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Rust v. Quality Car Corral, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Feb 20, 1980
614 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1980)

Summary

holding that if complaint is not filed within time period prescribed by TILA statute of limitations, federal court has no jurisdiction to entertain it, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not alter this fundamental premise

Summary of this case from Walker v. Michael W. Colton Trust

Opinion

No. 77-3528.

Argued December 10, 1979.

Decided February 20, 1980.

Drake W. Ebner, Swain Hardin, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

W. Kenneth Zuk, Zuk Schaeffer, James R. Whitaker, Keating, Muething Klekamp, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

Before CELEBREZZE, MERRITT and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.


This case requires us to construe 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), the statute of limitations applicable to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. Plaintiff Rust appeals the district court's dismissal of the action based upon the one-year statute of limitations contained in § 1640(e). We affirm.

On July 1, 1976, plaintiff entered into an installment sale agreement with defendant Quality Car Corral, Inc. Quality Car subsequently assigned its interest in the contract to defendant Provident Bank. On July 1, 1977, Rust filed a complaint in district court. He alleged that defendants' extension of credit to finance the transaction had violated various provisions of the Truth in Lending Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that Rust was barred from suit for failure to bring his claim within the one-year statute of limitations.

The issue here is whether the statutory limitations period had expired when Rust filed his claim on July 1, 1977. The governing statute provides: "Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (emphasis added).

Appellant argues that "one year" should be computed by applying Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 6(a) states:

In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. . .

Thus, according to plaintiff's interpretation, the July 1, 1977 filing was timely because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until July 2, 1976.

In support of his position, plaintiff cites Gammons v. Domestic Loans of Winston-Salem, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 819 (M.D.N.C. 1976), and Souife v. First National Bank of Commerce, New Orleans, Louisiana, 452 F. Supp. 818 (E.D.La. 1978). Both cases applied Rule 6(a) to computations of the 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) limitations period.

We believe, however, that defendants have expressed the better view of the relationship between a federal statute and Rule 6(a). The Truth in Lending Act creates a cause of action and confers jurisdiction on federal courts to hear cases arising under the statute. That jurisdiction is defined and circumscribed by the Act itself, in a temporal as well as a substantive sense. If a complaint is not filed within the time period prescribed by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), a federal court has no jurisdiction to entertain it.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not alter this fundamental premise. The "rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts . . . ." Rule 82, Fed.R.Civ.P. Their design is, rather, to govern procedural matters once an action is properly before the court. See Joint Council Dining Car Employees, Local 370 v. Delaware, L. W. R. Co., 157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946). Accordingly, we must find jurisdiction in this case, if at all, in the statute itself and not by reference to Rule 6(a).

The district court held that the language of Section 1640(e) precludes adoption of plaintiff's position. We agree. The phrase "within one year from the date of occurrence" is straightforward. Nothing in that language supports judicial implication of a lapse in time between the "occurrence" and the date the statute of limitations begins to run. In the context of this case, the alleged violations took place on July 1, 1976. To obtain relief under the Act, Rust had one year — 365 days — beginning on the date of the transaction to file his complaint. The last day of that year was June 30, 1977. Any other analysis would be inconsistent with the statutory language. We have already indicated this understanding of Section 1640(e) in dictum. Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874, 94 S.Ct. 161, 38 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973). We reaffirm that interpretation here and note that the Third Circuit concurred in our reading of the statute in Bartholomew v. Northampton National Bank of Easton, 584 F.2d 1288, 1296 (3d Cir. 1978).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.


Summaries of

Rust v. Quality Car Corral, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Feb 20, 1980
614 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1980)

holding that if complaint is not filed within time period prescribed by TILA statute of limitations, federal court has no jurisdiction to entertain it, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not alter this fundamental premise

Summary of this case from Walker v. Michael W. Colton Trust

refusing to apply Fed.R.Civ.P. 6 when computing a limitations period in the Truth in Lending Act

Summary of this case from In re Pugh

In Rust v. Quality Car Corral, Inc., 614 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1980), the court refused to apply Rule 6(a) and included the day of the relevant event in the counting.

Summary of this case from Merriweather v. City of Memphis

In Rust, a case concerning when a statute of limitations began to run, we held that the one-year statute of limitations period at issue began on the date of the occurrence (the date the parties entered into an installment agreement), and not on the day after, as would be the case had we applied the computation method in Civil Rule 6(a).

Summary of this case from Bartlik v. U.S. Dept. of Labor

In Rust, the narrow question addressed was whether Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be read into § 1640(e) to exclude the actual date of the violation from computation of the one year limitations period.

Summary of this case from Jones v. Transohio Sav. Ass'n

In Rust v. Quality Car Corral, 614 F.2d 1118, 1119 (6th Cir. 1980) the Sixth Circuit held that if a complaint is not filed within the time period prescribed by the TILA statute of limitations, a federal court has no jurisdiction to entertain it, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not alter this fundamental premise.

Summary of this case from Trimm v. Fifth Third Mortgage Company

In Rust v. Quality Car Corral, 614 F.2d 1118, 1119 (6th Cir. 1980) the Sixth Circuit held that if a complaint is not filed within the time period prescribed by the TILA statute of limitations, a federal court has no jurisdiction to entertain it, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not alter this fundamental premise.

Summary of this case from Roache v. Huron Valley Financial

In Rust v. Quality Car Corral, Inc., 614 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1980), upon which defendants rely, the Sixth Circuit, in construing the time limitation contained in § 1640(e), held that "jurisdiction is defined and circumscribed by the Act itself, in a temporal as well as substantive sense."

Summary of this case from Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp.

In Rust, the court held that a complaint filed July 1, 1977 was barred by the TILA statute of limitations where the installment sales agreement was entered into on July 1, 1976.

Summary of this case from Krajci v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.

In Rust, the Sixth Circuit was confronted with a fact situation which required them to construe 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), the statute of limitations applicable to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. The District Court had dismissed the action based upon the one-year statute of limitations contained in Section 1640(e) and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of this case from In re Butcher

In Rust the court held that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply to exclude the day of the occurrence of the violation in computing the one-year statute of limitations under the Truth in Lending Act.

Summary of this case from In re Butcher
Case details for

Rust v. Quality Car Corral, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:ROBERT L. RUST, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. QUALITY CAR CORRAL, INC.; AND THE…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

Date published: Feb 20, 1980

Citations

614 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1980)

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Merriweather v. City of Memphis

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