Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.

5 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Hot Topics in Products Liability Law: Split in Authority Regarding the Indirect Purchaser Rule as a Bar to a Products Liability RICO Claim

    Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C.Devin BatesOctober 24, 2023

    .”).In the Fifth Circuit. Harris Cnty., Tex. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CV H-19-4994, 2020 WL 5803483, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2020) (declining “to follow the minority rule” and holding “that indirect purchasers lack standing under RICO”).But there is also enough authority going in the other direction to allow plaintiffs room for argument. Other circuits and some federal district courts have held that the indirect purchaser rule does not apply to federal RICO claims. Some district courts have reached this decision within circuits that have yet to provide guidance on the rule’s application to federal RICO claims. For example, here is the authority sometimes deployed by the plaintiffs’ bar to defeat dispositive motions attempting to rely on the indirect purchaser rule:Fourth Circuit.Mid Atl. Telecom v. Long Distance Servs., 18 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1185 (4th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996)) (recognizing that the Fourth Circuit held that Brandenbug “did not... establish a rule that only injuries suffered by the immediate victim of a predicate act satisfied” the standing requirement of the RICO statute, and implying that to hold that an indirect purchaser has no RICO standing in a consumer fraud case would conflict with Fourth Circuit authority holding that even “indirect victims” have standing if their injuries were proximately caused by the predicate acts).In the Tenth Circuit. In re: EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Antitrust Litig., 336 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1325 (D. Kan. 2018) (declining to apply the indirect purchaser rule to a RICO claim in the absence of supporting Tenth Circuit authority and instead holding that RICO standing requires only a showing of proximate causation).In the Eleventh Circuit.GolTV, Inc. v. Fox Sports Latin Am., Ltd., No. 16-24431-CIV, 2018 WL 1393790, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018) (noting the parties’ failure to cite

  2. “I hate, hate, hate motions for sanctions.”

    EDRM - Electronic Discovery Reference ModelMay 8, 2023

    Governing the Performance of Judicial Duties state that: “A judge shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office impartially and fairly.” Md. Rule 18-102.2(a). Comment [2] adds that: “Although each judge comes to the bench with a unique background and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in question.”[6]Md. Rule 18-102.7 is titled “Responsibility to Decide” and it adds that: “A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge unless recusal is appropriate.” Md. Rule 18-100.4 states that an “impartial judiciary” that “will interpret and apply the law that governs our society is indispensable to our system of justice.”In an admittedly different context, the Supreme Court wrote that: “We have often acknowledged that federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)(addressing federal jurisdiction and the abstention doctrine, not a motion for sanctions).To be clear, I do not imply that any of the cited decisions would violate any of those rules, even if the Maryland Rules were applicable, and they are not. In each case, the court engaged in a thorough, fair, and comprehensive analysis of the motion.My point in this blog is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for sanctions motions for good reason. They should be viewed like any other motion. After all, there are a lot of “thin” Rule 12(b)(6) motions and Rule 56 motions that involve obvious genuine disputes of material fact. Sanctions motions are not the only type that are overused.If a litigant makes an improper use of that, or any other tool, the Rules provide remedies.[7]“The practice of law may be poetically likened to sailing a ship. Constitutions, case law, and legislative enactments are to the lawyer what charts, buoys, and beacons are to the sailor. The compass, however, is ge

  3. Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharmaceutical Co. (3rd Cir. 2016)

    McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLPKevin E. NoonanSeptember 8, 2016

    However, the Court also noted that the question of subject matter jurisdiction raised by the amici was one that a court has "an independent obligation" to raise in situations where its jurisdiction (and hence institutional competence) are called into question, citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). The Court continued that "federal courts [also] have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress," citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996), and "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not," quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). Accordingly, the panel concluded that it had a duty to question the District Court's decision that it did not have jurisdiction regardless of whether this was an issue for the parties.

  4. HIF Bio, Inc., et al. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co., Ltd. (doing business as Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals and Yung Shin Pharm, Ind. Co. Ltd.), et al.

    Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLPDavid Albagli Ph.D.November 13, 2007

    In fact, the Federal Circuit observed that Powerex states that a remand order need only be colorably characterized as a remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction to be beyond the reach of appellate courts under § 1447(d). CTI relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), which held that § 1447(d) interposes no bar to appellate review of “abstention-based” remand orders. A court “abstains” from hearing claims over which it has an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, whether it be federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.

  5. “The Three Amigos”: Same 5th Circuit panel which recently addressed §1453 now considers whether §1453 allows appeal of remand orders beyond those cases removed under CAFA.

    McGlinchey Stafford PLLCMcGlinchey StaffordMay 22, 2006

    ” the three judges decided that the court did have authority to review the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Latching onto the fact that the district court based its original remand order on abstention, and citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), the Fifth Circuit decided that § 1291, which provides appellate review of remands based on abstention, allowed consideration of the appeal. After considering the merits of the appeal, particularly the district court’s misapplication of supplemental jurisdiction and abstention statues, the three amigos vacated the remand order and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.