Rogers v. Richmond

4 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. State v. Elijah Arlanders Brock, No. 2009AP002120-CR, District I, 7/27/10

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderJuly 27, 2010

    Under established law, absent a showing that such a scenario was impossible or feigned, the explanation of what could happen to a third person does not make the defendant’s confession coerced. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 535–536 (1961) (Pretense by police chief that he would take the defendant’s wife into custody unless defendant confessed made confession involuntary.); United States v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 254, 262 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[P]romises of leniency may be coercive if they are broken or illusory.”); Thompson v. Haley, 255 F.3d 1292, 1296–1297 (11th Cir. 2001) (no coercion when defendant claimed that he confessed to spare his girlfriend from being arrested because the police had probable cause to arrest her); Allen v. McCotter, 804 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1986) (defendant told by police that unless he confessed, his wife would be charged; no showing that such a charge was impossible) (detective “had probable cause to arrest the petitioner’s wife for aiding in the commission of the robbery.

  2. NEVER EVER TALK TO POLICE WITHOUT A LAWYER

    John T. Floyd Law FirmJohn T. FloydSeptember 26, 2009

    This fundamental interest does not lend respect for individual constitutional safeguards. That’s why, when faced with any law enforcement request for an “interview,” an individual must firmly and consistently assert, first, his right to silence, and, second, his right to procure the assistance of counsel.Even if you have done nothing wrong and have nothing to hide, politely tell law enforcement investigators that you would like to cooperate but will do so only after consulting with, and in the presence of, your lawyer.SOURCES:1/ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 2/ Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) 3/ Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) 4/ McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) 5/ Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1990) 6/ Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) 7/ Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963)http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090920/ap_on_re_us/us_nyc_terrorhttp://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/18/I/47/1001 By: Houston Criminal Defense Attorney John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

  3. Capital Defense Weekly, July 2, 2001

    Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 2, 2001

    *fn3 However, we conclude, as a matter of law, that Thompson's version of events, even if true, would not make his statement involuntary, and therefore he is not entitled to relief on this claim.Under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has found that police deception invalidates an accused's waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. *fn4 See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (misrepresentation by police officers that a suspect would be deprived of state financial aid for her dependent child if she failed to cooperate with authorities rendered the subsequent confession involuntary); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (confession involuntary where defendant confessed when police chief pretended that if defendant did not confess the defendant's ailing wife would be arrested).In this case, unlike in Lynumm and Rogers, Thompson's girlfriend, Shirley Franklin, had voluntarily implicated herself in the murder prior to Thompson's arrest.

  4. Capital Defense Weekly, April 5, 1999

    Capital Defense NewsletterApril 5, 1999

    It would allow prosecutors to indict without specifying a drug quantity, obtain a guilty plea, and then put the defendant on the stand at sentencing to fill in the quantity. To enlist a defendant as an instrument of his or her own condemnation would undermine the long tradition and vital principle that criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved by the Government, not on inquisitions conducted to enhance its own prosecutorial power.Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 , 541. Pp. 6—10.