Filed May 24, 2016
The exercise of the Court’s inherent authority to sanction is appropriate where the conduct at issue “constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.” Roadway, 447 U.S. at 767. Bad faith is shown where the court determines “that fraud has been practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been defiled.”
Filed June 23, 2015
Manez v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 533 F.3d 578, 585 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (finding that a court may sanction bad faith conduct under the court's power to protect the authority and dignity of the court). The Court should exercise that broad discretion to impose sanctions in this case because plaintiffs have continued to make reckless statements about Hangtime’s practices without any genuine factual basis.1 1 While bad faith is sufficient to warrant a sanction, see Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (finding that a court may sanction bad faith conduct under the court’s power to protect the authority and dignity of the court), Rule 11 can be violated even without bad faith. Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569, 1574 (7th Cir. 1987); Halim v. Great Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., No. 03 C 8414, 2007 WL 773286, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2007) (“A finding of bad faith is not a prerequisite to imposing Rule 11 sanctions.”)
Filed May 1, 2014
Anderson v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 21 22 23 24 25 C 09-2970 MEJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50975, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2010) (citing Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 762). For an award of sanctions under Section 1927, a showing of recklessness, rather than bad faith, suffices.
Filed June 24, 2013
(quoting Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 766). See Fink, 239 F.3d at 991-92; See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that sanctioning those who abuse judicial processes with bad-faith conduct is within the discretion of the Court); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (holding that the Court has the inherent power to assess attorneys’ fees); Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (affirming a Court’s discretion to impose extreme sanction of dismissal for bad- conduct on part of parties and their attorneys).
Filed August 28, 2009
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that this provision “incorporates the ‘American rule’ for fee-shifting,” which permits an award of fees where the losing party has acted “‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’” Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974)).8 As under the court’s inherent sanction power, a court “may consider conduct both during and prior to the litigation” in determining whether the government has acted in bad faith. Id. Bad faith includes misconduct involving oppression, fraud, or abuse of the judicial process, i.e., abusive misconduct that “constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.” Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767. Courts have had no difficulty finding that plaintiffs act in bad faith when they file complaints or continue prosecuting cases even though the testimony of witnesses undermines the alleged factual basis of the claims.
Filed May 29, 2007
This Court has the power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d); 28 U.S.C. Section 1927, Northern District Local Rule 1-4, and its inherent authority to impose this expense shifting sanction. In re Vitamins AntiTrust Lit., 216 F.R.D. at 174 (fees the moving party incurs to prepare a motion for sanctions related to production of an uneducated 30(b)(6) deponent are mandatory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d)); See Roadway Expressway, Inc., 447 U.S. 752 (federal courts have authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and under their inherent power to levy fees and costs against attorneys who violate the federal discovery rules); Zambrano, 885 F.2d 1473, 1480 (district court can impose monetary sanctions under its local rules for conduct amounting to recklessness, gross negligence, and repeated, although unintentional flouting of court rules). CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, RTCI respectfully requests that the Court grants this motion in its entirety and enter an order restricting trial testimony on the unanswered 30(b)(6) categories and directing Weitz to reimburse RTCI $20,894.51 for the excess expenses it incurred in preparing for an taking the three 30(b)(6) depositions, plus $12,888.75 for half of the expenses it incurred in bringing this motion.
Filed July 30, 2016
Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980).
Filed July 7, 2016
Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants acted in bad faith “The general rule in federal courts is that a litigant cannot recover his counsel fees.” Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980). The Second Circuit’s “case law is clear that a district court may not impose attorney’s fees as a sanction without first making an explicit finding that the sanctioned party, whether a party or a party’s counsel, acted in bad faith in engaging in the sanctionable conduct.”
Filed December 18, 2015
’’” AntiCancer, 769 F.3d at 1329 (citing Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir.1997), quoting Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980)). “This rigid imposition that district courts make an explicit finding of bad faith is justified under Ninth Circuit law because of the ‘very potency [of] inherent powers.
Filed November 30, 2015
G. Lang Request for $32,755 in “Travel and Other Expenses” is Improper “Excess costs recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 include only those taxable costs enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (costs taxable to a losing party).” United States v. Austin, 749 F.2d 1407, 1408-1409 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757-60 (1980)). Lang only describes its $32,755 request as relating to “travel and other expenses.”