Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority

11 Citing briefs

  1. Brown v. The City of New York et al

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 34 FIRST MOTION for Summary Judgment.. Document

    Filed April 18, 2014

    Id. ¶¶ 91-92. When the officers arrived, they did not see anyone banging on the door, and did not see Ms. Brown doing anything illegal. Id. Case 1:13-cv-01018-KBF Document 49 Filed 04/18/14 Page 18 of 31 14 ¶¶ 93-95. Based on this information—the only information known to the officers before they arrested Ms. Brown, and thus, the only information that matters, see Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 125— there was no lawful basis to arrest Ms. Brown.

  2. Botbol et al v. The City of New York et al

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 187 MOTION for Summary Judgment Dismissing False Arrest Claims at Church/Fulton Streets.. Document

    Filed October 3, 2011

    “Once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of 8 Case 1:05-cv-01572-RJS-JCF Document 190 Filed 10/03/11 Page 18 of 45 innocence before making an arrest.” Ricciuti v. N YC. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir, 1997) (citing Baker v. McCollan. 443 U.s. 137, 145-46 (1979)).

  3. Bozella v. The County of Dutchess et al

    REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 33 MOTION to Dismiss.. Document

    Filed December 3, 2010

    There is no case which holds a police officer must investigate all claims of innocence or all possibly exculpatory evidence and indeed the law is to the contrary. Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir., 2001); Ricciuti v. NYCTA, 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir., 1997); Gisondi v. Town of Harrison, 72 N.Y.2d 280, 284-285, 532 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1988). Absent the glaring misconduct of the type involved in Russo and McCray a defendant cannot hold the police responsible for not, from his perspective, doing a more thorough investigation.

  4. Jovanovic v. City of New York et al

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 92 MOTION for Summary Judgment dismissing all of plaintiff's claims.. Document

    Filed December 21, 2009

    plaintiff must show that Detective Bonilla fabricated evidence and that his fabrication was material to plaintiffs conviction. Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130 (fabrication must be “likely to influence a jury’s decision”). We submit that, as a matter of law.

  5. Blumatte v. Quinn et al

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 36 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint., 33 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint.. Document

    Filed August 13, 2007

    The following facts plainly averred in the amended complaint defeat the typical result: (a) Under no conceivable circumstances could Plaintiff ever have asserted any civil claims against the Police Defendants, the State of New York or any other person employed by the New York criminal justice system relating to his imprisonment, because they all could successfully claim that they relied upon the perjurious testimony of Farthing that the other Trustees criminally induced Farthing to give. Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996); 11 The second claim of the amended complaint does not assert a claim for malicious prosecution, but rather a claim for “fraud and deceit,” quoting directly from Burbrooke. That said, measured in dollars, the quantum of damages is likely the same.

  6. Watson v. Estrada et al

    MEMORANDUM in Opposition re Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12

    Filed June 10, 2015

    In evaluating whether probable cause existed for an arrest, courts “consider the facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997). When all facts are considered in the light most favorable to Mr. Watson, as is required in a summary judgment evaluation, the evidence in Mr. Watson’s case demonstrates that the Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest and detain Mr. Watson.

  7. Nnodimele v. City of New York et al

    RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION for Summary Judgment , MEMORANDUM in Opposition

    Filed May 22, 2015

    Rehberg v. P aulk, 1 32 S.Ct. 1497 (2012)................ Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997). Richardsonv.

  8. Botbol et al v. The City of New York et al

    REPLY AFFIDAVIT of Stefanie Mount in Support re: 256 MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed July 22, 2014

    ’” Id. (citing Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Rodriguez v. City of New York, 535 F. Supp. 2d 436, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting the officer “was not required to make a full investigation into plaintiff[s’] state of mind” because “[o]nce plaintiffs pushed [the officer], a person of reasonable caution could have believed that plaintiffs had committed a crime"). Her argument that Diaz failed to remediate Plaintiff’s overly tight handcuffs fails because Plaintiff cannot dispute that a senior officer tested her handcuffs and determined them not to be too tight.

  9. Botbol et al v. The City of New York et al

    REPLY AFFIDAVIT of Lieutenant Iecampo in Support re: 256 MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed July 22, 2014

    ’” Id. (citing Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Rodriguez v. City of New York, 535 F. Supp. 2d 436, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting the officer “was not required to make a full investigation into plaintiff[s’] state of mind” because “[o]nce plaintiffs pushed [the officer], a person of reasonable caution could have believed that plaintiffs had committed a crime"). Her argument that Diaz failed to remediate Plaintiff’s overly tight handcuffs fails because Plaintiff cannot dispute that a senior officer tested her handcuffs and determined them not to be too tight.

  10. Botbol et al v. The City of New York et al

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 256 MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed May 30, 2014

    Qualified immunity operates to shield officers who perform discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as it was objectively reasonable for such officials to believe, even if mistakenly, that their conduct did not violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Allen v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 2829, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity ‘extends to official conduct that does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, insofar as it was objectively reasonable for such officials to believe, even if mistakenly, that their conduct did not violate such rights’”) (quoting Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 127-128 (2d Cir. 1997)); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S, 224,228-29 (1991) (The qualified immunity doctrine “gives ample room for mistaken judgments” by protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.") (quoting Malley v. Briggs,475 U,S. 335,341(1986)).