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Sabre v. First Dominion Capital

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Dec 10, 2001
01 Civ. 2145 (BSJ) (HBP) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2001)

Summary

In Sabre, the court ruled that "the 30(b)(6) deposition is a separate deposition from the deposition of that same person as an individual witness and is presumptively subject to a separate, independent time limit."

Summary of this case from DHL Express (Usa), Inc. v. Express Save Industries

Opinion

01 Civ. 2145 (BSJ) (HBP).

December 10, 2001.


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


In correspondence dated November 29, December 3 and December 4, 2001, the parties dispute whether the presumptive seven-hour time limit set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(2) applies cumulatively to the testimony given by a witness in both his individual capacity and as a corporate representative pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.p. 30(b)(6) or whether the individual deposition and the 30(b)(6) deposition are subject to independent seven-hour presumptive time limits. For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that the latter interpretation is correct and that the depositions of an individual who is noticed as an individual witness pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.p. 30(b)(1) and who is also produced as a corporate representative pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.p. 30(b)(6) are presumptively subject to independent seven-hour time limits.

Fed.R.Civ.p. 30(d)(2) provides that "[u]nless otherwise authorized by the court or stipulated by the parties, a deposition is limited to one day of seven hours." The 2000 Advisory Committee Notes to this amendment provide that "[f]or purposes of this durational limit, the deposition of each person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) should be considered a separate deposition."

A deposition pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) is substantially different from a witness's deposition as an individual. A 30(b)(6) witness testifies as a representative of the entity, his answers bind the entity and he is responsible for providing all the relevant information known or reasonably available to the entity. 8A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice Procedure § 2103 (2d ed. 1994). The distinct status of a 30(b)(6) deposition is confirmed by the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which expressly state that for purposes of calculating the number of a depositions in a case, a 30(b)(6) deposition is separately counted as a single deposition, regardless of the number of witnesses designated. As a separate deposition that probes the knowledge of the entity and not the personal knowledge of the individual testifying, a 30(b)(6) deposition should be subject to its own independent seven-hour limit.

If defendants' interpretation were correct, and a person who is both an individual witness and a 30(b)(6) witness were presumptively subject to a single seven-hour deposition there would be substantial potential for over-reaching. For example, any entity that wanted to limit the testimony of an individual could accomplish that goal by designating the individual as a 30(b)(6) witness; under defendant's interpretation, every minute spent conducting the 30(b)(6) deposition would be deducted from the time available to probe the witness's individual knowledge. Conversely, defendants' interpretation would also permit an entity to curtail 30(b)(6) examinations by designating as a 30(b)(6) witness a person who previously testified for six hours as an individual and has only one hour left on his or her presumptive seven-hour clock. An interpretation that would lead to such absurd results must be rejected.

This is not to say, however, that the inquiring party has carte blanche to depose an individual for seven hours as an individual and seven hours as a 30(b)(6) witness. In the case of many closely held corporations, the knowledge of an individual concerning a particular subject also constitutes the total knowledge of the entity. In such a situation, the witness could simply adopt the testimony he or she provided in a former capacity, thereby obviating the need for a second deposition. In addition, if the questioning at any deposition becomes repetitive or is otherwise being conducted in an oppressive manner, the aggrieved party can always make application for a protective order.

Accordingly, I conclude that the 30(b)(6) deposition of an witness is a separate deposition from the deposition of that same person as an individual witness and is presumptively subject to a separate, independent seven-hour time limit.

SO ORDERED


Summaries of

Sabre v. First Dominion Capital

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Dec 10, 2001
01 Civ. 2145 (BSJ) (HBP) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2001)

In Sabre, the court ruled that "the 30(b)(6) deposition is a separate deposition from the deposition of that same person as an individual witness and is presumptively subject to a separate, independent time limit."

Summary of this case from DHL Express (Usa), Inc. v. Express Save Industries

In Sabre v. First Dominion Capital, 2001 WL 1590544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the Court concluded that "the 30(b)(6) deposition of a witness is a separate deposition from the deposition of that same person as an individual witness and is presumptively subject to a separate, independent seven-hour time limit."

Summary of this case from Miller v. Waseca Medical Center, Mayo Health System
Case details for

Sabre v. First Dominion Capital

Case Details

Full title:JOHN L. SABRE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FIRST DOMINION CAPITAL, LLC, et…

Court:United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Dec 10, 2001

Citations

01 Civ. 2145 (BSJ) (HBP) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2001)

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