remain an alleged father.

Father appeared at the January 23, 2015 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing and requested paternity testing. He also sought reunification services. The juvenile court ordered a paternity test and set a trial for February 24, 2015.

The paternity test revealed that Father was the child's biological father. Father was cooperative with CFS, but lacked a stable home. Father had no criminal history and CFS recommended unsupervised visits for Father. Mother was provided with service referrals on January 21, 2015. She failed to drug test on three occasions and admitted she was " 'messing up.' " She also reported that she was unable to get to her outpatient treatment program and requested to enter an inpatient program, which was approved on February 19, 2015. Mother began individual counseling on February 19, 2015, and had participated in four parenting classes.

The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on February 24, 2015. The parents submitted waivers of their constitutional rights. The juvenile court found the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations true and declared the child a dependent of the court. The parents were provided with reunification services and ordered to participate.

By the time of the August 24, 2015 six-month review hearing, the parents had failed to show an ability to adequately provide for the child. Mother had begun her services but had not been able to remain clean and sober. She was still abusing substances and failed to follow through with her substance abuse treatment program. She also failed to begin a domestic violence program, even though her ex-boyfriend had hit her in the head in June 2015. Mother had no employment and lived with an elderly lady friend where she received room and board in exchange for helping the elderly friend. Father failed to provide CFS information about his residence or stay in contact with CFS. He also failed to visit the child. Notwithstanding the above-referenced shortcomings, CFS recommended continued services for the parents.

Mother had regularly visited the child twice a week for one hour. The visits were described as appropriate. During the visits, Mother fed and held the baby, but she at times became sad and emotional about not having her son in her care, inhibiting her ability to focus on the needs of the child. During a June 2015 visit, Mother fed the child but did not notice the child had finished his bottle and was sucking air. Additionally, the foster parent had to wake up Mother to attend her visits.

At the August 24, 2015 six-month review hearing trial was set for September 3, 2015, at Father's request.

The social worker met with the parents on August 24, 2015. Mother reported that she was participating in a substance abuse program three times a week, and therefore had not randomly drug tested. However, when the social worker called Mother's substance abuse program, staff reported that Mother had been discharged from the program because she failed to return after her August 17, 2015 intake.

At the September 3, 2015 six-month review hearing, the juvenile court once again ordered continued services for the parents. The court also ordered extended unsupervised visits for Father and supervised visits for Mother.

On September 18, 2015, the juvenile court authorized the child's placement with Father on family maintenance services. The court informed Father that he was not permitted to leave the child alone in his home with the female who resided there and that Mother was not permitted to have unsupervised visits with the child in his home. The child was placed in Father's care on October 23, 2015. CFS allowed Father to use the maternal grandmother for childcare.

On February 5, 2016, CFS detained the child and filed a section 387 supplemental petition due to Father violating the court's orders. Father had allowed the child to be alone with the female residing in his home. Father had also allowed Mother to have unsupervised visits with the child in violation of the court's order.

On February 5, 2016, Father told the social worker that the maternal grandmother was babysitting the child at her home and that he was working. The social worker went to Mother's home unannounced. Mother appeared to be under the influence with slurred words and was tearful. Mother reported that she wanted to return to treatment and get help for domestic violence and that she had psychotic thoughts when not attending inpatient substance abuse treatment. Mother talked at length about the child being in her home, playing in her yard, almost eating dog " 'poop.' " She also stated that the child slept in her bed and discussed how the child would pull the cell phone charger out of the wall. She further discussed how the child took his bottle at night before bedtime and about Father routinely dropping the child off and picking him up at her residence. The homeowner where Mother resided confirmed the child spent a significant amount of time at that home and how much the child loved his mother.

The social worker also went to the maternal grandmother's home. The maternal grandmother indicated that the child was with Father. She confirmed that Father drops the child off at Mother's home and reported that she had no concerns with the child being alone with Mother or sleeping at Mother's residence. She stated Mother " 'is an excellent mother.' " The social worker noted that the maternal grandmother's home contained no toys or baby items in view and that the maternal grandmother appeared to have difficulty walking and spoke slowly.

The social worker also visited Father's home on February 5, 2016. The same woman who had been seen at Father's home previously was there caring for the child. Father arrived minutes later and admitted to taking the child to Mother's home twice, but stated he thought the maternal grandmother would arrive soon after he left. He knew Mother actively used drugs, but felt he was not placing the child at risk.

At the February 10, 2016 section 387 detention hearing, at the request of minor's counsel, the court ordered the parents to drug test that day, and advised that a missed test would be deemed a positive test. The court found a prima facie case under section 387, detained the child, and ordered weekly supervised visits for the parents.

CFS recommended that the allegations in the section 387 petition be found true and that the court terminate services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Father was frustrated with Mother, yet he wanted the child to live with her. The social worker learned that a week before the child's recent detention, the maternal grandmother and Mother had brought the child to spend the night with the child's prior foster parent on at least two occasions. In addition, Father failed to show up for the recent court-ordered drug test, and Mother tested positive for amphetamines.

The foster parent informed the social worker that the child used to readily fall asleep, but he was now fussy and woke up three to four times nightly. The foster parent repeatedly needed to comfort the child and sit near his bed and pat him to sleep. The foster parent also reported that the child exhibited frustration and would hit himself. The foster parent had been working with the child to stop this behavior. Father was offered services to address the child's behavior, but Father chose not to have the child participate in these services.

The social worker had a difficult time contacting Mother. Mother would leave the social worker long messages, and then would call back and repeat herself. When the social worker attempted to call her back, Mother did not answer her phone. Mother was aware that she needed services, but during the last six months Mother had made no progress in her case plan. She continued to abuse drugs and was a no show for all drug tests until the court ordered her to test on February 10, 2016, which resulted in a positive test for amphetamines. Since the section 387 detention hearing, the parents regularly visited the child for the two-hour supervised visits. Mother expressed her frustration and anger with CFS during one visit. Mother also had a telephone call with the child; however, according to the foster parent, Mother's words were slurred and it was hard to understand her.

At the March 2, 2016 section 387 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered the parents to drug test and set a trial for March 17, 2016. Mother failed to show for the court-ordered drug test, and Father left the testing facility without testing.

After the March 2, 2016 hearing, Mother missed a scheduled visit with the child, and later claimed she had a migraine headache.

The contested section 387 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on March 17 and 18, 2016. Following testimony from Father and the social worker, and hearing argument from the parties, the juvenile court found the allegations in the section 387 petition true and formally removed the child from Father's custody. The court thereafter terminated the parents' services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The parents were provided with weekly supervised visits.

Father subsequently filed a writ petition, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence removing the child from Father's care, termination of services, and the reasonableness of services. This court affirmed the judgment on June 10, 2016 in case No. E065616. (R.A. v. Superior Court (Jun. 10, 2016, E065616) [nonpub. opn.].) --------

In their report filed July 7, 2016, CFS recommended termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption. At that time, the child was 18 months old and in good health. He was developing appropriately and meeting age-appropriate milestones. He was comfortable with his non-related foster mother who desired to adopt the child if there were no appropriate relatives available to adopt him. CFS was assessing three out-of- state relatives interested in adopting the child and had initiated the Interstate Compact Placement of Children (ICPC) request.

Mother had attended weekly supervised visits with the child, but she missed visits set for March 3, May 16, and May 23, 2016. Additionally, a visit set for March 18, 2016 was cancelled because Mother arrived 16 minutes late. Mother begged to allow the visit. The visitation center noted that Mother was " 'unke[m]pt, upset, irate, and high emotional [sic].' " It was reported that Mother had been incarcerated during the time period of some of these missed visits. In addition, it appeared the child's visits with Mother were detrimental to his well-being. The foster mother noted that the child did well with visits with Father, but not with Mother. The foster mother also reported that the child's behavior changed drastically following his visits with Mother. The child refused to sleep even though he appeared tired, became extremely clingy, and cried frantically and loudly when the foster mother tried to put him down for a few seconds. Additionally, the child would not eat for nearly 24 hours, and when he did, he would throw up. It took several days for the foster mother to stabilize the child. CFS staff also noted the child appeared more comfortable with Father during visits than with Mother.

On July 18, 2016, the juvenile court set a further section 366.26 hearing to allow completion of the ICPC assessments for the out-of-state relatives.

On July 18 and 25, 2016, CFS received ICPC approvals from the state of Louisiana for placement of the child with the paternal uncle and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. A., and the paternal first cousin and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. S., respectively. CFS was anticipating that the third relative would also be approved for placement by ICPC. The paternal relatives had discussed who would be the best placement for the child and determined Mr. and Mrs. S. would be the best placement in that they had no children and were looking to adopt when they were made aware of the child in March 2016. The paternal relatives reported that they were very close and lived close to each other so the child would have ongoing contact with his many paternal relatives who lived in the area. CFS was in agreement with having the child placed with Mr. and Mrs. S.

On July 18, 2016, the S.'s flew to California to attend the court hearing and visit with the child. They also flew to California on July 25, and stayed until July 28, 2016 to have daily visits with the child, and planned on flying back to California on August 7, 2016, to spend time with the child and attend the court hearing. The child readily engaged with the S.'s and readily went with the S.'s on outings. He left his foster mother without exhibiting signs of distress or anxiety. He was affectionate with Mr. and Mrs. S. and appeared comfortable with them. He also cried when the S.'s left upon their return from the outings, indicating he was quickly developing a positive attachment to them.

Mr. and Mrs. S. were in their early 30's. They were committed to adopting the child and providing him with love, stability, and security. Mrs. S. was a part-time registered nurse, and Mr. S. was a firefighter. They had no criminal, child abuse, substance abuse, or psychological history, and were reportedly in good health. Mr. S. coached little league, and the S.'s often rode their ATV's to the homes of relatives for family functions. They resided in a three bedroom two bath home.

At a further hearing on August 9, 2016, the juvenile court placed the child with the S.'s. The parents were provided with monthly supervised visits and the contested section 366.26 hearing was set for November 4, 2016.

On October 26, 2016, CFS reported that the child was doing well in his placement with the S.'s. The ICPC social worker observed that the child had formed a strong bond with the S.'s, and referred to them as " 'mommy and daddy.' "

The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on November 4, 2016. At that time, the parents objected to termination of their parental rights but had no affirmative evidence to offer and requested a lesser permanent plan such as a legal guardianship. The child's counsel and CFS asked the court to find no exception to adoption and termination of parental rights. The juvenile court found the child adoptable and terminated parental rights. This appeal followed.

III

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights should be reversed because the beneficial parent relationship exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applies. We disagree.

This "may be the most unsuccessfully litigated issue in the history of law." (In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1255, fn. 5, overruled on other grounds in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414.) While it can have merit in an appropriate case (e.g., In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296-301 (S.B.)), this is clearly not such a case.

In general, at a section 366.26 hearing, if the juvenile court finds that the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1).) This rule, however, is subject to a number of statutory exceptions (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(A) & (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi)), including the beneficial parental relationship exception, which applies when "termination would be detrimental to the child" (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)) because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

"When applying the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, the court balances the strength and quality of the parent-child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging that a stable family would confer on the child. If severing the existing parental relationship would deprive the child of 'a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.' [Citation.]" (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1234-1235, italics added.)

" '[F]or the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt.' [Citation.]" (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 938.) " 'A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent. [Citation.] A child who has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree, but that does not meet the child's need for a parent.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 937.) Even a "loving and happy relationship" with a parent does not necessarily establish the statutory exception. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419.) "The age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent[-]child bond." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)

No matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existence of an "emotional bond" with the child, "the parents must show that they occupy 'a parental role' in the child's life." (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108; In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1418-1419.) The relationship that gives rise to this exception to the statutory preference for adoption "characteristically aris[es] from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. Day-to-day contact is not necessarily required, although it is typical in a parent-child relationship." (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51.)

The parent contesting the termination of parental rights bears the burden of showing both that a beneficial parental relationship exists and that severing that relationship would result in great harm to the child. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315.) A juvenile court's finding that the beneficial parental relationship exception does not apply is reviewed in part under the substantial evidence standard and in part for abuse of discretion. The factual finding, i.e., whether a beneficial parental relationship exists, is reviewed for substantial evidence, while the court's determination that the relationship does or does not constitute a "compelling reason" (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53) for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Bailey J., supra, at pp. 1314-1315; accord, In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622.) A juvenile court's ruling on whether there is a " 'compelling reason' " is reviewed for abuse of discretion because the court must "determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and . . . weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption." (In re Bailey J., supra, at p. 1315, italics omitted.)

In this case, although Mother missed visits on four occasions, the record indicates Mother had maintained regular contact and visitation with the child. However, the evidence fails to show Mother's relationship with the child promoted the child's well-being to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being he would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534 (Brandon C.).) While there was evidence of successful visits between the child and Mother during the early stages of the proceedings, it was insufficient to outweigh the benefits of finally providing the child with permanency and stability. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the child would be harmed, much less "greatly harmed," by termination of parental rights. (In re B.D., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1234-1235.)

Moreover, there is also evidence supporting a reasonable conclusion that the child would gain a greater benefit from being placed in a permanent adoptive home. Mother simply cannot meet her burden to show that the bond between her and the child was so strong and beneficial to the child that it outweighed the benefit the child would receive from having a stable, permanent adoptive home. The child was removed from Mother's custody at birth and was nearly two years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing. The child was never placed in Mother's custody. And, Mother never obtained unsupervised visits with the child, with the exception of when Father violated the court's order. The child was placed with paternal relatives who were committed to adopting him and providing him with the security and stability the child required. The child had instantly formed a bond with his paternal relatives and was doing very well in their home. The child referred to them as " 'mommy and daddy' " and exhibited no signs of distress from being separated from his foster mother. The child and his paternal relatives had formed a strong, mutual, loving bond, and the paternal relatives ensured the child had a safe, nurturing home. The child was happy and content with his paternal relatives, and urgently required permanence and stability. On the other hand, Mother had not demonstrated an ability to provide the child with a stable, safe and loving home environment even while clandestinely caring for the child during a four-month period.

Mother argues that the child suffered detriment due to being separated from his parents and that Mother was bonded with the child and helped take care of the child for Father during a four-month time frame. She points out that both the homeowner where Mother resided and the maternal grandmother reported Mother was an excellent mother and the child loved his mother. However, in addition to the parents repeatedly violating court orders, the juvenile court had sufficient evidence to determine mere contact with Mother caused the child to suffer detriment. After the child's removal from Father's care for violating the court orders, the child was uncomfortable with Mother at visits, and refused to eat and sleep after visits. The child's foster mother noted the child used to readily fall asleep when first placed with her, but when he returned to the foster mother's care, the child was fussy, required attention to fall asleep, and woke three to four times nightly. The foster mother also stated that the child would also get frustrated and hit himself and would not eat for a 24-hour period after visits with Mother. The child's behavior suggests the detriment stemmed from Mother's inattentive caregiving due to her substance abuse. Mother continued to abuse drugs even while the child was in her care. She did a poor job parenting the child. Mother was actively abusing drugs, and apparently had psychotic thoughts. Mother described her own inability to supervise the child when she admitted he put dog " 'poop' " in his mouth and played with her phone charger when in her care. Moreover, on at least two occasions, Mother dropped off the child with his foster mother before he was again detained while surreptitiously caring for the child in violation of court orders. The juvenile court could have reasonably concluded Mother's unfit parenting triggered the child's regression. There is no evidence to suggest the child suffered detriment due to being separated from Mother. Rather, the evidence shows the child's contact with Mother was detrimental to the child.

Mother relies on S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 289 to support her contention that she established the beneficial relationship exception. In S.B., a three-year-old child was removed from the custody of her father who had been her primary caregiver. The father immediately acknowledged his drug use was untenable and fully complied with his case plan, remained drug free, and regularly visited his daughter three days a week. (Id. at pp. 295, 298.) Even after a year apart, when the visits ended, the child continued to become upset and wanted to leave with her father. (Id. at p. 298.) The appellate court reversed the termination of parental rights, finding substantial evidence to support application of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception on the basis of an emotionally significant relationship arising from the frequent and loving visits between parent and child. (S.B., at pp. 298-299.)

Since its publication, S.B. has been subject to considerable criticism, particularly for its suggestion the exception applies if the child will merely "derive[] some measure of benefit" from the parental relationship. (S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 301.) In Jason J., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at page 937, the same court that decided S.B. cautioned: "The S.B. opinion must be viewed in light of its particular facts. It does not, of course, stand for the proposition that a termination order is subject to reversal whenever there is 'some measure of benefit' in continued contact between parent and child." In In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, the same court once again emphasized that S.B. must be "confined to its extraordinary facts. [S.B.] does not support the proposition a parent may establish the parent-child beneficial relationship exception by merely showing the child derives some measure of benefit from maintaining parental contact." (Id. at pp. 558-559.)

In any event, unlike S.B.'s father, who had "complied with 'every aspect' of his case plan," Mother in this case failed to comply with her case plan and was unable to maintain sobriety. (S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) Mother continued to abuse drugs and had not demonstrated an ability to provide the child with a stable, safe, and loving home environment. Further, there was no evidence in the record before us that the child would suffer detriment if parental rights were terminated, unlike the daughter in S.B. The child did not display the depth of emotional attachment to Mother that S.B. displayed to her father. Unlike the father in S.B., Mother was not described as parental towards the child. It was noted during visits that Mother was inattentive towards the child and that the child appeared uncomfortable with Mother. The child also exhibited signs of emotional harm after being cared for by Mother secretly in violation of court orders. Accordingly, the juvenile court had ample evidentiary support in finding there was no beneficial parental relationship sufficient to overcome the statutory preference for adoption.

Mother also relies on In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102 (C.B.), but that case is inapposite. In C.B., "the juvenile court implicitly found that there was substantial, positive emotional parent-child attachment despite the lack of day-to-day contact" but found that the benefits of adoption outweighed the benefits of the parental relationship. (Id. at p. 126.) Because the juvenile court's conclusion was "based, at least in part, upon the expectation that the children's aunt and uncle would permit the children to have continued contact with mother after they were adopted," the appellate court reversed and remanded the matter to the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 127.) In the instant case, the juvenile court did not improperly consider "the prospective adoptive parents' willingness to allow the child[] to have continued contact with mother." (Id. at p. 128.) Thus, C.B. does not help Mother.

Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1530 also does not support Mother's position. In that case, the juvenile court found that the children would benefit from continuing their relationship with their mother and ordered a legal guardianship instead of adoption. (Id. at p. 1533.) The agency appealed, but the appellate court found substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the children would benefit from continuing the relationship with the mother. (Id. at p. 1537.) In contrast to Brandon C., this case involves a substantial evidence review of the juvenile court's determination that the parental relationship exception did not apply. Moreover, that case is factually distinguishable. In Brandon C., the children had been placed with the paternal grandmother, who testified the children referred to the mother as " 'Mommy,' " and who did not think it would be in the children's best interest to terminate their parental relationships. (Id. at p. 1533.) The agency "did not present any evidence to the contrary." (Id. at p. 1537.) Here, there was evidence that the child referred to his paternal adoptive relatives as "mommy" and "daddy" and that he was uncomfortable with Mother. Further, CFS presented evidence that it was in the child's best interest to terminate parental rights in order to provide the child with stability and permanency.

The totality of evidence shows that there would be no significant detriment in terminating Mother's parental rights. At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, Mother did not hold a parental role or have a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed by termination of parental rights. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.) We conclude that the juvenile court did not err in not applying the parental beneficial relationship exception to adoption.

IV

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J. We concur: RAMIREZ

P. J. SLOUGH

J.


Summaries of

In re E.B.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Apr 20, 2017
E067207 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2017)
Case details for

In re E.B.

Case Details

Full title:In re E.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

Date published: Apr 20, 2017

Citations

E067207 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2017)