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People v. Trujillo

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Dec 3, 2019
No. D071715 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2019)

Opinion

D071715

12-03-2019

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAYLO A. TRUJILLO, Defendant and Appellant.

James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. OPINION AFTER TRANSFER FROM THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT (Super. Ct. Nos. SCE364544, SCE364802) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniel B. Goldstein, Judge. Affirmed. James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In separate cases, Daylo A. Trujillo pleaded guilty to attempted robbery and assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664, 245, subd. (a)(4).) After a combined sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Trujillo to one year in county jail and three years' formal probation.

Trujillo's sole appellate challenge concerns an electronics search condition of probation imposed in both cases. He contends the condition is unreasonable under California Supreme Court standards (see People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent)) and is constitutionally overbroad.

In September 2017, we issued an opinion rejecting Trujillo's contentions. Trujillo filed a petition for review, which our high court granted and held pending consideration and disposition of related issues in In re Ricardo P. (S230923).

In August 2019, the California Supreme Court filed its opinion in In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo). The following month, that court transferred this matter to us "with directions to vacate [our] decision and reconsider the cause in light of" Ricardo. We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties regarding (1) the import of Ricardo and (2) Trujillo's current probationary status.

The parties represent in their supplemental submissions that Trujillo's probation is set to expire on January 9, 2020. The parties also agree that, under Ricardo's clarification of Lent, the electronics search condition is unsustainable on the record before us. Trujillo asks us to strike the condition, while the Attorney General requests that we remand the matter to afford the trial court the opportunity to supplement the record in light of Ricardo or to further tailor the electronics search condition.

We agree with the parties that, in light of Ricardo, the electronics search condition is unsustainable on the record before us. Accordingly, we vacate our earlier opinion in this matter and strike the electronics search condition. And while we would otherwise be inclined to grant the Attorney General's request to remand for further proceedings, the interests of judicial economy do not justify this relief here because Trujillo's probation is set to expire at about the same time this opinion will become final, leaving little (if any) time for further proceedings in the trial court.

Because we are striking the electronics search condition on Lent/Ricardo grounds, we do not reach Trujillo's constitutional challenge.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We base our factual summary on the probation reports. In October 2016, at about 2:15 a.m., two individuals (S and V) were retrieving S's car left in a Smart and Final parking lot. When S and V drove into the parking lot, Trujillo was inside S's parked car. Trujillo then exited the car, approached S and V, and pointed what appeared to be a semi-automatic handgun at them (which later turned out to be an airsoft replica gun). When S got out of the car and walked towards Trujillo, Trujillo pointed the gun at S's face. S backed away, and Trujillo struck him in the head with the gun. Trujillo then pointed the gun at V and demanded she give him everything she had. When V refused, Trujillo fled. S and V called law enforcement.

S sustained a large cut to his head. S's vehicle (that had been left at the parking lot) was damaged. S reported items missing from his car, including $100 in cash, a phone charger, a backpack, and the vehicle registration.

Several hours later, at about 5:15 a.m., Trujillo approached another victim (C) at a fast-food restaurant about 100 yards away from the Smart and Final parking lot. C was in his vehicle waiting at a drive-through window. Trujillo brandished an airsoft gun, pointed it at C's face, and demanded cash. C believed the gun was real and feared for his safety, but was able to wrestle the weapon away from Trujillo. After Trujillo fled, C called the police. A security camera captured the event.

Shortly after, deputies arrested Trujillo and transported him to a sheriff's substation. Trujillo's vehicle contained a bottle with two Xanax pills (that had not been prescribed to him). Deputies interviewed Trujillo while he was in a holding cell. His breath had a strong alcohol odor and he exhibited slurred speech. Trujillo said he had been " 'drinking all night,' but could not recall what he had been drinking." He told deputies he was "desperate for money."

After being charged by separate complaint for each incident, Trujillo pleaded guilty in both cases. On the Smart and Final parking lot incident, Trujillo pleaded guilty to assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury. On the fast-food incident, Trujillo pleaded guilty to attempted robbery.

Probation Reports

A separate probation report was prepared for each case. The reports noted that 19-year-old Trujillo had no criminal history. He admitted to a probation officer that he ingested Xanax pills and drank alcohol before the offenses, which he believes caused him to commit the crimes. Trujillo described his childhood as "rough"—his father and one brother committed suicide (the latter of which Trujillo witnessed), and another brother had also died. Trujillo acknowledged he abuses alcohol to cope with his hardships.

The probation department determined Trujillo could be successfully guided and monitored in the community (as opposed to prison), but also identified multiple risk factors. The probation department recommended 365 days in county jail, and three years of formal probation subject to various conditions (e.g., alcohol and weapons restrictions), including the condition at issue in this case: that Trujillo shall "[s]ubmit person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media . . . to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [the probation officer] or law enforcement officer." (Italics added; hereafter, the electronics search condition.)

Sentencing Hearing

Defense counsel objected at the sentencing hearing that the electronics search condition has "no logical nexus to this charged crime" under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 and In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749 (J.B.), and is unconstitutional. The court disagreed, explaining: "I think that in order to supervise the defendant now on two felonies, . . . one is legally violent [attempted robbery], the other is just violent [assault by means likely to result in great bodily injury]. And that is to supervise him and make sure that he's not engaging in criminal activity, I think it would assist the probation department to be able to review what is on his computer, his cell phone, et cetera, to make sure he's being law abiding and also he's rehabilitating."

DISCUSSION

Trujillo challenges the electronics search condition under Lent, as recently construed by Ricardo.

In Ricardo, a juvenile who admitted to committing two burglaries was placed on probation subject to an electronics search condition. (Ricardo, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116-1117.) Although the juvenile had not used an electronic device in the charged offenses, the juvenile court justified the condition by (1) construing the juvenile's statements to his probation officer as admitting he had used marijuana in connection with the offenses, and (2) " 'find[ing] that minors typically will brag about their marijuana usage . . . by posting on the Internet, showing pictures of themselves with paraphernalia, or smoking marijuana.' " (Id. at p. 1117.) Thus, the juvenile court reasoned the ability to search the juvenile's electronic devices was " 'a very important part of being able to monitor [his] drug usage.' " (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal concluded the electronics search condition was valid under Lent's third prong, but the Supreme Court disagreed. (Ricardo, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1119.) The high court explained that "Lent's requirement that a probation condition must be ' "reasonably related to future criminality" ' contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition." (Id. at p. 1122.) The court found "[s]uch proportionality . . . lacking" because "nothing in the record suggests that [this juvenile] has ever used an electronic device or social media in connection with criminal conduct." (Ibid., italics added; see ibid. ["courts may properly base probation conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior offense"].) Thus, the juvenile court's generalized finding that juveniles use electronic devices to brag about marijuana use was insufficient to justify the condition because "Lent's third prong requires more than just an abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality." (Id. at p. 1121.)

The Ricardo court was careful to note that its "holding does not categorically invalidate electronics search conditions. In certain cases, the probationer's offense or personal history may provide the juvenile court with a sufficient factual basis from which it can determine that an electronics search condition is a proportional means of deterring the probationer from future criminality." (Ricardo, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1128-1129, citing People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 [finding electronics search condition reasonable because the defendant lured victim using " 'either social media or some kind of computer software' "]; In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 902 [condition allowing officers "to search a cell phone to determine whether [the defendant] is the owner" was reasonable in light of the defendant's "history of robbing people of their cell phones"]; People v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1173, 1176-1177 [finding electronics search condition related to the defendant's future criminality where the defendant was convicted of making gang-related criminal threats and had previously used social media sites to promote his gang].) But, on the record before it, the Ricardo court found "the electronics search condition imposes a burden that is substantially disproportionate to the legitimate interests in promoting rehabilitation and public safety." (Ricardo, at p. 1129.)

"From [Ricardo, supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113] we glean the following guidelines for determining when an electronic[s] search condition survives the third prong of Lent . . . . First, there must be information in the record establishing a connection between the search condition and the probationer's criminal conduct or personal history—an actual connection apparent in the evidence, not one that is just abstract or hypothetical. [Citation.] But no nexus between the search condition and the [probationer]'s underlying offense is required. . . . Finally, 'the burden imposed by [the] probation condition' must be proportionate to 'the legitimate interests served by the condition.' [Citation.] Thus, ' "[a] condition of probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is . . . 'reasonably related to future criminality,' " ' only if its infringement on the probationer's liberty is not 'substantially disproportionate to the ends of reformation and rehabilitation.' " (In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 166.)

Under Ricardo's clarification of Lent's third prong, the Attorney General now "acknowledges that based on the current record there is an insufficient basis for finding that the electronic[s] search condition is reasonably related to future criminality." However, the Attorney General asks that we "not simply strike the condition" but, rather, "remand the matter to the superior court to afford it an opportunity to supplement the record in light of Ricardo . . . ."

We agree with the parties' assessment that the electronics search condition is unsustainable on the record before us. Accordingly, we strike the condition. And while we would otherwise agree with the Attorney General that remand for further proceedings is warranted, such relief is not warranted here because Trujillo's probation is set to expire on January 9, 2020—about the same time our opinion in this case will become final—leaving little (if any) time for further proceedings in the trial court. Thus, in the interests of judicial economy, we deny the Attorney General's request.

"[A] Court of Appeal decision . . . is final in that court 30 days after filing." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.366(b)(1).) "A petition for review [to the California Supreme Court] must be served and filed within 10 days after the Court of Appeal decision is final in that court." (Id., rule 8.500(e)(1); id., rule 8.368 ["Rules 8.500 through 8.552 govern the hearing and decision in the Supreme Court of an appeal in a criminal case."].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to strike the electronics search condition (Condition 6.n). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

HALLER, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. O'ROURKE, J.


Summaries of

People v. Trujillo

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Dec 3, 2019
No. D071715 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2019)
Case details for

People v. Trujillo

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAYLO A. TRUJILLO, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Dec 3, 2019

Citations

No. D071715 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2019)