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Pyara v. Sysco Corp.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Jul 19, 2016
No. 2:15-cv-01208-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2016)

Summary

granting judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff's claim for inaccurate wage statements based on failure to pay meal and rest break premiums because such a basis would result in improper double recovery

Summary of this case from Urena v. Cent. Cal. Almond Growers Ass'n

Opinion

No. 2:15-cv-01208-JAM-KJN

07-19-2016

CHRIS PYARA on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiffs, v. SYSCO CORPORATION; SYSCO SACRAMENTO, INC., A California Corporation; and DOES 1-100, Defendants.


ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

This is a wage and hour case brought by plaintiff Chris Pyara ("Pyara") on behalf of similarly situated employees of defendants Sysco Corporation and Sysco Sacramento, Inc. (collectively "Defendants"). Pyara alleges ten causes of action for violations of various provisions of the California Labor Code ("CLC"), associated regulations, and common law. Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(c) for each of the ten causes of action raised by Pyara (Doc. #9). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies in part and grants in part the motion.

This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for June 14, 2016. --------

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pyara was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt industrial truck driver from October 31, 2011 to November 27, 2013. Compl. ¶ 18; Tzintun Decl. (Doc. #1-5) ¶¶ 2-3. During this period, there was a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") in place between Sysco Sacramento and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 137, which represented Sysco Sacramento employees. Tzintun Decl. ¶ 8; Defendants' First Request for Judicial Notice ("D RJN 1") (Doc. #10), Exh. A.

On April 13, 2015, Pyara, on behalf of himself and "all non-exempt employees, including . . . hourly industrial truck workers, truck drivers, drivers, or similar job designations and titles who are presently or formerly employed" by Defendants, filed a complaint against Defendants in Sacramento Superior Court alleging that Defendants violated the common law and various provisions of the CLC and associated regulations. Pyara's first cause of action for "wage theft / time shaving" is based on Defendants' alleged practice of clocking out Pyara for meal and rest periods even when he remained working. Pyara's second cause of action for failure to pay overtime is based on Defendants' alleged failure to provide meal and rest periods and therefore not correctly classifying certain hours as overtime work. Pyara's third cause of action for failure to provide meal periods is based on Defendants' alleged policy of requiring Pyara to work through meal periods and to work at least five hours without a meal period and failing to provide a second meal period when Pyara worked shifts of ten hours or more. Pyara's fourth cause of action for failure to permit rest periods is similarly based on Defendants' alleged policy of requiring Pyara to work through rest periods and work four hours without a rest period. Based on these alleged practices (wage theft, failure to pay overtime, and failure to provide meal and rest breaks), Pyara alleges that Defendants failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements (fifth cause of action); failed to pay all wages due upon termination (sixth cause of action); were unjustly enriched (seventh cause of action); converted Pyara's wages (eighth cause of action); defrauded Pyara (ninth cause of action); and violated the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") (tenth cause of action). Defendants removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction and pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") (Doc. #1). Pyara did not oppose removal. Jurisdiction is indeed proper based on CAFA because the parties are minimally diverse, there are over 100 potential class members, and the aggregate amount in controversy is greater than $5 million. Removal at 6-13.

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings of all ten of the causes of action (Doc. #9). Defendants allege that the first four causes of action are either statutorily barred or preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Pyara opposed the motion (Doc. #14).

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Defendants bring their motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), which states that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." For the purposes of Rule 12(c), the pleadings are closed once an answer has been filed. Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). Since Defendants filed their answer (Doc. #1-2) and the motion will not delay trial, a Rule 12(c) motion is appropriate at this time.

Rule 12(c) motions are "functionally identical" to Rule 12(b) motions. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). Just as in Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss, courts must accept as true the allegations of the non-moving party. Id.

B. Judicial Notice

In support of its motion, Defendants ask this court to take judicial notice of the CBA between Sysco Sacramento and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 137 (Doc. #10). D RJN 1, Exh. A. Pyara asks this Court to take judicial notice of (1) the California Legislative Counsel's Digest for Assembly Bill 569 dated February 25, 2009; (2) the California Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment file for Assembly Bill 569; and (3) the California Assembly Committee on Appropriations file for Assembly Bill 569 (Doc. #14-1). Plaintiff's RJN, Exhs. 1-3. In support of its reply, Defendants request that this Court take judicial notice of the order denying the motion to remand in the case Gerardo Ayala v. Destination Shuttle Services LLC, et al., CV 1306141 GAF (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013) and the Bill Analysis of Senate Bill 1255 by the California Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment from the hearing held on June 20, 2012 (Doc. #16). Defendants' Second RJN, Exhs. A, B. Neither party objects to the opposing party's requests for judicial notice.

A court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not reasonably disputed if it "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). CBAs are properly considered materials that are not subject to reasonable dispute and are therefore proper for judicial notice. Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply, 2016 WL 696503, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016). The Court grants Defendants' first RJN (Doc. #10).

Courts may also judicially notice legislative facts such as "facts of which courts take particular notice when interpreting a statute." Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1414 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Moreover, if the legislature's intent is not clear from its language, a court may take judicial notice of legislative history, including committee reports. Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff's exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and Defendants' Exhibit B from Defendants' second RJN are all legislative history and are therefore proper for judicial notice.

Finally, courts are allowed to consider "matters of public record." Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants' Exhibit A from Defendants' second RJN is a matter of public record and proper for judicial notice. For these reasons, the Court will take judicial notice of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and Defendants' Exhibit A from Defendants' first RJN and Exhibits A and B from Defendants' second RJN.

C. Analysis

Defendants' motion argues that the first four causes of action are preempted by the LMRA and that the second and third causes of action are statutorily exempted. If either the second or third cause of action is statutorily exempted, the preemption analysis for that claim is moot. For that reason, the Court will first address the issue of whether the second and third causes of action are exempted before proceeding to the preemption issue.

1. Second Cause of Action

Pyara's second cause of action alleges that Defendants failed to pay overtime as required by CLC section 510. Defendants make two arguments in support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings on this claim. First, Defendants argue that the second cause of action is preempted by the LMRA. Mot. at 10. Second, Defendants argue that the second cause of action is statutorily barred under CLC section 514. Mot. at 11. In opposition, Pyara contests Defendants' argument that the second cause of action is preempted by the LMRA but concedes that the claim is statutorily barred by Section 514. Opp. at 3 n.1.

Overtime claims may not be brought by an employee who is covered by a CBA that "expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage." Cal. Lab. Code § 514. Here, Plaintiff is covered by a CBA that complies with the Section 514 requirements. The terms of the CBA expressly provide for wages (Art. VIII), working hours (Art. VI), working employee conditions (Arts. V-VIII), and premium wage rates for overtime worked (Art. VIII). D RJN 1, Exh. A. In light of those CBA provisions, Pyara concedes that this claim fails as a matter of law and the Court therefore grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the second cause of action for failure to pay overtime. Because the second cause of action is statutorily barred, the Court need not address whether the cause of action is also preempted by the LMRA.

2. Third Cause of Action

In his third cause of action, Pyara alleges that Defendants' policies and practices failed to provide employees with a meal period after employees worked five continuous hours or a second meal period when an employee worked in excess of ten hours. By failing to provide such meal periods, Defendants allegedly violated CLC section 512(a). Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the third cause of action is preempted by the LMRA and statutorily barred under CLC section 512(e). Mot. at 11. In opposition, Pyara argues that the claim is not statutorily barred because the CBA "does not provide for more than one meal period, as the express language of § 512(e) requires before the exemption will lie." Opp. at 9.

An employers' meal period obligations under Section 512(a) are not applicable to commercial drivers who are covered by a CBA that "expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of employees, and expressly provides for meal periods for those employees, final and binding arbitration of disputes concerning application of its meal period provisions, premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked, and a regular hourly rate of pay of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage rate." Cal. Lab. Code §§ 512(e), (f). Here, the CBA satisfies all of the conditions set forth in Section 512(e) and (f). It expressly provides for wages (Art. VIII), hours of work (Art. VI), working conditions (Arts. V-VIII), meal periods (Art.VI), final and binding arbitration procedures (Art. XIV, Sec. 1), premium wage rates for overtime (Art. VIII), and an hourly pay rate that is greater than 30 percent of the California minimum wage (Art. VIII). D RJN 1, Exh. A. Pyara's Section 512(a) claim is thus exempted by Section 512(e).

Pyara argues that the Section 512(e) exemption to Section 512(a) only applies if the CBA provides more than one meal period for any employee who works over ten hours. Since the CBA in this case explicitly bars more than one meal period for employees working more than ten hours, Pyara argues that it does not meet the requirements for the Section 512(e) exemption. Pyara makes two arguments in support of his interpretation of Section 512(e). First, Pyara points out that Section 512(e) employs the plural phrase "meal periods." Second, Pyara argues that the legislative history of the statute indicates that the Legislature was concerned about public safety - a goal that would be furthered by requiring two meal breaks.

With respect to Pyara's textual argument, the ordinary meaning and underlying purpose of Section 512 do not compel Pyara's proposed interpretation. The term "meal periods" is plural because the term "employees" is plural. "Meal periods," as used in Section 512(e), is best construed as at least one meal period per employee. Moreover, the ability to bargain away a second meal period is written into the statute itself: "if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee." Cal. Lab. Code § 512(a). "It would make no sense to conclude that subdivision (a)'s requirements apply to an employee who is explicitly exempted from them." Araquistain v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 229 Cal. App. 4th 227, 236 (2014). Pyara's textual argument carries no weight.

As for Pyara's second argument regarding the legislative history of Section 512(e), nothing in the legislative history states that all commercial drivers must be given at least two meal periods if they work longer than ten hours. Certainly safety was a concern of the Legislature, but the legislative history also demonstrates that the exemption was provided to afford commercial drivers and their employers with flexibility in scheduling meal periods. Plaintiff's Exh. 2. The legislative history supports Defendants' conclusion that Section 512(e) was not intended to establish a non-negotiable right to two meal periods for drivers such as Pyara who are covered by a valid CBA that meets a strict set of labor protections.

Finally, Pyara has failed to cite to a single case in support of his proposed interpretation of Section 512(e). Pyara's citation to Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prod., Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094 (2007) does not assist him. Opp. at 12-13. Murphy refers to safety concerns surrounding CLC section 226.7, not 512(a). Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1113. The court in Murphy was concerned about the possible health hazards of not providing any meal or rest periods, not the ability of parties to bargain away a second meal period. Id. The court in Murphy does not conclude that Section 512(e) requires employees to have two meal periods.

For these reasons, Pyara's third cause of action is statutorily barred by Section 512(e) and judgment on the pleading as to this claim is granted. Given that the claim cannot proceed, the Court need not determine whether it is also preempted by the LMRA.

3. Preemption

Defendants argue that the first and fourth causes of action are preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. The LMRA is a jurisdictional statute stating that "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Federal law preempts claims directly founded upon rights established by a CBA and claims that are "substantially dependent" on analysis of a CBA. Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). "The preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state claim." Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, "not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985); see also Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc v. Local 302 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 1997 WL 236296, at *1 (9th Cir. March 27, 1997) (holding that extending preemption to permit parties to immunize their conduct from state law by including it in a labor contract "clearly exceeds the scope of § 301 preemption intended by Congress").

Courts apply a two-pronged inquiry to determine whether claims are preempted by Section 301. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007); Sciborski v. Pac. Bell Directory, 205 Cal.App.4th 1152 (2012). First, courts "determine whether a particular right inheres in state law or, instead, is grounded in a CBA." Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. If the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted. Id. When determining whether a case arises from state law or the CBA, courts are instructed to consider the "legal character of the claim . . . independent of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1994). The mere fact that the claim could have been pursued under the CBA does not establish preemption. Id. at 124. And "reliance on the CBA as an aspect of a defense is not enough to inject a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim." Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060.

If the claim exists independently from the CBA because it arises under state law, the Court then applies the second prong of the Burnside analysis: "whether [the] state law right is substantially dependent on the terms of [the] CBA." Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. A state law claim substantially depends on the terms of a CBA if the Court must interpret the CBA. Id. The word "interpret" is to be construed narrowly: "it means something more than 'consider,' 'refer to,' or 'apply.'" Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). "If the claim requires interpretation of the CBA, the claim is preempted; if the claim merely requires looking to the CBA, it is not preempted." Densmore, 2016 WL 696503, at *4.

a. First Cause of Action

Pyara's first cause of action alleges that Defendants "breached the legal duty to pay full wages to Plaintiff by automatically deducting a portion of the wages earned when Plaintiff and the Class members' actual time records indicated that a meal [or rest] period was not taken." Compl. ¶ 90. Pyara also alleges that Defendants "failed to pay for the overtime that was due." Id. Pyara labels this cause of action "wage theft/time shaving. Id. ¶¶ 87-94. Defendants argue that this claim is preempted by the LMRA because the right to meal breaks, rest breaks, and overtime "exist[] entirely as a result of the CBA." Mot. at 10. In opposition, Pyara argues that "this cause of action is not premised on Defendants' failure to provide meal and rest periods as required by California law." Opp. at 5. Instead, Pyara argues that the claim simply "seeks wages for time that he and the putative class members spent working off the clock." Opp. at 5.

"'Time-shaving' is the practice of doctoring hourly employees' time sheets to reduce their pay." In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 616 (N.D. Cal. 2007). California employees who do not receive their full wages owed may bring an action to recover the unpaid balance. Cal. Lab. Code § 1194(a) ("[E]mployees receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage"); Cal. Lab. Code § 204(a) ("[a]ll wages . . . earned by any person in any employment are due and payable.").

Defendants' preemption argument fails. Defendants cite multiple CBA provisions that the Court will allegedly be required to interpret to adjudicate this claim. Reply at 2-4. But none of these clauses reference Defendants' alleged policy of automatically clocking out Pyara regardless of whether he continued to work. Even if the Court assumed that the rights to overtime, meal periods, and rest periods "exist entirely as a result of the CBA," the right to be paid for all of the hours one works exists independently of the CBA. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1194(a). The Densmore case is instructive in this regard. Just as in this case, the plaintiff in Densmore alleges that defendants violated state law by failing to provide workers with all wages earned during a pay period. Densmore, 2016 WL 696503 at *1. Here, just as in Densmore, the Court did not find "any provision contained [in the CBA] that could pertain to this cause of action." Id. at *10.

Moreover, Pyara appears to allege that Defendants engaged in time shaving by not paying him for rest break periods, meal break periods, overtime periods, and even regular time he worked. As discussed above, Pyara's claims for violations of right to overtime and meal periods are respectively exempted by CLC sections 514 and 512(e). But those exemptions do not apply to Pyara's allegations that Defendants failed to provide him with rest periods and shaved time off of his regular time worked. In Kilbourne v. Coca-Cola Co., 2014 WL 11397891 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2014), a case similar to this one, the court granted partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's wage theft / time shaving cause of action. The Court reasoned that "it is unclear whether Plaintiff alleges a [wage theft / time shaving] claim for either regular time or overtime or both." Kilbourne, 2014 WL 11397891, at *8. The Court granted summary judgment on this claim insofar as it rested on overtime violations because the plaintiff's overtime claims were statutorily exempted under CLC section 514. Id. But the Court permitted the case to move forward on the issue of whether the defendant had engaged in time shaving or wage theft with respect to the plaintiff's regular time. Id.

Given that this cause of action does not inhere in the CBA but in state law, the LMRA does not preempt Pyara's first cause of action for time shaving. However, to the extent this cause of action rests upon violations of overtime or meal periods, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted because those claims are statutorily barred. To the extent that the time shaving occurred on non-statutorily barred claims, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

b. Fourth Cause of Action

Pyara's fourth cause of action alleges that Defendants failed to authorize rest periods by having a policy of not providing rest breaks and by assigning too much work for an employee to complete within the assigned time frames. Compl. ¶¶ 121-135. As with the third claim, Defendants argue that this claim is preempted because it requires the Court to interpret the CBA. Mot. at 9. Specifically, Defendants argue that because Pyara challenges the manner and amount of work assigned, the Court will be required to interpret the CBA by "analyz[ing] the 'inextricably intertwined' CBA terms on job bidding, route assignments, hours and overtime (Articles V, VII, and VIII), as well as meal and rest periods (Article VI) to determine if Defendants met their obligation to Plaintiff." Id. In opposition, Pyara argues that the Court may need to reference but not interpret the CBA because the relevant terms are clear. Opp. at 8.

Applying the first step of the Burnside analysis, it is clear that the basis of this claim is state law, not the CBA. On the face of the complaint, Pyara alleges violations of CLC section 226.7 and California Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") Wage Order No. 9-2001. Compl. ¶¶ 133-134. Pyara does not allege any federal cause of action or any CBA violation. Id. ¶¶ 121-135. Therefore, preemption is not appropriate under the first prong of the Burnside inquiry. The Court must next determine whether this cause of action is preempted because it substantially depends on the terms of the CBA, i.e. the Court must examine whether, in analyzing the merits of this claim, it is required to interpret provisions in the CBA. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060.

The Ninth Circuit has found that "'[s]ubstantial dependence' on a CBA is an inexact concept, turning on the specific facts of each case, and the distinction between 'looking to' a CBA and 'interpreting' it is not always clear or amenable to a bright-line test." Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691. But in this case, the CBA's rest break provisions are not especially complex. D RJN 1, Exh. A at 6-7. And preemption is not simply triggered by referencing unambiguous provisions in a CBA. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 (concluding that "when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished."). Even if the Court was required to determine whether Pyara waived his rights to a rest period, the analysis would not rise to the level of "interpretation." Cramer, 255 F.3d at 692 ("a court may look to the CBA to determine whether it contains a clear and unmistakable waiver of state law rights without triggering § 301 preemption.").

Additionally, "§ 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law." Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123. Pyara alleges that Defendants failed to provide him with his state statutory and regulatory rights regarding rest breaks. In their moving papers, Defendants do not argue that the right to rest breaks established by IWC Wage Orders and the CLC are negotiable rights. This is notably different that the right to meal periods, as discussed in section C(2) above.

Finally, while Defendants cite the CBA in defense of their alleged practices and policies, "a defense based on the terms of a CBA is not enough to require preemption." Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 690 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Aug. 27, 2001); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399 ("a defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated") (emphasis in original).

In sum, the Court finds that Pyara's fourth cause of action is not preempted because it rests on a right created by state law and is not substantially dependent on the terms of the CBA. Further, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the rights asserted in this claim are negotiable. Defendants also cannot inject a federal question into state law claims by citing the CBA as a defense. The Court therefore denies the motion for judgment as a matter of law on the fourth cause of action.

4. Fifth Cause of Action

Pyara's fifth cause of action alleges that Defendants violated CLC section 226(a) by knowingly failing to provide wage statements that accurately reflected the total hours worked and total wages earned by Pyara. Compl. ¶ 137. Defendants argue that this claim fails because courts do not permit Section 226(a) claims "based on alleged meal and rest period violations." Mot. at 12. In opposition, Pyara argues that this claim is "not entirely dependent on Defendants failure to provide compliant meal and rest periods," but "[r]ather, they are in part predicated on Defendants' failure to provide compliant meal and rest periods under Sections 226.7 and 512(a), and then failing to accurately reflect the time actually worked and the appropriate wages earned in Plaintiffs' wage statements as a result." Id. (emphasis in original).

Defendants are correct. As the court found in Jones v. Spherion Staffing LLC, 2012 WL 3264081, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012), permitting a plaintiff to use violations of meal and rest period regulations to form the basis of a CLC section 226 claim "would result in an improper multiple recovery by the employee." And multiple courts have found that permitting such claims to move forward would be directly contrary to the purpose of Section 226; namely, "to ensure that employers provide accurate wage statements to employees, not to govern employers' obligations with respect to meal periods." Nguyen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2011 WL 6018284, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011); Jones, 2012 WL 3264081, at *7 ("the legislative history shows that the purpose of Section 226 was for transparency, not for double recovery"). Moreover, Pyara's argument that his claim is based on the failure to accurately reflect the actual time he worked is not a compelling distinction because he concedes that the inaccuracy is based on Defendants' failure to provide compliant meal and rest periods. For these reasons, the Court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings on Pyara's fifth cause of action.

5. Derivative Causes of Action—Sixth Through Tenth

Both parties agree that the sixth through tenth causes of action are derivative of causes of action one through four and therefore survive only insofar as causes of action one through four survive. Mot. at 13 ("Because these claims are dependent on the underlying claims, they fail to the extent they are derivative of any earlier-pleaded claim that is subject to dismissal."); Opp. at 15 ("Plaintiff's fifth through tenth causes of action are derivative of his other causes of action."). Since the first and fourth causes of action survive the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the sixth through tenth causes of action survive as derivative actions. The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth through tenth causes of actions is denied.

D. Sanctions

The Court issued its Order re Filing Requirements for Cases Assigned to Judge Mendez ("Order") on June 5, 2015 (Doc. #2-2). The Order requires that reply memoranda in support of a motion to dismiss be limited to five pages. The Order further states that violations of the page limit will result in the imposition of monetary sanctions against counsel in the amount of $50.00 per page. Defendants' reply memorandum (Doc. #15) is ten pages long. As such, the Court imposes sanctions against counsel for Defendants in the amount of $250.00, and the Court has not considered any arguments made after page five of Defendants' reply memorandum.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on Pyara's second, third, and fifth causes of action. The Court DENIES Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on Pyara's first cause of action, except to the extent this claim rests upon violations of overtime or meal periods; fourth cause of action; and sixth through tenth causes of action. Counsel for Defendants is ordered to pay $250.00 in sanctions to the Clerk of the Court within five days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 19, 2016

/s/ _________

JOHN A. MENDEZ,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


Summaries of

Pyara v. Sysco Corp.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Jul 19, 2016
No. 2:15-cv-01208-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2016)

granting judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff's claim for inaccurate wage statements based on failure to pay meal and rest break premiums because such a basis would result in improper double recovery

Summary of this case from Urena v. Cent. Cal. Almond Growers Ass'n
Case details for

Pyara v. Sysco Corp.

Case Details

Full title:CHRIS PYARA on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, and on…

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Jul 19, 2016

Citations

No. 2:15-cv-01208-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2016)

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