Filed November 6, 2006
The D.C. Circuit noted that the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 928 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298), adding that, “To the extent that conditions … ‘are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 928 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). The extent of plaintiff’s injuries are “pain, colds, and harsh living conditions” (Third Amended Complaint ¶ 182); “despair, anxiety, [and] hopelessness” (Id.
Filed October 10, 2006
The D.C. Circuit noted that the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d Case 1:05-cv-01514-RCL Document 55 Filed 10/10/2006 Page 16 of 23 17 at 928 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298), adding that, “To the extent that conditions … ‘are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 928 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). The extent of plaintiff’s injuries are “pain, colds, and harsh living conditions” (Third Amended Complaint ¶ 182); “despair, anxiety, [and] hopelessness” (Id.
Filed January 12, 2016
(citing cases)); Enigwe, 2007 WL 2713849, at *8 (“[A]lthough prison officials have a statutory duty to protect inmates from harm, in general decisions regarding the best way to safeguard prisoners are discretionary in nature.” (citing cases)); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981) (“[A] prison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators.”).
Filed October 7, 2014
" Id. at 183; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981). In our case, Plaintiffs are asking for relief that exceeds the requirements of Title 15 and the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Filed April 29, 2014
This level of care does not indicate that he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Moreover, that response does not evidence a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs.
Filed July 18, 2013
Because Plaintiffs are unable to present proof of classwide harm in support of their Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the related subclass should be denied. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (stating that “[n]o static ‘test’ can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual”). B. Plaintiffs Do Not Demonstrate Sufficient Typicality.
Filed April 11, 2011
In so ruling, the Judge noted: 12 Case 4:10-cv-01187-MM-DB Document 49 Filed 04/11/11 Page 17 of 23 [I]n assessing a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, a court must bear in mind that a prison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter [for] the discretion of prison administrators.” Whitley v. Albers, 75 U.S. 312, 321 (1986) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n. 14 (1981)). Prison officials ‘should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”
Filed September 27, 2007
360 See id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 731 (2002)) (quoting Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 324). 361 See id. (citing Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 324 (quoting Smith v. Dooley, 591 F.Supp. 1157 (W.D.La.1984), aff'd, 778 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting Dailey v. Byrnes, 605 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.1979). In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc) the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 362 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) 363 Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 325 (11th Cir. 1987) 364 See, e.g., Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1303-04 (holding in a case naming Defendant Green that beating an inmate who had been incapacitated by a stun shield clearly constituted excessive use of force even if the initial decision to stun him was justified by his refusal to come out of his cell); Breeden, 280 F.3d at 1321-23; Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (holding use of hitching post unconstitutional once inmate had ceased presenting any type of threat); Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding, with respect to an inmate who was captured by officers after trying to escape, that dropping him on his head while he was in handcuffs constituted excessive force because he no longer posed a threat). Case 3:04-cv-00917-TJC-JRK Document 325 Filed 09/27/07 Page 64 of 126 59 regarding the correctional officer’s subjective intent to harm the inmate.
Filed April 28, 2006
However, “[t]he Constitution . . . does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities . . . are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)(quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-349). In Seiter, the Supreme Court clarified that, to establish that prison conditions amount to cruel and unusual “punishment,” a plaintiff must satisfy a two part test: (1) an objective component, considering whether the conditions were sufficiently serious to amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (2) a subjective component, considering whether the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” when imposing or failing to remedy such conditions.
Filed April 14, 2006
“Cruel and unusual punishment” is that which involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, those which are grossly disproportional to the severity of the crime for which an inmate is imprisoned, or are totally without penological justification. Case 1:05-cv-01514-RCL Document 16 Filed 04/14/2006 Page 4 of 11 5 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 at 346. A discerning review of plaintiff’s grumblings show a nitpicking of petty problems that lack the obduracy or wantonness required to make out an Eighth Amendment violation.