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Roland v. Covenant Care of California Inc.

California Court of Appeals, Third District, San Joaquin
Nov 6, 2008
No. C056658 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2008)

Opinion


GEORGE ROLAND et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COVENANT CARE OF CALIFORNIA, INC., Defendant and Appellant. C056658 California Court of Appeal, Third District, San Joaquin November 6, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super. Ct. No. CV029766

BUTZ, J.

Covenant Care of California, Inc. (Covenant) appeals from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.2, 1292.4, 1294.) The trial court denied the motion, inter alia, on the ground that Covenant had waived any such right by actively participating in the litigation and failing to seek arbitration until trial was imminent. Covenant contends this ruling was erroneous. Respondents George Roland (Roland) and his children, Janice Coleman, Pamela Lighten, Darwin Roland, Charlene Young, and Sandra Drain (collectively, the Rolands) contend that the appeal of the ruling is frivolous and taken solely for delay. Finding no merit in Covenant’s contention of error, we shall affirm the judgment (order denying motion to compel arbitration). However, we are not persuaded that Covenant’s appeal is frivolous and shall deny the Rolands’ motion for sanctions.

Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Rolands filed the complaint initiating this action on June 30, 2006. The gist of the complaint, as amended, is as follows: Covenant operates Wagner Heights Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (Wagner Heights) in Stockton, a 24-hour skilled nursing facility providing rehabilitation services. On July 8, 2005, after an uneventful elective surgery for revision of a prior left knee replacement, George Roland was sent to Wagner Heights. As a result of malfeasance during an 11-day stay at Wagner Heights, he developed serious bedsores causing great pain and humiliation. This prevented rehabilitation from the knee surgery and led to a staphylococcus infection that required a month-long rehospitalization. As a result, Roland, who had lived independently before the surgery, will require the assistance of a caregiver for the rest of his life. The Roland children witnessed abuse and neglect of Roland while he was at Wagner Heights and their complaints to Wagner Heights staff were disregarded, causing them severe emotional injury.

Covenant was served with the amended complaint on September 1, 2006. It filed an answer, by way of a general denial and allegation of affirmative defenses, on October 24, 2006. One of those defenses is: “That Plaintiffs herein executed a Facility-Patient Arbitration Agreement, which was in full force and effect at the time of all treatment rendered by Defendant and Defendant asserts the right and entitlement to have this matter arbitrated pursuant to said agreement.”

Initial case management statements were filed in January 2007, and extensive discovery was commenced by both sides in February 2007. On February 23, 2007, Covenant issued a subpoena for “any and all records and documents including but not limited to any and all billing records and records of payments” pertaining to Roland to “Kaiser Hospital & PMG/Billing Dept. c/o Healthcare Recoveries--Unit Q” in Louisville, Kentucky.

On March 6, 2007, Roland filed a motion for trial setting preference under section 36, on the ground that he is 85 years old, in frail health, and suffering from debilitating conditions. On March 15, 2007, before Roland’s motion was heard, the court set a trial date of September 17, 2007. Covenant opposed the pending motion for trial preference, without mention of arbitration. The motion for preference was granted on April 3, 2007, and the trial date was advanced to July 30, 2007.

On April 6, 2007, Covenant issued a subpoena for “copies of any and all membership agreements (including but not limited to the health plan medical and hospital services agreement, disclosures, skilled nursing facility service agreements, amendments) that cover George Roland for any and all of the health care services he is entitled to receive under any and all membership agreements” to “Kaiser PMG/Stockton, Attn: Barbara Bower” and to “Kaiser Legal Department” in Oakland.

On May 2, 2007, Covenant received a copy of a document entitled “Evidence of Coverage Plan” describing health care coverage provided members under the “Senior Advantage” plan, an agreement between Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Kaiser) and the ILWU-PMA Welfare Plan, for the period between July 1, 2005 and June 30, 2006. The document provides for binding arbitration of certain claims asserted by a member against parties including any organization whose contract with Kaiser requires arbitration of claims brought by members.

On May 16, 2007, Covenant received from Kaiser a copy of an application form for Senior Advantage health plan membership signed by George Roland on August 22, 1996. Above the signature line are statements acknowledging agreement to abide by the provisions of the health plan and that any claim he asserts for “medical or hospital malpractice, or premises liability must be decided by binding arbitration.”

On May 17, 2007, Covenant notified the plaintiffs of its view that the disputes in this action were subject to arbitration under the Senior Advantage health plan contract provisions and requested a stipulation to arbitrate the matter. Plaintiffs replied the same day that they would like a written explanation of Covenant’s reasoning concerning an entitlement to arbitrate in view of the imminent trial date and the consideration that there was a claim of elder abuse.

On June 6, 2007, Covenant notified plaintiffs that unless they were interested in stipulating to arbitration it would seek an order shortening time for a motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs declined so to stipulate. On June 7, 2007, Covenant filed an application for an order shortening time to hear a motion to compel arbitration. The application was denied.

On June 12, 2007, Covenant filed a motion for an order to compel arbitration under the provisions of the Senior Advantage health plan contract. The hearing was set for July 20, 2007, just 10 days before the July 30 trial date. In addition to the documents received from Kaiser, the moving papers included a contract between Covenant and Kaiser for the provision of skilled nursing services to Kaiser members at Wagner Heights. The contract provides that Covenant shall submit to binding arbitration of Kaiser member’s claims in accordance with the Kaiser membership agreement. The contract was executed in October of 2000 on behalf of Covenant by Janey Hargreaves, the then and current administrator of Wagner Heights. In her foundation declaration, Hargreaves avers: “I clearly recognize and am familiar with the [contract] document.”

Covenant’s supporting memorandum of points and authorities commences with the argument that it had been diligent in discovering information about a binding arbitration provision between Roland and Kaiser. It laments that counsel for Covenant did not discover that such a provision “existed” until May 16, 2007.

On June 28, 2007, the court heard the Rolands’ motion to continue the trial date for two weeks. Covenant argued for a longer delay. In view of conflicts and the court’s trial calendar, the court reset the trial date to November 5, 2007.

On July 9, 2007, the Rolands filed their opposition to the motion to compel arbitration arguing, inter alia, that Covenant had waived any right to arbitrate under the Senior Advantage health plan contract by failing to make any demand for such arbitration until the litigation had progressed to the threshold of trial. They noted that various law and motion matters had been litigated and that there had been extensive discovery, including dozens of depositions, and that the motion to arbitrate had not been filed until trial preparation was almost entirely completed.

The Rolands also supplied evidence showing that Pamela Lighten, acting for her father under a power of attorney at the time of his admission to Wagner Heights, was offered a choice by Covenant of whether to accept or decline a written provision to the “Resident Admission Agreement” document calling for binding arbitration and that she declined.

The opposition declaration of the Rolands’ attorney included the following:

On July 20, 2007, the hearing on Covenant’s motion was continued to July 25, 2007. The court issued a tentative ruling denying the motion, inter alia, on the ground that, “[u]nder St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1196 (2003), and [Sobremonte] v. Superior Court [(1998)] 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 992 . . ., [Covenant] has waived its right to arbitration, assuming the parties had an agreement to arbitrate, by taking actions inconsistent with the right to arbitrate, invoking the machinery of litigation and not requesting arbitration until close to the original trial date. The Court finds that the delay in requesting arbitration affected, misled and prejudiced the Plaintiff. The reasons for arbitrating this case no longer exist (speedy resolution, reduced cost) and no public policy would be benefited by compelling arbitration at this point in the litigation.”

Covenant waived oral argument on its motion. No statement of decision (§ 1291) was requested. An order denying the motion to compel arbitration was entered on August 9, 2007. Covenant filed a notice of appeal on August 14, 2007.

DISCUSSION

I. Waiver

Covenant contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration on the ground of waiver. Covenant argues that the record “plainly” shows that it did not delay in enforcing its right to arbitrate because it moved to compel arbitration immediately upon receiving the documents confirming its status as a third party beneficiary of the Kaiser membership contract. Moreover, Covenant argues, there is no substantial evidence to support the waiver finding because there is no showing that the delay was prejudicial to the Rolands. The arguments are not persuasive and the contention of error is not meritorious.

Notwithstanding the strong policy favoring arbitration, both California and federal law recognize a defense of waiver of enforcement of a contract right to arbitration. (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 (St. Agnes); see § 1281.2, subd. (a).) We briefly recapitulate the doctrine of waiver of arbitration, as recently explained by the Supreme Court in St. Agnes:

“While ‘waiver’ generally denotes the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, it can also refer to the loss of a right as a result of a party’s failure to perform an act it is required to perform, regardless of the party’s intent to relinquish the right.” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195, fn. 4.) There is no single test of such waiver: It can arise in situations in which the party seeking to compel arbitration has previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to invoke arbitration; in which the petitioning party has unreasonably delayed in undertaking the procedure; or where there has been “‘bad faith’” or “‘wilful misconduct.’” (Id. at pp. 1195-1196.)

Waivers are not lightly inferred and the party seeking to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof. (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195.) The mere participation in litigation, by itself, does not result in waiver without a showing of prejudice. (Id. at p. 1203.)

“Rather, courts assess prejudice with the recognition that California’s arbitration statutes reflect ‘“a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution”’ and are intended ‘“to encourage persons who wish to avoid delays incident to a civil action to obtain an adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own choosing.”’ (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Prejudice typically is found only where the petitioning party’s conduct has substantially undermined this important public policy or substantially impaired the other side’s ability to take advantage of the benefits and efficiencies of arbitration.” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1204.)

“For example, courts have found prejudice where the petitioning party used the judicial discovery processes to gain information about the other side’s case that could not have been gained in arbitration (e.g., Berman v. Health Net (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1366; Guess?, Inc. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 553, 558; Davis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., [(1997)] 59 Cal.App.4th [205,] 215); where a party unduly delayed and waited until the eve of trial to seek arbitration (e.g., Sobremonte v. Superior Court [(1998)] 61 Cal.App.4th [980,] 995-996); or where the lengthy nature of the delays associated with the petitioning party’s attempts to litigate resulted in lost evidence (e.g., Christensen v. Dewor Developments [(1983)] 33 Cal.3d [778,] 784).” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1204.)

Generally, the determination of waiver is a question of fact, and the trial court’s finding, if supported by sufficient evidence, is binding. To the extent that the facts are undisputed and when only one inference may reasonably be drawn, the issue is one of law and the reviewing court is not bound by the trial court’s ruling. (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196.)

A. Lack of Diligence

As related, Covenant first argues that the trial court erred in implicitly finding it had unreasonably delayed in seeking to compel arbitration. Covenant relies on its showing that it acted to compel arbitration as soon as it received documents confirming its claim that Roland had signed a Kaiser Senior Advantage health plan contract that had an arbitration provision. Covenant submits that it moved for arbitration as soon as possible and as soon as legally allowed.

The ultimate question is whether Covenant “‘“unreasonably delayed in undertaking the procedure [to obtain arbitration].”’” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196.) Covenant submits, in effect, that it reasonably delayed because it could not act until it had documents in hand proving the contract relationships. As appears, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the unreasonable delay finding; Covenant did not diligently seek arbitration.

By her own admission, Covenant’s administrator of Wagner Heights was familiar with the contract providing for arbitration of claims brought by Kaiser members upon which Covenant relies. Thus, Covenant was on inquiry notice as to whether Roland was a Kaiser member and subject to a Kaiser arbitration obligation.

Covenant suggests this is not so because there is no factual basis for an inference that it knew Roland was a Kaiser member and subject to a Kaiser arbitration clause. It is true that no direct evidence was adduced of the precise time and manner in which the pertinent Covenant agents first became aware of Roland’s Kaiser membership. However, that lack is because the declarations of Covenant agents, submitted by Covenant, fail to address that point. The trial court could reasonably determine that Covenant should not profit from lack of evidence on this point, as it was a matter peculiarly within the knowledge and competence of Covenant. (See, e.g., Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1189-1190.)

In any event, it is inferable that Covenant, aware of its contract with Kaiser, could easily and promptly have ascertained whether Roland was referred to Wagner Heights and his treatment financed as a Kaiser member. The question of diligence is not limited to what Covenant’s agents knew. It also encompasses what they should have known. Diligence in pursuit of a claim entails an obligation of diligence in inquiry. Covenant was aware from the outset of the prospect of some arbitration provision, in alleging that as a basis for an affirmative defense.

The actual allegation--that Roland “executed a Facility-Patient Arbitration Agreement”--suggests the kind of agreement in the Wagner Heights admission contract that the evidence indicated was expressly rejected on his behalf by his daughter, Pamela Lighten. Nonetheless, Covenant’s pleading supports the view that it was on inquiry notice and should have promptly ascertained and asserted any available contractual arbitration clause promptly.

There is no showing of justification for Covenant’s delay of almost six months, until late February, before even beginning to investigate whether it could obtain documentary proof of Roland’s status as a Kaiser contract member. Moreover, Covenant failed to show that it could not have obtained evidence on this point more efficaciously, informally from Kaiser or the Rolands, than via the belated and fitful processes of formal discovery it employed. (See generally Zimmerman v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 153, 159 [claim of need to delay until legible copies of contracts were found was unavailing; party “could have utilized alternative methods to establish the existence of the arbitration clauses”].)

Covenant warns that if it is faulted for having failed to pursue arbitration more promptly, arbitration motions “may have to be made before there is adequate evidence to back up the allegations.” We do not discern any peril in that prospect. To the contrary, prompt filing would advance the policy favoring arbitration, where applicable.

When sued by an ostensible Kaiser member, a facility that wants to invoke Kaiser’s ubiquitous arbitration clause that redounds to its benefit can and should immediately demand arbitration on that ground. If the Kaiser member declines, the facility should immediately file a petition in the lawsuit for an order to arbitrate under section 1292.4 to compel arbitration in the action. If the limited issues of fact raised by the petition cannot be resolved by evidence obtained informally, limited discovery can be employed on those issues. This mode of proceeding, prescribed in the arbitration statutes, would prevent misleading the patient and preserve the legitimate benefits of arbitration: expedition and avoidance of unnecessary formal litigation costs.

Covenant suggests that it could not allege the existence of a written arbitration agreement without the writings in hand. This is incorrect. A contract may be pleaded, on information and belief, by allegation of the substance of its relevant terms. (See 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading § 519, p. 651.) Once Covenant had reason to suppose that Roland was likely to be a Kaiser member, it could make the requisite allegations. Moreover, Covenant’s claim that it needed the writings does not address lack of diligence in pursuing the writings.

For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court was not compelled to find that Covenant acted diligently to pursue arbitration on this record.

Covenant makes the bare assertion that the Rolands forfeited any claim of waiver in moving to continue the trial date for two weeks during the pendency of the hearing on its motion to compel arbitration. No legal argument is offered to support this claim, which was not raised in the trial court, and we reject it on that ground. (See, e.g., 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 701, p. 769.)

B. Lack of Prejudice

Covenant’s second argument is that its lack of diligence, however prolonged, is not sufficient to support the waiver ruling unless there is an additional showing of some kind of concrete prejudice to Roland. Covenant suggests that prejudice cannot be found in this case because the extensive discovery undertaken “is exactly the same as the discovery available in any Kaiser arbitration.” The argument is unpersuasive.

Covenant quotes the following sentence from page 11 of the 20-page rules for Kaiser arbitrations: “Discovery shall be conducted as if the matter were in California state court.” (Rules for Kaiser Permanente Member Arbitrations, rule 27(a), as amended Jan. 1, 2005.) As far as we can tell there was no mention of this provision nor of this claim in the trial court.

As related, St. Agnes affirms the precept that “mere[] participati[on] in litigation” does not result in waiver without a showing of prejudice. (St. Agnes, supra,31 Cal.4th at p. 1203.) There is tension in the case law concerning the meaning of this prejudice requirement for waiver.

The opinion in Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 980 asserts that such prejudice can consist of the inability to take advantage of the benefits of arbitration as an expedient, efficient and cost-effective method to resolve disputes. (Id. at p. 996.) In Sobremonte the party seeking arbitration participated for 10 months in law and motion, extensive discovery, status conferences and trial setting before moving for arbitration. (Id. at pp. 995-996.) The opinion says that this was prejudicial as it deprived the plaintiffs of the benefits arbitration can provide. Those benefits, “to both the parties and an already overburdened judicial system, become illusory when there is a failure to timely and affirmatively implement the procedure.” (Id. at p. 997.) As noted previously, the opinion in St. Agnes cites Sobremonte with apparent approval on this point: “For example, courts have found prejudice [(1)] . . .; [(2)] where a party unduly delayed and waited until the eve of trial to seek arbitration (e.g., Sobremonte v. Superior Court, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 995-996).” (St. Agnes, supra,31 Cal.4th at p. 1204.)

On the other hand, Sobremonte is expressly disapproved on this point in Groom v. Health Net (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1197 (Groom). Groom asserts that prejudice “normally means some impairment of the other party’s ability to participate in arbitration.” (Ibid.) In Groom, although the matter had been in litigation for almost a year, no discovery was completed and trial had not been set. What had occurred was a series of demurrers. (Id. at pp. 1193, 1196.) Groom called the view of Sobremonte related above dicta. (Groom,at p. 1197.) It characterizes Sobremonte as one of a series of cases where “prejudice was shown by the fact that by engaging in discovery, the defendant learned all the details of the plaintiff’s case before demanding arbitration.” (Groom, at p. 1196.)

St. Agnes does not mention this criticism of Sobremonte in citing Groom for the proposition that “mere expense of responding to motions or other preliminary pleadings filed in court is not the type of prejudice that bars a later petition to compel arbitration.” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)

Covenant’s implicit argument is that Groom’s view is correct and even if a party delays requesting arbitration until the threshold of trial, there is no prejudice unless “the party seeking arbitration used judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration to obtain discovery of the opposing party’s strategies, evidence, theories, or defenses.” (Groom, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1196.) Covenant suggests this requirement cannot be met in this case because, under the Kaiser arbitration rules it belatedly proffers, the same discovery procedures that are available in the judicial forum would have been available in arbitration. This premise is incorrect; hence, we need not choose between the views of Sobremonte and Groom in this case.

The discovery rules for the arbitration here are not prescribed by Kaiser. As to a “dispute, controversy, or issue arising out of or resulting from any injury to, or death of, a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” (§ 1283.1, subd. (a)), the discovery rules provided by section 1283.05 are conclusively deemed to be incorporated into the agreement to arbitrate (§ 1283.1, subd. (a)). Generally, section 1283.05 provides for discovery “as if the subject matter of the arbitration were pending before a superior court of this state.” (§ 1283.05, subd. (a).) However, there is one significant difference: “Depositions for discovery shall not be taken unless leave to do so is first granted by the arbitrator or arbitrators.” (§ 1283.05, subd. (e).) Thus, neither side would have been able to conduct in arbitration the extensive depositions that occurred in this case in the judicial forum, as a matter of right.

In addition to “mere” delay, Covenant had the benefit of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration. Assuming arguendo that the Groom view of Sobremonte is correct, the trial court did not err in concluding that this case falls within the Sobremonte waiver holding.

In light of this conclusion, none of the other arguments of the parties, concerning a right to arbitration, warrant discussion.

II. Motion for Sanctions

The Rolands have moved for dismissal and for sanctions on the ground that this is a frivolous, bad faith appeal because the arguments against the trial court’s waiver finding are untenable. The motion to dismiss was denied; the motion for sanctions was deferred for resolution along with this opinion. We deny the motion for sanctions.

In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637 provides the standard. “[A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive--to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment--or when it indisputably has no merit--when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit.” (Id. at p. 650.)

The analogy of this case to Sobremonte is reasonably subject to question. A reasonable attorney could think the appeal had merit. That leaves the question of improper motive. There is no trial court finding of abuse as to the conduct below about which the Rolands complain. There is an obvious motive for delay, in that if Roland dies, damages for pain and suffering will be unavailable. (§ 377.34.) However, on this record we cannot say that the appeal was taken “solely for delay” (§ 907) and accordingly we deny the Rolands’ motion for sanctions.

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order denying Covenant’s motion to compel arbitration) is affirmed. The Rolands shall recover their costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

We concur: DAVIS, Acting P. J., RAYE, J.

“6. . . . The Defendant has afforded itself the benefits of the civil litigation process in the following respects: (1) Defendant served more than eighteen hundred and twenty-five (1,825) written discovery requests to the Plaintiffs; (2) Defendant has deposed eighteen (18) witnesses and has the intention of deposing twelve (12) more witnesses for a total of thirty (30) witnesses. To date, there have been a total of forty-two (42) depositions conducted; (3) Defendant has issued twenty-nine (29) Deposition Subpoenas for Production of Business Records; (4) Defendant has sought ex parte relief from the court to shorten time on this Motion to Compel Arbitration, as well as a Motion to Quash Personal Records; (5) Defendant has filed two (2) Motions to Quash, one to quash the Plaintiffs’ subpoena for Department and Health Services records and the second, to quash subpoenas for personnel and licensing board information from the Defendants’ employees and temporary help, and finally, this Motion to Compel Arbitration.

“7. The Plaintiffs have noticed and the court has heard two (2) Motions to Compel Site Inspection and Further Responses to Written Discovery (and has a third motion pending), and a Motion for Preference under Code of Civil Procedure [section] 36[, subdivision] (a). In addition, Plaintiffs have deposed twenty-two (22) witnesses and has outstanding, pursuant to a court order, at least one (1) other Wagner Heights employee to depose, and three (3) corporate personnel, the person most qualified to answer certain topics, and a custodian of records deposition, plus the Defendants’ seven (7) experts to depose.

“8. The Plaintiffs propounded one hundred and sixteen special interrogatories, two (2) form interrogatories, and forty-six (46) requests for production to the Defendant. Plaintiffs served eight (8) deposition subpoenas for production of business records.”

Covenant also argues that the trial court should have denied the waiver claim because the Rolands filed a proposed amendment to the complaint on August 3, 2007, to substitute an entity, “Covenant Care, LLC,” for a fictitiously named DOE defendant. Covenant submits that adding this “new” party defendant could substantially delay a trial.

It suffices to say that the claimed factual and legal consequences of the amendment, if any, are entirely undeveloped and speculative, have not been tendered to the trial court, and warrant no further discussion.


Summaries of

Roland v. Covenant Care of California Inc.

California Court of Appeals, Third District, San Joaquin
Nov 6, 2008
No. C056658 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2008)
Case details for

Roland v. Covenant Care of California Inc.

Case Details

Full title:GEORGE ROLAND et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COVENANT CARE OF…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Third District, San Joaquin

Date published: Nov 6, 2008

Citations

No. C056658 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2008)