Rubin v. Green

43 Citing briefs

  1. PARRISH v. LATHAM & WATKINS (To be called and continued to the June 2017 calendar.)

    Amicus Curiae Brief of The Association of Southern California Defense Counsel

    Filed May 17, 2016

    Just the opposite; no legitimate purpose is served on this record by expanding litigation-related torts. (Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1199 [“preferring instead the increased use of sanctions within the underlying lawsuit and legislative measures” including fee awards].) 23 CONCLUSION The Court of Appeal ultimately affirmed dismissal of this malicious prosecution under the anti-SLAPP statute based upon the interim adverse judgment doctrine.

  2. BARAL v. SCHNITT

    Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed July 16, 2015

    [Citations.] That is, the key in determining whether the privilege applies is whether the injury allegedly resulted from an act that was communicative in its essential nature.” (/d. at p. 1058; see also Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1195 [‘‘the fact that defendants’ communications with the Cedar Village residents necessarily 46 involvedrelated acts” does not“destroy the privilege’’].) Here, the gravamenofBaral’s cause of action regarding Moss Adamsis clearly communicative.

  3. Epistar Corporation v. Philips Lumileds Lighting Company, LLC

    MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings With Respect To Epistar Corporation's First, Third, And Fourth Claims Regarding Unfair Competition And Tortious Interference

    Filed June 5, 2008

    79 Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal. 4th 1187 (1993). 80 Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 182 (emphasis added) (citing and quoting Rubin, 4 Cal. 4th at 1201- 1203). Case 4:07-cv-05194-CW Document 54 Filed 06/05/2008 Page 19 of 27 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW PALO ALTO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1-PA/3705519.6 15 REDACTED PHILIPS LUMILEDS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS C 07-5194 CW “may . . . not ‘plead around’ an ‘absolute bar to relief’ simply ‘by recasting the cause of action for unfair competition.’”81 Epistar’s Unfair Competition Claims fail as a matter of law.

  4. ROSE v. BANK OF AMERICA (Mauro, J., assigned justice pro tempore; Chin, J., not participating)

    Respondent’s Answer to Petition for Review

    Filed January 20, 2012

    Even prior to Manufacturers Life, this Court had adopted the rationale of these Court of Appeal decisions (Safeco, Maler and Industrial Indemnity) to foreclose UCL claims. (See Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1199-1202 [UCL could not be used to sue for conduct protected by litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)].) Federal courts also have adhered to this rule in considering whether federal statutes can serve as bases for California UCL claims.

  5. Smit v. Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. et al

    Memorandum in Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

    Filed February 4, 2011

    The litigation privilege created absolute immunity for the Rubin defendant that “‘may not be circumvented by recasting the action as one under’” the UCL. Id. (quoting Rubin, 4 Cal. 4th at 1202). But Cel-Tech sharply circumscribed this rule: “To forestall an action under the unfair competition law, another provision must actually ‘bar’ the action or clearly permit the conduct.”

  6. Girafa.Com,Inc. v. Alexa Internet, Inc. et al

    MOTION to Dismiss DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF UNDER FED.R.CIV. P. 12

    Filed July 16, 2008

    By filing its UCL claim, Girafa is attempting to engage in the very “unending roundelay of litigation” that the California Supreme Court has denounced as “evil.” Rubin, 4 Cal. 4th at 1054. California law simply does not allow a defendant to challenge the merits of pending litigation in a collateral and derivative lawsuit.

  7. Sengchanthalangsy v. Accelerated Recovery, et al

    MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings

    Filed December 27, 2006

    See, e.g., Zurich, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 24 (claims based upon allegedly fraudulent statements made by attorney in order to induce unfavorable settlement failed because privilege “applies to statements made by counsel during settlement negotiations”) (citations omitted); Petrovich, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 171 (same: Case 3:06-cv-01124-JAH-BLM Document 14 Filed 12/27/06 Page 7 of 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SENGCHANTHALANGSY V. ACCELERATED RECOVERY SPECIALISTS (C06 CV 1124-JAH (BLM)) MPA IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 7. plaintiff “can not [sic] plead around the litigation privilege based on the theory that the defamatory statements were fraudulently published to coerce a settlement”); Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 219-20 (privilege barred claim based on alleged false statements made by attorney during divorce proceedings); see also Rubin, 4 Cal. 4th at 1195-96 (§ 17200 claim based upon allegedly false statements made to potential clients concerning litigation barred by privilege); Lamour v. Campanale, 96 Cal. App. 3d 566, 569 (1979) (attorney demand letter relating to potential lawsuit held privileged); Lerette, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 577-78 (attorney demand letter privileged even though no lawsuit had been filed). None of the claims against defendants Vasbinder and Collins can survive here.

  8. Valadimir Parenago et al v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank et al

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case

    Filed October 4, 2016

    Thus, each and every cause of action based on the recordation of the foreclosure notices is barred by the litigation privilege. Kachlon, 168 Cal.App.4th at 336; Rubin, 4 Cal. 4th at 1187, 1193-94. Upon these grounds alone, there is sufficient basis to conclude that Plaintiffs improperly named ALAW in this action and the First Amended Complaint should be dismissed as to ALAW.

  9. Valadimir Parenago et al v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank et al

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case

    Filed August 2, 2016

    Thus, each and every cause of action based on the recordation of the foreclosure notices is barred by the litigation privilege. Kachlon, 168 Cal.App.4th at 336; Rubin, 4 Cal. 4th at 1187, 1193-94. Upon these grounds alone, there is sufficient basis to conclude that Plaintiffs improperly named ALAW in this action and the Complaint should be dismissed as to ALAW.

  10. Guccione et al v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

    MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed January 20, 2015

    (See generally, FAC and Exhibits.) These communications were all in furtherance of resolving the State Court Action by agreeing on a reinstatement amount, and therefore fall within the privilege. (FAC, ¶¶ 20-44.) The litigation privilege bars all tort claims except for malicious prosecution, and has also been held to also preclude constitutional, statutory, and breach of contract causes of action in certain circumstances. See Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 215-16 (tort claims other than malicious prosecution barred); Jacob B. v. County of Shasta, 40 Cal. 4th 948, 952 (2007) (suit based on violation of constitutional right barred); Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal. 4th 1187, 1204 (1993) (litigation privilege barred California Business and Professions Code section 17200 claim); Wentland v. Wass, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1484, 1492 (2005) (breach of contract claim barred so long as claim comports with policy reasons for litigation privilege). Chase therefore respectfully submits