Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades

11 Citing briefs

  1. Berger et al v. Cushman & Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc. et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed April 14, 2017

    Welc v. Porter, 675 A.2d 334, 338 (Pa. Super. 1996) (plaintiff, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident with a drunk driver, was precluded from recovering on an aiding and abetting claim under Section 876(b) because plaintiff did not plead or prove that defendant, a minor passenger in the drunk driver’s automobile, substantially assisted or encouraged the driver to engage in tortious conduct; and as a passenger, defendant owed no duty to plaintiff), appeal denied, 683 A.2d 885 (Pa. 1996). See also Rochez Bros., Inc., 527 F.2d at 889 (noting that in cases where an aider and abettor has been held liable, courts consistently have found an “involvement” in the actual scheme). To satisfy the culpable conduct requirement to sustain their aiding and abetting fraud claim against Blank Rome, plaintiffs must prove, through clear and convincing evidence, that Naselsky actively assisted or encouraged Chawla to defraud plaintiffs.

  2. Dartell v. Tibet Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment Corrected Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed July 8, 2016

    Id. (citing Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 890). Control person liability claims based on inaction fail if the controlling person “had no knowledge of [the controlled person's] fraudulent acts and did not consciously intend to aid” the controlled person.

  3. Dartell v. Tibet Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment Corrected Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed July 8, 2016

    Id. (citing Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 890). Control person liability claims based on inaction fail if the controlling person “had no knowledge of [the controlled person's] fraudulent acts and did not consciously intend to aid” the controlled person.

  4. Rahn v. Genzyme Corporation et al

    MEMORANDUM in Support re MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed June 2, 2010

    , see Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1108-1109 (10th Cir. 2003); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985), the Supreme Court’s reinvigoration of Fed. R. Civ. Case 1:09-cv-11267-GAO Document 66 Filed 06/02/10 Page 32 of 40 25 P. 8(a) in Twombly and Iqbal demonstrate that plaintiffs must plead a “plausible” § 20(a) claim, and without an allegation of culpable participation, there is no reason to believe each defendant did not act in good faith and induced, directly or indirectly, the violation. See Rochez, 527 F.2d at 885 (noting that requiring defendant’s culpable participation achieves Congress’s intent that no one “be an insurer against the fraudulent activities of another” but instead must have been meaningfully involved in the fraud to be liable). Requiring the careful pleading of sufficient facts to raise a strong inference of scienter as to each individual as a primary violator simply cannot be squared with permitting derivative liability—which could be even greater—as a control person simply by alleging bare facts of “control” without sufficient facts to conclude that the individual defendant was actually involved in the supposed wrongdoing.

  5. Audet et al v. Garza et al

    Memorandum in Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint

    Filed January 9, 2017

    Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (adopting the same definition of control as Salit); Bausch & Lomb, 941 F. Supp. at 1368 (“In determining control status, ‘courts have given heavy consideration to the power or potential power to influence and control the activities of a person, as opposed to the actual exercise thereof.’” (quoting Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890 (3d Cir. 1975))). Courts following this interpretation of control find that “‘indirect means of discipline or influence need not be stock ownership.

  6. In re Tremont Securities Law, State Law and Insurance Litigation

    REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re:

    Filed February 28, 2014

    at 5, 12), Congress intentionally left “control” undefined in the statute to allow courts to decide issues of control on a case-by-case basis. See Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890 (3d Cir. 1975) (“Congress deliberately did not define „control,‟ thus indicating its desire to have the courts construe the applicable provisions of the statute . . .”). The courts of this District have done so, and they have rejected Plaintiffs‟ interpretation; indeed, a number of Plaintiffs‟ own cases reject their interpretation.

  7. IN RE: Banco Santander Securities-Optimal Litigation

    MEMORANDUM in Support re MOTION to Dismiss 156 Amended Complaint,,

    Filed November 18, 2009

    Kalin v. Xanboo, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 392, 406 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973)). This is so in part because an underlying Section 10(b) violation requires an element of culpability, Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1299, and Congress “did not intend anyone to be an insurer against the fraudulent activities of another,” Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Laperriere, 526 F.3d at 724 (noting that Section 20(a) “is not applicable wherever the fact of control exists,” and that Congress explicitly rejected an “insurer’s liability” for controlling persons).

  8. Montoya v. Herley Industries, Inc. et al

    Memorandum of Law in Opposition re MOTION in Limine to Preclude the Report and Testimony of Defendants' Expert Witness Albert S. Dandridge III

    Filed November 16, 2009

    Likewise, section 20(a), which imposes liability on one who controls a violator of the securities laws, provides an exception if the actor can show he acted in “good faith.” Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889 (3d Cir. 1975); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78t (stating a defendant cannot be held liable under section 20(a) if “the controlling person acted in good faith[.]”).

  9. Schnall v. Annuity & Life, et al

    Opposition to 60 Motion to Dismiss

    Filed November 19, 2003

    See G. A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir. 1981); Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); First Interstate Bank, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 896-97 (10th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Enstar Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 (11th Cir. 1996). Only the Third and Fourth Circuits require plaintiffs to plead culpable participation, which the Third Circuit has failed to define, see Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1975), and the Fourth Circuit has defined as “something more than negligence.” Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979) Case 3:02-cv-02133-EBB Document 83 Filed 11/19/2003 Page 77 of 93 67 Observing that good faith is a defense, and that it would be anomalous to require plaintiffs to plead the absence of an affirmative defense in their complaints, several district courts have correctly held that culpable participation need not be pled in the complaint; instead, it is the defendant’s burden to show good faith.

  10. Lasala et al v. Marfin Popular Bank Public Company, Ltd.

    MEMORANDUM in Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss the Complaint

    Filed July 6, 2009

    .........................23 Parr v. Buontempo Ins. Serv., L - 2500 - 06, 2006 WL 2620504 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 8, 2006) ............................25 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008).......................................................................................................15 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).....................................................................................................................7 Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002).......................................................................................................25 Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2001).........................................................................................................4 Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd., 33 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 1994)...........................................................................................................6 Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).......................................................................................................20 Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1998).......................................................................................................20 Romero v Allstate Corp., 404 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2005).......................................................................................................25 Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989).......................................................................................................21 Roy v. Brahmbhatt, 2008 WL 5054096 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2008) .............................................................................5, 7 Santos v. U.S., 559 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2009).......................................................................................................27 Case 3:09-cv-00968-JAP-DEA Document 30 Filed 07/06/09 Page 7 of 40 vii Seville Indus. Machinery Cor