Randall v. Sorrell

5 Citing briefs

  1. The People, Appellant,v.Raymond Crespo, Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed February 8, 2018

    This is "especially true where, as here, the principle has become settled through 19 iteration and reiteration over a long period of time." Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (plurality) . "The doctrine also rests upon the principle that a court is an institution, not merely a collection of individuals, and that governing rules of law do not change merely because the personnel of the court changes."

  2. Orr v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co et al

    Brief/Memorandum in Support

    Filed October 6, 2016

    , or to foresee which of many different possible ways the legislature might respond to the constitutional objections we have found. Given these difficulties, we believe the Vermont Legislature would have intended us to set aside the statute’s contribution limits, leaving the legislature free to rewrite those provisions in light of the constitutional difficulties we have identified. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006). The Texas Supreme Court agrees that “we are not free to rewrite the statutes to reach a result we might consider more desirable, in the name of statutory construction.”

  3. Thompson et al v. Dauphinais et al

    RESPONSE in Opposition re First MOTION for Hearing re First MOTION for Preliminary Injunction

    Filed November 16, 2015

    DATED: November 16, 2015. CRAIG W. RICHARDS ATTORNEY GENERAL By: /s/ Margaret Paton Walsh Margaret Paton Walsh Assistant Attorney General Alaska Bar No. 0411074 Department of Law 1031 W. 4th Avenue, Suite 200 Anchorage, AK 99501 Phone: (907) 269-6612 Facsimile: (907) 258-4978 Email: margaret.paton-walsh@alaska.gov 8 See Lair v. Murry, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1080; Randall, 548 U.S. at 253. Thompson, et al. v. Dauphinais, et al.

  4. Speechnow.org et al v. Federal Election Commission

    MOTION for Order to Certify Under 2 U.S.C. 437h

    Filed June 27, 2008

    See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that “it is implausible that contributions to independent expenditure political committees are corrupting” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Davis v. FEC, No. 07-230, 2008 WL 2520527, at *10 14 n.7 (U.S. June 26, 2008) (stating that even if a provision of BCRA that raised contribution limits for opponents of self-funded candidates “were characterized as a limit on contributions rather than expenditures, it is doubtful whether it would survive”); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248-53 (2006) (recognizing corruption as the only interest that can support contribution limits and striking down limits under intermediate scrutiny as broader than necessary to achieve that interest). While there is certainly more to this argument—as Plaintiffs showed in their briefs in support of their motion for preliminary injunction—these two fundamental points are more than enough to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ challenges to the contribution limits that apply to them are not frivolous or otherwise settled questions and thus that they easily meet the standard for certification under §437h.

  5. Speechnow.org et al v. Federal Election Commission

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION for Preliminary Injunction

    Filed March 5, 2008

    The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this holding. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000); FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (“Colorado II”), 533 U.S. 431, 440-42, 456 (2001); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161-62 (2003); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 135 (2003); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, __, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 2488, 2491 (2006) (plurality) (same). 9 Case 1:08-cv-00248-JR Document 13 Filed 03/05/2008 Page 19 of 54 Contribution limits leave contributors free to become members of associations and assist with their various efforts on behalf of candidates, and also “to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.”