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Redmond v. Coffin

Supreme Court of North Carolina
Dec 1, 1833
17 N.C. 437 (N.C. 1833)

Summary

In Redmond v. Coffin, 17 N.C. 437, the widow took both land and chattels under the will, in which there was a disposition of certain slaves of the residue of the estate, which was illegal and ineffectual; and it was held, as to them, that there was a resulting trust for the next of kin, excluding the widow.

Summary of this case from Brown v. Brown

Opinion

(December Term, 1833.)

1. Where to a bill by the next of kin against the executors and legatees the latter relied upon a former decree, pronounced in a cause between the same plaintiff and the executors, commenced after the legal estate of the legatees was complete, but the executors did not plead it, nor in any way rely upon it, the decree was held not to be a bar.

2. A bequest of slaves for the purpose of emancipation is void, and a trust results to the next of kin.

3. An instrument in its terms a release, but not under seal, cannot be pleaded as a bar.

4. An attorney must act in the name of his principal, and a deed executed by him in his own name, and as his proper act, does not bind the principal.

5. A partial payment by a trustee to his cestui que trust cannot, under any circumstances, operate as a discharge of the residue.

6. Upon a bill by the next of kin, if his character does not conclusively appear, a reference as to that fact will be directed.

7. Although executors who bona fide pay a legacy to a charity of doubtful validity are protected, yet when slaves were bequeathed to a Quaker society upon a trust for emancipation, and the executors confederating with the society to defeat the claim of the next of kin, delivered the slaves to the society, and otherwise acted mala fide, they, in default of payment by the society, were held responsible for their value and hire, and also for interest thereon.

THE plaintiff in her bill averred that she was the sole next of kin of the testator of the defendant; that he died in 1816, possessed of a number of slaves, and by his will devised as follows: "I give and bequeath them (the slaves) unto the Society of Friends of New Monthly Meeting, or their agents and their successors. I also give and bequeath all the personal property of my estate to the above named black people (438) to be sold and equally divided amongst them." The plaintiff averred that the bequest of the slaves to the New Garden Society was a bequest in trust that they might be emancipated, as religious opinions of the society forbade its members, or the society as a body, to hold slaves; that the bequest of the residue to the slaves was void, because of the incapacity of the legatees to take, and that a trust resulted to her as the next of kin, both of the slaves and of the residue. She then averred that one of the slaves named Jim had been sent out of the State to foreign parts for the purpose of being emancipated. She also averred that she had appointed one Willie Wright her attorney in fact to settle with the defendants, but that he had greatly abused her confidence, and that she had revoked his power. The prayer was for an account of the price of the slaves and of the residue, and payment of the value of Jim.

Winston for plaintiff.

Gaston, Nash, and Mendenhall for defendants.

Nash and Mendenhall for defendants.

Winston for plaintiff.


By an amendment Eliazur Hunt, Timothy Manney, Josiah Unthank, and George Swain, agents of the New Garden Meeting, were made defendants, and the plaintiff alleged that they had received the said slaves and surplus of the executors, and had hired out the former, and she prayed the same relief against them which in her original bill she had prayed against the executors.

The executors by their answer insisted that the New Garden Meeting as a body politic could take and hold slaves, and averred that believing the bequest to be valid, they had in August, 1816, delivered the slaves, and paid over the residue to the agents of that meeting. They denied notice of the plaintiffs' claim until 1818, after they had delivered the slaves. They stated that in December, 1817, Wright presented to them a duly authenticated power from the plaintiff, authorizing him or his substitute to settle and compound with them for the plaintiffs' share in the estate of their testator; that Wright appointed one Draughn his substitute, and that they came "to a full and fair settlement and compromise for all the interest of the plaintiff in the estate of (439) their testator, for the recovery of which the said Willie Wright had filed a bill of complaint in the court of equity for the county of Guilford," and that Wright received the consideration stipulated to be paid by them upon the compromise. And they averred positively that this settlement and payment was made without notice of the revocation of his power.

Two papers executed by Wright, dated 12 and 14 December, 1818, were filed. The first was a release, in which it was recited that "Willie Wright of, etc., attorney and agent in fact for Betsey Redmond, of Fayette County, Kentucky, by virtue of her power, investing me with all right, etc., have remised, etc." This was signed and sealed by Wright, without the addition in any way of the name of the plaintiff. The other was without a seal, was signed by Wright alone, without reference to his principal, and acknowledged the receipt of $450 as a consideration of the compromise. The last was relied on as a bar and was filed as an exhibit to the answer. The first was proved by the deposition of an attesting witness.

The answer of the agents of the New Garden Meeting set forth at large the religious belief of the society, and insisted that as a society they could take and hold slaves. They admitted, however, that slaves held by the society were not worked for its profit, but that the money realized from their labor was deemed by the society a fund to be held in trust for the slaves, and to be used for their spiritual and temporal advancement. They charged that the plaintiff "heretofore preferred in this court her bill of complaint against the executors of Thomas Wright for the same causes of complaint and relief sought in this bill, and that after full consideration of the claims of the respective parties, and for the purpose of finally disposing of and adjusting all matters in litigation and equitable consideration involved therein, the said controversy and suit was compromised by the parties at and for the sum of $450, which was paid by the said executors to the said plaintiff, by her (440) attorney duly authorized and empowered, to wit, one Willie Wright, who as agent and attorney managed and conducted the said suit; and for which said sum paid as aforesaid the said W. W., attorney as aforesaid, released and conveyed to the said executors all the title, interest and claim of the said plaintiff in and to the estate of the said testator, and that in pursuance of the said compromise made as aforesaid a decree of the court of equity for the county of Guilford was duly made at, etc., in the following words, to wit: "The plaintiff, by her attorney in fact, W. W., having sold and assigned and released all her right and interest in the slaves and other property of Thomas Wright, deceased, to the defendants in consideration of $450 paid to him: bill dismissed, each party paying their own costs," and they prayed the full benefit of this decree, as if it had been specially pleaded.

The release and conveyance mentioned in the answer was that above stated, filed by the executors. These defendants exhibited a copy of the former bill and decree, which fully supported their answer and plea. Replications were taken to these answers, and the proofs filed were very voluminous. A condensation of them is unnecessary, as they are stated in the several opinions delivered in the progress of the cause. It was argued at great length at June Term, 1831.


The general question upon the validity of the charity created by this will was not much argued in this case. I presume the counsel considered, as the Court does, that it is not open to discussion. Qualified emancipation of the kind set up by the answer, and proved so distinctly by the member of the Society of Friends who has been examined as to it, stand upon the same ground as a bequest directly for that purpose. However praiseworthy the motive for accepting such a trust, or however benevolent the will of the donor may be, it (441) cannot be supported in a court of justice. A stern necessity arising out of the safety of the Commonwealth forbids it. Haywood v. Craven, 4 N.C. 360, and Huckaby v. Jones, 9 N.C. 120, are leading cases; the one a direct declaration of the purpose of emancipation, and the other of one collected by the Court from the terms of the will. They were followed by Trustees v. Dickinson, 12 N.C. 189, and Stevens v. Ely, 16 N.C. 493, which leaves no part of the ground unoccupied. The former was on a conveyance to the Friends for the same purpose designated in this bequest, only this is stronger, because here is a bequest to the slaves, which shows, on the will, that the testator meant emancipation. That is not an odious, but it is a dangerous and unlawful species of mortmain; and a trust results to the next of kin, where there is no residuary clause.

Several bars to an account are set up here. The first is that of a release, which is relied upon in the answers of the executors and also of the trustees. That annexed to the answer, and said to be a copy, bearing date 14 December, 1818, is not a release from anybody, not being under seal. And it might, perhaps, be proper to exclude any other, because that and that alone is relied on in the answer. But the reading of the original proved by Hubbard, and bearing date 12 December, 1818, was not objected to, and will therefore be considered by the Court.

Neither of them can avail the defendants, because neither is executed in the name of the principal. It is not material in what form the deed be signed, whether A. B. by D.C. or D.C. for A. B., provided it appear in the deed and by the execution that it is the deed of the principal. But that must appear; and the cases cited put that beyond doubt. To them may be added Combe's case, 9 Rep., 75, Frontis v. Small, Ld. Raym., 1418, and White v. Cuyler, 6 Term, 176.

As a positive bar, then, these papers are nothing. They do not mention any sum of money paid. But the answers state that money (442) was paid, namely, the sum of $450; but Hubbard, the subscribing witness examined by the defendants, says that the sum agreed on was $300, of which only part was paid, a note being given for the residue. A question has been made on this, whether the payment to Wright was good, since his power was revoked and the parties had notice of the revocation. The Court would not declare that fact, were it in the least doubtful, but leave it to arise on the master's report, upon his allowing or disallowing the sum paid to Wright as a payment to the plaintiff. But it is positively sworn by Scott that he gave notice of the new power to Swain, who made the agreement for the executors with Wright, and through whom the money was paid. He is supported by the testimony of Draughn, who says that when he came to see Wright next day at Greensboro, he heard of the revocation, and told Wright; and that he had before seen the defendant Coffin, and been told by him that he had seen John C. Redmond, the agent appointed by the second power, and had a conversation with him respecting the suit, though he did not say that he told him of the second power. From this it seems certain that the power to the son was at the place, in the possession of Scott; and no conceivable reason can be assigned why he or the son should conceal it, while the compromise was going on, and disclose it immediately afterwards. The Court must, therefore, take it that the revocation was known to Swain, who was the agent in the business, and consequently to the executors, and declare that the payment was made by the executors, or on their behalf, in their own wrong.

If this were not so, it certainly could not be set up but as a satisfaction pro tanto. A payment of a less sum is not a satisfaction for a greater than due, even at law. Much less does a payment by a trustee of a part of the fund belonging to a cestui que trust extinguish the right to the residue. Here, besides the slaves, the plaintiff was entitled to more money than was received. But it is unnecessary to pursue this point, because even the sum advanced was not a payment to the plaintiff, for want of authority in Wright then to receive it.

(443) It is, however, contended that a decree pronounced in a former cause, brought by the plaintiff against Coffin and others, the executors of Thomas Wright's will, is a bar to this suit. It is not pleaded by either of the defendants, nor is it relied on in the answer of the executors; but it is brought forward in the answer of the trustees of the Quaker society to the bill as amended, so as to make them parties. And the transcript of the first suit has been read in evidence. From that it appears that a bill was filed in February, 1818, by this same plaintiff for an account of Thomas Wright's personal estate against his executors, who are also part of the defendants in this suit. There were no other defendants but the executors. No answer was put in, and after the compromise before spoken, viz., at April Term, 1819, the entry in question appears.

It has been objected by the plaintiff that this does not bar as a decree, because it does not profess to be the act of the court, or to be founded on the merits, but that of Willie Wright himself, after the revocation of his power, in execution of his agreement. Perhaps, if strictly construed, it might be held so, and therefore only obligatory as an agreement. But I believe the decree is clearly removed out of the case upon other and more general principles. When a former decree is pleaded and relied on as an absolute bar, proprio vigore, it must be a decree determining the very point in a suit between the same parties. This is the case at law, and hence a judgment against A. is not evidence in suit against A. and another. In equity there may be this difference: that as the liability of the several defendants in this Court may be several, the introduction of a new party in a second suit shall not prevent a former decree from protecting one of the defendants who is called in question a second time for the same matter; for as to that matter; the parties are the same. But a decree in favor of one cannot protect another who was not a party, unless he be a privy. And, indeed, a stranger thus introduced cannot use the decree at all, as such, because it cannot be used against him. I will not say that the executors might not have relied on this as (444) a former decree; but the other defendants cannot set it up, because they are not bound by it, being neither party nor privy. Indeed, in this very case they have objected to the reading of a deposition taken in the former suit, upon this ground, and the objection was sustained. The reason is, if they had been defendants before, the decree might have been different, because other evidence might have been offered. 1 Phil. Ev., 250, 252, where the cases are collected. I am now speaking of the decree operating as being an adjudication, and not as founded on a compromise; in which last case it may be used by anybody as evidence of the fact of satisfaction. The privity between the executors and the society did not then exist. It never did extend to anything but the slaves, for the residue is not given to the society, but to the slaves, and the bequest is merely void. Then, as to the slaves, they were delivered over on 16 August, 1816, to the trustees of the Quakers, as alleged in both the answers in this suit. There is a privity between trustees and cestuis que trust as long as that relation continues; and a legatee is bound by and can avail himself of a judgment or decree for or against the executor while the trust is open and the funds in the hands of the executor. But after the trust estate is conveyed to the cestui que trust, or the legacy assented to and the property delivered to the legatee, there is no further privity. The legal estate is in the legatee himself. A suit, then, against the executor, founded on his acts or breach of trust, does not affect the legatee, who claims above it and by a legal title prior to the institution of the suit. When the privity is destroyed, the consequence necessarily follows, namely, that as a stranger, he can neither be benefited nor injured by a decree in a suit against the executors; for the estoppel of res judicata like all others, must be mutual. Here the trustees of the society did not come to the estate since the former decree, nor pendente lite, but before the former suit was (445) instituted. And as to the money arising from the perishable estate, that was paid over to them without any pretence of right, and, therefore, though paid after the first suit, it must be considered as remaining, for the purposes of this suit, in the executors' hands.

The next consideration is, whether the decree protects the executors themselves — that is, conclusively. They have not relied on it. Can another set it up for them? Or, when not relied on as a positive bar in the pleadings, but offered in evidence, is it not open to an investigation of the merits of the demands determined in it? At law, a former judgment is conclusive; but to make it so it must be pleaded (if the party have an opportunity) as an estoppel. And if it be not pleaded, the matter is at large; because the party may think that he can do better than he did before. Vooght v. Winch, 2 Barn and Ald., 662. Here, the executors may have been conscious that the decree was obtained by collusion with Willie Wright, the removed agent (as it was certainly entered after notice of the revocation of his power), and not willing to litigate it, and to have chosen to rest their case upon its merits. It is not for another to prevent that. Again: the plaintiff might have dismissed that bill upon the discovery that the legal title of the slaves had passed by the assent to the legacy, because she did not choose to take a personal decree against the executors, who might be insolvent, or because she wished to recover the specific chattels. She may follow the property; and a bill for that purpose is not barred by a previous bill against another person through whose hands it has passed, unless the privity then existed, and unless, at any rate, it appear that in the first suit the right to the chattels be the very point decided. Both because there was no privity between these two sets of defendants at the time of the former bill, and because new matter, that is, a right to specific relief against another person, not a party before, upon a state of facts not brought forward in the first suit, that decree does not bar this suit. But if it would have that effect, it would extend only to the persons in whose favor that decree was pronounced, if relied on by them. They have waived the bar, and have elected to have a decision upon the merits, as well they may, (446) if they wish to assume any appearance of fairness as between the other parties. They ought to desire that the right should prevail between them; and, therefore, very properly, left the case open to a decision of it. As it would be enough for them that they delivered the legacy bona fide, they ought not to attempt to conclude the true owner, if she be such, from recovering back that which they delivered over by mistake.

As the case stands, then, upon the pleadings, the former decree (if it be one) does not prevent this suit going on. The former defendants submit that it shall. The new defendants cannot forbid them. And the new defendants cannot avail themselves of the proceedings, as such, in a former suit to which they were not parties nor privies.

It is next objected that the plaintiff has not shown herself next of kin of the testator. It is common to direct an inquiry to ascertain who are next of kin; and the bill would not be absolutely dismissed on the hearing upon that ground, where the relation is not denied, though not admitted in the answer. But here there is prima facie evidence in favor of the plaintiff. The testator had no issue, nor is any parent or other brother or sister shown. The plaintiff alleges that she is sole sister, and resides in Kentucky. Her residence is proved, and there is no evidence that another of her name lived there. It is proved by a witness that the testator said he had a sister living in Kentucky, by the name of the plaintiff, and that he corresponded with her husband; and spoke of no other brother or sister. And further, in both the letters of attorney she recites her relationship, and upon the faith of that, and other information acquired by the defendants, probably from Willie Wright (who was a relative), they treat with Wright as her agent for the whole estate. After this, the defendants cannot say she is not to be presumed of kin, at all events, until upon inquiry, if the defendants ask for it, the contrary shall appear.

Another question of some difficulty was touched on at the bar, (447) which the Court will not decide without further argument. It is whether the testator's widow is entitled. Clearly, she was not against the charity, unless she dissented. Thence the argument arises that she cannot say she was not to have a part only in favor of the trustees; but that under our act of Assembly the legacy is a satisfaction of her whole claim on the estate, because the testator must be supposed to make the bequest in reference to her rights. On the other hand, this being a legacy which fails for its illegality, it may be said that intention is out of the case altogether; for if the intention prevailed, both the widow and next of kin would be equally included. It becomes a case where the law disposes of the fund, because in the case that has happened no intention is to be collected either way; and when the law distributes, there is but one rule, which is the statute. Possibly there may be a distinction between an undisposed residue and that of a legacy failing, as this; and possibly, too, the act of 1784 may bar her right in both, as she did not dissent. The Court inclines to let in the widow; but it is too general a question to be decided without having the widow's representative before the court and without full argument. It will be left, therefore, to be considered of by the plaintiff's counsel.

A motion was made on that side to remit the cause for amendment in another particular; and if they deem it expedient, on this point, to make the widow's representative a party, the case may go back for that purpose, as we do not wish to conclude the question unless the case is put into such a shape as will allow a full hearing to the claims of the widow. But if the plaintiff chooses to bring on a final hearing here, relying upon her exclusive right, she may do so, at the risk of having her bill dismissed for want of all proper parties, in case the Court should think the widow entitled.


Declare the bequest of the slaves to the New Garden Meeting to be illegal and void, and that of the residue to the slaves to be also void, for want of capacity in the slaves to take; and that (448) a trust of the slaves and residue results for the next of kin. Declare further, that the letter of attorney made by the plaintiffs to Willie Wright was revoked on 1 October, 1818, and that the defendants had notice thereof before making the compromise with Wright, and that therefore the plaintiff is not bound by the payment alleged to be made to him.

Declare, also, that the decree relied on in the answer of the agents does not bar this suit against the executors, because they have not pleaded the same nor relied upon it in their answers as a bar; and that it does not bar this suit against the other defendants, because they were not parties to the suit in which it was pronounced, and because the executors were not at the time the said decree was made, nor thereafter, trustees for the other defendants, nor otherwise privy to them.

The minutes then directed an account, and gave the plaintiff an election to have the cause remanded to the court below, with liberty to make the wife of the testator a party.

Upon this order the plaintiff elected to have the cause sent back to Guilford, where he made the administrator of the widow a party. It appeared that she died a few days after the testator, without having entered her dissent to the will by which she took both land and slaves.

The master, during the time the cause pended in the court below, made his report, in which he charged the defendants jointly with the net residue of the estate of the testator, $416.93, and interest thereon; with the value of four slaves, which had been carried to distant states, and interest thereon, together with the annual value of all the other slaves and interest thereon — amounting in the whole to $3,621.74.

The case was removed to this Court again, at June Term last, when the defendants excepted to the report:

1. Because the master had disallowed the payment to Wright.

2. Because he had charged them with the value of slaves which had been removed, and interest thereon.

3. Because he had charged them with interest upon the annual (449) value of the slaves.

In support of their exception, the defendants filed a petition to rehear so much of the order made at June Term, 1831, which declared that the payment to Wright had been made after notice to the defendants of the revocation of his power.


The master having made a report under the reference ordered at June Term, 1831, to which the defendants having excepted, the cause has been again brought on upon the report and exceptions, and on the motion of the plaintiff for further directions.

The report finds the balance of the proceeds to the personal estate, exclusive of the slaves, to be $416.93, on which interest is computed from April, 1821, that being the time when the executors stated and returned their account current. The master finds that this sum is not now in the hands of the executors, but was paid to the other defendants, the trustees of the Society of Friends, or by their order, and was in fact applied in paying the sum agreed to be given upon the compromise made with Willie Wright.

To the whole of this charge both the executors and the trustees except; the latter, because the money was never in their hands, and the former because it was paid with the privity of the trustees, and on their behalf, in good faith on the part of the executors, under the belief that it belonged to the society as owners of the slaves and that Wright was the agent of the plaintiff.

The report also finds that in 1816 the executors delivered all the slaves to the trustees, and that in 1819 one of the slaves was sent out of the State to parts unknown, or was permitted by the defendant to go, so that the plaintiff cannot now get the possession of him, and that pending this suit, viz., in 1825, three others of them were in like manner sent or permitted to go away. The master charges the defendants with the (450) value of those slaves as of the time they were sent away, and with interest from that time. He also charges them with reasonable hires of all the slaves while in their possession, including those sent away up to the time they went, and interest on those hires as they become annually due.

To this part of the report the executors and trustees also respectively except, the former because they properly assented to the legacy to the society, and delivered the slaves to the trustees when their duty ceased, and they were no longer liable for either the slaves or their profits, since if a trust resulted to the next of kin, it arose out of the legal estate in the agents of the society; and the latter, because they have personally derived no profits from the slaves, but allowed them to enjoy the profits of their own labor, and to leave the State under the honest belief that they belonged to the society, and that such was the intention both of the society and the testator. And as to the interest, both sets of defendants except upon the common ground that it is not chargeable on rents and hires.

To the proper consideration of the exceptions, it is necessary to advert to the pleadings and to the transactions previous to this suit. Thomas Wright died in April, 1816, and by his will bequeathed his slaves to the Society of Friends of New Garden Monthly Meeting, or their agents and successors, and gave the residue of his personal property to the slaves themselves. This has been heretofore declared to be a trust for emancipation, and, as that was against the policy of the law, that it was void, and resulted to the next of kin. The executors, however, delivered the slaves to the agents in August, 1816. On 16 February, 1818, the present plaintiff, as sole next of kin of the testator, filed her bill against the executors for an account of the personal estate, and alleging that the trust of the slaves resulted to her. The plaintiff is a widow residing in Kentucky, and appointed Willie Wright, residing in Guilford, her agent to prosecute her suit in Guilford and receive the estate that might be coming to her. Wright was an incapable and distressed man, and, (451) as the event proved, faithless as an agent. The executors put in no answer to that bill at Spring Term, 1818, but got leave to answer at the next term. At the next term they still delayed to answer. Yet Wright did not set down the bill as confessed, but enlarged the time to another term. Before that arrived he was put in prison for debt, at whose instance does not clearly appear. But there is much reason to believe that these defendants were connected with it, for no communication for a settlement seems to have been had until he was imprisoned. On 12 December, 1818, the executors engaged with one Draughn, acting on behalf of Wright, for a compromise, and then advanced $60 towards it, for the purpose of releasing him from jail which was to be valid in case Wright should accede to it, and the residue should then be paid. The next day Wright, then in jail, assented to the arrangement, and it was concluded by the execution of two papers by him, one dated 12 December, 1818, purporting to be a general release to the executors, on the part of the plaintiff, of all demands for any part of the estate of the testator, and the other dated 14 December, 1818, in consideration of $450 then paid, to discharge the suit, and to sell and assign to the executors all the interest and claim of the plaintiff in and to the slaves and all other parts of the estate. This agreement was made by the executors personally, and by the advice and with the assistance of the defendant, George Swain, who acted on behalf of the society and their trustees, who state in their answer that they advanced part of the money. The sum paid to Wright does not precisely appear. Draughn says it was $410, including the previous $60, while Hubbard, a witness for the defendants, and a subscribing witness to one of the instruments, says it was $300 or thereabouts, for part of which a note was given. At Spring Term, 1819, the suit was dismissed under the agreement, by rule of court. This transaction has already been declared not to be a bar to the plaintiff, upon the ground that Swain and the executors then knew that the plaintiff had revoked the authority to Wright.

In July, 1824, this suit was brought, having the same objects (452) with the former, and making the agents of the society defendants, and charging that the compromise with Wright was unduly obtained, after the plaintiff had revoked his authority, and the other parties had knowledge of the fact. Both the executors and the agents by their answer insist upon the compromise and release as a bar, and also upon the title of the society to the slaves under them, and under the bequests of the will, upon the ground that the society controlled them, and does hold them as property, though they do not apply the profits to the use of the individual members or that of the society as a religious association, but as a charity for those slaves or others. The executors deny that Jim has been sent away by their privity, and say, although they are Friends and members of the same meeting, that they had no control over the slaves, but the agents only. And the agents, insisting upon a general property, say of course they had a right to send him or allow him to go away.

As a general rule, it must be admitted that executors are bound, at their peril, to pay money and deliver the property to the proper persons entitled to it, as next of kin or legatees. It may be admitted, as an exception, that executors in trust, for a charity, under a will of doubtful construction, or where the validity of the charity as a question of law is doubtful, who act honestly, though erroneously, will be protected in the application of the funds until demand from the person entitled. Upon this principle, perhaps, the executors might be excused for delivering the slaves in August, 1816, to the other defendants, though the Court cannot recognize the purpose of emancipation, there being no evidence of meritorious services, as being in this State a moral and charitable object in a general sense, much less a charity in a legal sense, and it is hard to suppose any citizen of North Carolina, and especially of the Society of Friends, to be so little informed of the law upon this subject as not to be certain of its illegality at least. But the case does not (453) require an opinion upon that point, nor even upon the effect of emancipation of the slaves, promised or permitted by the agents, before notice of the plaintiff's rights, either upon their own responsibility or that of the executors; for it does not appear that any of them have been emancipated at any time, and it does appear that the parties had full notice of those rights before any of the slaves were sent away. Three of them, indeed, have been put beyond the plaintiff's reach pending this suit, in which the defendants assert a right to withhold them from her, as being legally and beneficially their property. This would be a conversion at law. The fourth was sent off in 1819, in the interval between the termination of the first suit, and the bringing of this. Can that be regarded as bona fide, and arising from an honest mistake? I must here remark that Haywood v. Craven, 4 N.C. 360, was decided in this Court in July, 1816, in which the nature of such trusts was determined. Everybody deemed the question one of great importance, and perhaps no decision was ever sooner and more generally known, either as to the point of it or its principles. In possession of the knowledge of it, how stands the conduct of the defendants? They may be considered as acting upon a motive of praiseworthy benevolence in the abstract, in the endeavor to free their enslaved fellow-creatures; but in reference to the law of their country, and the duty of obedience to it, and in reference to the rights of property of the plaintiff, they cannot pretend good faith. They acted in bad faith in respect of those obligations. They endeavored to fortify their asserted rights of property by the release and assignment by the plaintiff of her right of property. They attempted to give that character to instruments obtained from one to whom she had given authority, and from whom she had withdrawn it, with their knowledge, in the hope she could not prove such knowledge on their part, and, therefore, that she would be bound notwithstanding the revocation. And if Wright had still authority, the compromise was made upon such terms and under such circumstances that it could not (454) stand in this Court, but would be set aside as unduly obtained upon inadequate consideration and by taking advantage of it not producing the distresses of the agent. The first suit had pended nearly a year without an answer, and without any steps towards a settlement. We then find the agent in jail, and immediately the compromise is proposed, and the plaintiff's money paid for his discharge; and the whole sum paid is less than the cash balance in the executors' hands, to which the plaintiff was entitled; in consideration of which she is made to release all claims to the residue of the estate and to convey the slaves specifically. Upon a bill filed to get rid of such a deed, upon the single point of fraud and imposition, the plaintiff must have been relieved, which is an answer to all that can be said about the good faith of the parties. If the executors had come forward as persons standing indifferent between the claimants, according to their duty, and said, "We have so much money, which we are ready to pay you; but as to the slaves, we cannot deliver them to you, because we have, as we thought we ought, already delivered them to the agents of the Society of Friends; and if there is a trust for you, apply to them, or for relief against them," it would have made a different case. But the executors and agents made a common cause, and this unfair compromise is effected, and an assignment of the slaves is actually made to the executors themselves, no doubt for the protection of the agents. Each of the parties is, in such a case, liable to the true owner for all subsequent conversions or misapplications of the property, though they may not be liable in equal degree, but the one after the other. Here all the parties are before the Court, and the plaintiff seeks the specific property. As far as it can be had, she is entitled to it; but for any parts of it that have been eloigned, she is entitled to compensation from the last holder and actual wrong-doer; and if satisfaction cannot be obtained from him, then she has a right to look to all the others by whose more remote agency the injury to her has arisen. That compensation consists in the value of the slaves withheld from her, and interest on it.

As to the sum paid to Wright, it being wrongfully paid by the (455) executors, it must be considered as between them and the plaintiff, to be still in their hands; but as between them and the other defendants, the agents, it was paid with the privity and by the request of the latter, and for the confirmation of their pretended title to the negroes, and, therefore, was a payment to their use, and the agents must be liable first for it. It is true that one of the defendants, Mr. Swain, was not appointed one of the agents of the meeting until 26 December, 1818, but he is equally liable with the others for the whole, for he was the individual who made the compromise and payment, acting on behalf of the meeting of which he was a member, and the other agents and he, as agent, subsequently ratified the whole, and all four of the slaves were sent away after he had charge of them.

As to the hires and the interest on them: Hire is the natural profit of slaves, and if not made, ought to have been made, and the owner is entitled to receive it from those who withhold the slaves themselves. It is no answer to say that the negroes worked for themselves. That was as much against law and public economy as against the individual rights of the plaintiff. It certainly is not the general rule to charge interest on the annual profits, nor would it be allowed here if the defendants had rendered a fair account or allowed the case to be decided simply on the original rights of the parties. But the extreme injustice done to the plaintiff in the beginning, in denying her right, in taking advantage of the incapacity, the faithlessness and necessities of her agent, to extort a release and a conveyance from him, upon payment only of a very small part of what was due to the plaintiff, and after they knew that she had appointed another attorney, and the attempt to set those deeds up as a bar in this suit, and in the meanwhile to send off some other of the slaves beyond the jurisdiction of the court, all together constitute so gross a case of bad faith, and willful resistance to the cause of justice, and the claims of property as acknowledged and guaranteed by the laws, as subjects the defendants to account upon the most rigorous principles, and renders them justly chargeable with the highest hire, (456) and interest on it. For which reasons, all the exceptions are overruled and the report confirmed, and the plaintiff must be declared entitled to all the slaves reported to be yet in this State, and to recover from all the defendants the sums of money reported to be due for the residue and for the value of the four slaves sent away, and the hires of all the others, and interest upon those several sums; for which however, the defendants, the agents of the society, are liable to her in the first place, and therefore execution will issue therefor immediately against them; and if upon return thereof it should appear that satisfaction of the whole or any part thereof cannot be had from them, that then the plaintiff shall have execution against the other defendants for the deficiency then remaining.

When this cause was before the Court, upon the hearing in 1831, a doubt was entertained upon the right of the testator's widow to a share in this property, as not being effectually disposed. The point has been since much considered, and finally decided against the right in Craven v. Craven, ante, 338. So that the bill, so far as it seeks to recover anything as belonging to the widow by her administrator, must be dismissed.

PER CURIAM. Bill dismissed.

Cited: Ford v. Whedbee, 21 N.C. 21; Brown v. Brown, 27 N.C. 137; McCall v. Clayton, 44 N.C. 423; Phillips v. Hooker, 62 N.C. 196; Bryson v. Lucas, 84 N.C. 687; Cadell v. Allen, 99 N.C. 547; Russ v. Harper, 158 N.C. 450; Elmore v. Byrd, 180 N.C. 127.


Summaries of

Redmond v. Coffin

Supreme Court of North Carolina
Dec 1, 1833
17 N.C. 437 (N.C. 1833)

In Redmond v. Coffin, 17 N.C. 437, the widow took both land and chattels under the will, in which there was a disposition of certain slaves of the residue of the estate, which was illegal and ineffectual; and it was held, as to them, that there was a resulting trust for the next of kin, excluding the widow.

Summary of this case from Brown v. Brown
Case details for

Redmond v. Coffin

Case Details

Full title:ELIZABETH REDMOND v. BETHUEL COFFIN, EXECUTOR OF THOMAS WRIGHT, ET AL

Court:Supreme Court of North Carolina

Date published: Dec 1, 1833

Citations

17 N.C. 437 (N.C. 1833)

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