People v. Toro

16 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. GOOLSBY

    Respondent’s Petition for Review

    Filed February 21, 2014

    In sum, because appellant’s statement and conduct reasonably implied his consentto the additional count, and because “adding a new offenseat trial by amending the information”is the functional equivalent of “adding the same charge by verdict formsandjury instructions[].” (Toro, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 976, fn. omitted), the charge was properly amended with the lesser offense of arson of property. * It is worth noting that appellant had tactical reasons for agreeing to the additional instructions and arguing accordingly. Appellant benefitted from the addition of the arson of property count because if the jury found it wastrue, the multiple structure enhancementallegation would not apply. (§ 451.1, subd. (a).)

  2. PEOPLE v. BRYANT

    Appellant, Leroy Wheeler, Reply Brief

    Filed April 24, 2007

    However, an appellate court has the statutory authority to review anyJury instruction even though no objection was madethereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby. (§ 1259, People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 977 [254 Cal.Rptr. 811].) In any event, California courts often examine constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal, especially when the asserted error fundamentally affects the validity ofthe judgment, important issues ofpublic policy are at issue (Hale v. Morgan, supra, 22 Cal.3d 388, 395), or when the error may have adversely affected the defendant’sright to a fair trial (Peoplev.

  3. PEOPLE v. GOOLSBY

    Respondent’s Reply to Answer to Petition for Review

    Filed March 24, 2014

    It is significant that appellant consented by tacit agreementto the lesser count. (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 136, fn. 19; Toro, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 976-977; People v. Ramirez, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 623.) Appellant’s tactical reasons for placing himself in jeopardy of the lesser count are clear—he could have escaped not only the multiple structure enhancement, but potentially the Three Strikes sentence to which he was ultimately sentenced.

  4. PEOPLE v. GOOLSBY

    Respondent’s Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed July 29, 2014

    (Dis. Opn. at p. 2, citing People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 976 (Toro), disapproved on another ground in People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 568, fn. 3; Orlina v. Superior Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 258, 263-264 (Orlina).) Justice.Richli reasoned that because the jury did not return a verdict on the offense of arson of property, the charge is “unresolved”andstill “pending”; the instructional error mischaracterizing the lesser related offense as a lesser included one did not implicate the concernsarticulated in Kellett.

  5. PEOPLE v. GOOLSBY

    Appellant’s Answer to Petition for Review

    Filed March 14, 2014

    However, that is where the similarity ends. Respondent relies on People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal. 3d 966, 975-975, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal. 4" 558, 568, fn.3, and similar cases, which hold or observe that where a defendant requests, agrees to, or does not object to instructions on lesser related offenses at his trial, he may not afterwards complain about lack of notice if he is convicted of one of those offenses. (Pet. at 7-9.)

  6. PEOPLE v. WHITMER

    Appellant’s Petition for Review

    Filed February 28, 2013

    There, the information charged the defendant with attempted murderand assault with a deadly weapon. (Toro, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 972.) In-addition to these offenses, the jury was instructed regarding the offense ofbattery with serious bodily injury, which the instructions and verdict forms erroneously described as a lesser included offense of attempted murder.

  7. PEOPLE v. LOPEZ

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed January 25, 2013

    Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel (People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 340), and since no accusatory pleading charging appellant with first degree murder had been filed, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with that charge (People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 368).” '° In People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966,overruled on other grounds in People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 568,fn. 3, this Court recognized a limited exception to this rule.

  8. PEOPLE v. MATA

    Appellant’s Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed October 15, 2012

    (/d. at pp. 1206- 1207.) In People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, disapproved on another point in People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 568, fn. 3, the trial court instructed the jury on a lesser related offense not listed in the information;it wasthe sole offense on which the defendant was convicted. (/d. at p. 971.)

  9. PEOPLE v. SALAZAR (MAGDALENO)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed July 24, 2012

    This Court has held, “‘A party may not complain on appealthat an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.’” (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 622, quoting People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 218; see also People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 977-978, [defendant’s failure to object to proposed instructions constituted an implied consent to the instruction and a waiver of any objection based on lack of notice]; People v. Gonzalez (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 475, 483.) Here, appellant did not object to the trial court instructing the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72.

  10. PEOPLE v. ANZALONE

    Appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed November 21, 2011

    Nor doesit involve a claim that a verdict form was defective in some respect. (See People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 446; People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 976-977; People v. Lewis (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1135, 1142; People v. Radil (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 702, 710.) The claims here are that section 1149 imposed a duty on thetrial court to ask the jury if they had agreed ona verdict, that the court’s failure to comply with that duty is prejudicial per se, that the court’s error led to the discharge ofthe jury before they had rendered a true verdict, and that double jeopardy barsretrial because the jury’s discharge was done without appellant’s consent and withoutlegal necessity.