Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany

10 Citing briefs

  1. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS LONDON et al v. GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA et al

    REPLY to opposition to motion re MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed March 2, 2007

    Although plaintiffs propose a narow application of the implied- waiver exception -- whereby implied waiver by virtue of terrorist sponsorship would be limited to circumstances in which forfeiture of immunity under section 1605(a)(7) was foreseeable, such as where the terrorist activities directly targeted U.S. nationals -- that Case 1:06-cv-00731-GK Document 39 Filed 03/02/2007 Page 10 of 26 approach does not address the issue that Princz said was the touchstone of section 1605(a)(1): whether the foreign state actually indicated, even implicitly, a willngness to waive immunity. See 26 F.3d at 1174 (emphasis supplied). The allegation that Sudan and Iran proceeded with their terrorist sponsorship knowing that doing so might subject them to suits by S. nationals in U.S. cours (which is a questionable proposition insofar as the actions of Sudan and Iran preceded the 1996 amendment of the FSIA) is insufficient to support a finding that these nations willngly waived their immunty from suits by other individuals injured as a result ofthe same conduct.

  2. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS LONDON et al v. GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA et al

    MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed December 5, 2006

    ” Princz, 26 F.3d at 1173 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 9 Case 1:06-cv-00731-GK Document 32 Filed 12/05/2006 Page 13 of 35 aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support . . . ” to establish implied waiver under § 1605(a)(1). Section 1605(a)(7) applies only to claims for personal injury or death, not property damage.4 The plaintiffs recognize that they cannot assert waiver of immunity under 1605(a)(7) in this case, so they have alleged that the Libya Defendants implicitly waived their sovereign immunity under § 1605(a)(1) because the Libya Defendants allegedly supported terrorist acts in violation of § 1605(a)(7). The language of both provisions is clear and the law of the D.C. Circuit is clear.

  3. LEO v. AL NASER et al

    MEMORANDUM re MOTION for Reconsideration re Order on Motion to Dismiss,

    Filed December 3, 2010

    28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). As Judge Wald forcefully argued in her dissenting opinion in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), this exception to the FSIA applies, and a foreign state implicitly waives its sovereign immunity, when it “violat[es] the jus cogens norms of international law condemning enslavement . . . .” Princz, 26 F.3d at 1179 (Wald, J. dissenting); see also Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva, & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 365 (1989).

  4. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS LONDON et al v. GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA et al

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed February 2, 2007

    The Princz court held that “[s]uch an expansive reading of § 1605(a)(1) would likely place an enormous strain not only upon our courts but, more to the immediate point, upon our country’s diplomatic relations with any number of foreign nations.” 26 F.3d 1166 at 1174. Here, as discussed supra at I.A. – I.C., the Plaintiffs contend that the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is not based on international law but rather premised upon the Plaintiffs’ allegations of the Libyan Defendants’ material support for the ANO, which satisfy the requirements of section 1605(a)(7), an explicit congressional grant of jurisdiction.

  5. BELHAS et al v. YA'ALON

    REPLY to opposition to motion re MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed June 26, 2006

    And the U.S. has repeatedly characterized this artillery barrage, and Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 12 Filed 06/26/2006 Page 18 of 33 -11- Israel’s actions against terrorists generally, as legitimate self-defense.6 The issue at Nuremberg, moreover, was not whether Nazi war criminals were immune from private lawsuits under the FSIA, but whether they should answer to a world tribunal. Cf. Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir. 2001) (“although jus cogens norms may address sovereign immunity in contexts where the question is whether international law itself provides immunity, e.g., the Nuremberg proceedings,” they “do not require Congress (or any government) to create jurisdiction” in its own courts); Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Amrab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 242-45 (2d Cir. 1996); Princz, 26 F.3d at 1173-74 & n.1. B. The TVPA Does Not Preempt the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act In support of their claim that the FSIA does not cover acts taken on behalf and with the approval of the official’s government, Plaintiffs craft a strained argument under the TVPA.

  6. Allen et al v. Russian Federation et al

    MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint

    Filed September 8, 2006

    A “‘direct effect’ . . . is one which has no intervening element, but, rather, flows in a straight line without deviation or interruption.” Peterson, 416 F.3d at 91 (quoting Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The “direct effect” of the conduct alleged in the complaint occurred in Russia, where Yukos violated Russian tax laws and was prosecuted for tax evasion; where shares of a Yukos subsidiary, Yuganskneftegaz, were auctioned; where criminal actions were prosecuted against Yukos employees; and where all additional alleged misconduct took place.

  7. BELHAS et al v. YA'ALON

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION to Dismiss with Points, Authorities, and a Declaration on the Status of War Crimes under international humanitarian law

    Filed May 15, 2006

    “‘In accordance with the restrictive view of sovereign immunity reflected in the FSIA,’ the defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff's allegations do not bring its case within a statutory exception to immunity.” Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 19 of 63 -6- Libyan Arab Jamahiriyi, 376 F.3d 1123, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2004) quoting Phoenix Consulting Co. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000), quoting Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also, Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2006) (Friedman, J.), this Court reviewed the burden of proof on a Rule12(b)(1) motion relying on the FSIA.: A court may dismiss a complaint brought under the FSIA only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief.

  8. SABBITHI et al v. AL SALEH et al

    REPLY to opposition to motion re MOTION to Dismiss MOTION TO QUASH

    Filed June 22, 2007

    Numerous courts, including this Circuit, have rejected a similar argument in the context of foreign sovereign immunity, refusing to read into the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act an implied waiver or exception based on the jus cogens nature of the plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g., Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Thus, not only do Plaintiffs lack support for their novel interpretation of diplomatic immunity, their argument actually flies in the face of significant precedent.

  9. SABBITHI et al v. AL SALEH et al

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION to Dismiss MOTION TO QUASH

    Filed May 30, 2007

    542 U.S. at 762 (2004) (Breyer, J. concurring). The present case can also be distinguished from Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), because there the court was concerned not with the effect of jus cogens violations on diplomatic immunity, but the effect of a jus cogens violation on foreign sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and whether Germany’s jus cogens violation resulted in an implied waiver of such immunity. Thus, a wholly different immunity regime was at issue.

  10. Allen et al v. Russian Federation et al

    REPLY to opposition to motion re MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint

    Filed November 9, 2006

    Case 1:05-cv-02077-CKK Document 69 Filed 11/09/2006 Page 28 of 31 24 intervening element, but, rather, flows in a straight line without deviation or interruption.” Peterson, 416 F.3d at 91 (quoting Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Plaintiffs contend that because the amended complaint “alleges that Rosneft supplies the U.S. market with oil,” they have established a direct effect in the U.S. Even if Rosneft sells oil to the U.S. market (an assertion that is contradicted by the news article plaintiffs rely on to make it), it is the sovereign’s commercial act upon which the action is based that must have a “direct effect” in the U.S. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).