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People v. Sturgis

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Feb 24, 1976
38 N.Y.2d 625 (N.Y. 1976)

Summary

In People v Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625), we held the People were not ready for trial within the statutory six-month period applicable to felonies because they could not proceed to trial without an indictment and they had not obtained one within six months after the proceeding was commenced.

Summary of this case from People v. Worley

Opinion

Argued January 6, 1976

Decided February 24, 1976

Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, DAVID O. BOEHM, J.

Alfred P. Kremer for appellant.

Jack B. Lazarus, District Attorney (Michael Nelson of counsel), for respondent.


MEMORANDUM.

The principle issue, on the motion for dismissal of the indictment upon the ground of denial of a speedy trial, is whether, in computing the six-months period specified in CPL 30.30 (subd 1, par [a]) a period of two and one-half months during which defendant was absent prior to indictment should have been excluded.

On April 2, 1973, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant with possession of a loaded firearm (Penal Law, § 265.05, subd 2) and escape in the second degree (Penal Law, § 205.10, subd 2). She was indicted for these crimes on November 2, 1973 and, according to defendant's filed memorandum, the case was placed on the Trial Calendar of the County Court of Monroe County on January 23, 1974. Defendant's motion for dismissal made on February 25, 1974, pursuant to CPL 210.20 (subd 1, par [g]) and in accordance with CPL 30.30 (subd 1, par [a]), was denied. After trial, defendant was found guilty of escape in the second degree but, upon the jury's inability to reach a verdict on the weapons count, that charge was subsequently withdrawn.

The People's brief in this court indicates that the matter was placed on the Trial Calendar on February 19, 1974.

Except as otherwise provided in CPL 30.30 (subd 3), not relevant here, a motion made pursuant to CPL 210.20 (subd 1, par [g]) must be granted where the People are not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony (CPL 30.30, subd 1, par [a]). A criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court (CPL 1.20, subd 17) and, in computing the time within which the prosecution must be ready for trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 (subd 1) certain periods must be excluded (see CPL 30.30, subd 4).

Nine months and 21 days elapsed from April 2, 1973, the date of commencement, until January 23, 1974, when the case was moved to the Trial Calendar. To be deducted therefrom is a delay of nine days, from April 7 to April 16, 1973, occasioned by defendant's counsel's request for an adjournment (CPL 30.30, subd 4, par [b]) and a period of four days, from April 16 to April 20, 1973, during which a Judge of the City Court of Rochester retained all papers pertaining to the action before submitting them to the District Attorney (CPL 30.30, subd 4, par [g]).

Under CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [c]), there must also be excluded: "the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defendant must be considered unavailable whenever his location is known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence." Under the instant facts, the County Court had a right to find that, from August 18 to November 26, 1973, defendant was absent. On the earlier of these dates, a bench warrant was issued against defendant by a Town Court of Monroe County based on incidents occurring the day before when she was alleged to have committed a larceny at a store and to have damaged two cars in attempting to get away from security guards. Later that month, bench warrants were issued by two other courts in Monroe County based on defendant's failure to appear in connection with separate criminal charges unrelated to those here. On October 12, 1973, defendant was arrested in Orange County under an alias and failed to appear in that county on November 2, 1973, to which date the matter had been adjourned. Eventually, on November 26, 1973, defendant was arrested on other felony charges lodged in the City Court of Rochester.

However, for time to be excludable under CPL 30.30, (subd 4, par [c]) there must be more than mere absence or unavailability. Explicitly under the statute, delay must result therefrom. Defendant's absence from August 18 to November 2, 1973, when the indictment was returned, did not result in a delay, attributable to her, since the finding of the indictment was in no way impeded or prevented by the absence. On October 24, 1973, which was more than six months after the matter was referred to the Grand Jury and also more than six months after the papers were submitted to the District Attorney by the City Court Judge, a "notice was sent to defendant to appear in Grand Jury for 10/29/73 and was never received". There is nothing to indicate that defendant had ever requested an appearance before the Grand Jury. Indeed, the lack of relation between defendant's absence and the delay in indicting is apparent from the affidavit of the Assistant District Attorney stating: "The People contend that the Court take cognizance of previous affidavits submitted [apparently in other matters] indicating a backlog of cases, an inadequate staff and a system of priorities in the District Attorney's office". The record is barren of a showing of "exceptional circumstances" under CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [g]).

Since the period between the commencement of the criminal action and the time when the People were ready for trial, after deducting periods properly excludable, exceeded six months, the order of the Appellate Division must be reversed and the motion to dismiss granted.

Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur in memorandum.

Order reversed, etc.


Summaries of

People v. Sturgis

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Feb 24, 1976
38 N.Y.2d 625 (N.Y. 1976)

In People v Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625), we held the People were not ready for trial within the statutory six-month period applicable to felonies because they could not proceed to trial without an indictment and they had not obtained one within six months after the proceeding was commenced.

Summary of this case from People v. Worley

In People v Sturgis (38 NY2d 625), the Court of Appeals interpreted that provision to require a showing not just that the defendant had been absent or unavailable, but that the delay in readiness resulted from that absence or unavailability (id. at 628).

Summary of this case from People v. Williams

In People v. Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625), the Court of Appeals qualified the People's right to rely on the absence provision by requiring a showing that the defendant's absence actually delayed the People's readiness — mere absence did not suffice. Proffering Sturgis, the instant defendant — who was apprehended nearly 18 months after an accusatory instrument had been filed against him — successfully moved to dismiss his indictment on speedy trial grounds.

Summary of this case from People v. Bratton

In Sturgis, the defendant disappeared following arrest and arraignment and she was not rearrested for about three months, although she was indicted about three weeks before the rearrest.

Summary of this case from People v. Bratton

In People v Sturgis (38 NY2d 625), the Court of Appeals held that for time to be excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (c), more than mere absence or unavailability on the part of a defendant must be shown.

Summary of this case from People v. Smith

In People v. Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625, 381 N.Y.S.2d 860), the Court of Appeals held that for time to be excludable under 30.30(4)(c), more than mere absence or unavailability on the part of a defendant must be shown.

Summary of this case from People v. Smith, JR

In People v. Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625), the Court held that a four-day period during which the local court retained all the paperwork pertaining to a case before submitting it to the District Attorney was excludable as "exceptional circumstances" under CPL 30.30 (4) (g).

Summary of this case from People v. Hendryx

In People v Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625) and People v Colon (59 N.Y.2d 921, supra) the court held that adjournments resulting from an absent or unavailable defendant, normally excluded pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (c), will be charged to the People if the People have failed to file an accusatory instrument sufficient to confer jurisdiction to prosecute on the court.

Summary of this case from People v. Masellis

In People v Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625) and People v Colon (59 N.Y.2d 921, supra), the provisions of CPL 30.30 (4) (c) were held to require the People to obtain jurisdictionally valid accusatory instruments on which they could proceed to trial prior to claiming that a trial delay resulted from a defendant's absence and thereby constituted excludable time under the statute.

Summary of this case from People v. Surita

In People v Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625) the Court of Appeals considered and ruled upon the meaning of the exclusion in CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [c]).

Summary of this case from People v. Yonkers Motors Corp.

In Sturgis, the Court of Appeals held "for the time to be excludable under CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [c]) there must be more than mere absence or unavailability.

Summary of this case from People v. Escoto

In Sturgis, the issue was whether a period of slightly more than three months while the defendant was absent from court was an excludable period of time not to be charged to the People.

Summary of this case from People v. Zisis

concerning the absence of a defendant, CPL 30.30, subd 4, par (c)

Summary of this case from People v. Reid

In People v Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625) the issue to be decided was whether a period of slightly more than three months, during which defendant was absent from court, was properly an excludable period within the meaning of CPL 30.30.

Summary of this case from People v. Callender

In Sturgis a felony complaint was pending in a local criminal court. Until an indictment was returned and the case placed on the calendar in the appropriate superior criminal court, the People could not have answered that they were ready for trial.

Summary of this case from People v. Callender

In People v Sturgis (38 N.Y.2d 625), the Court of Appeals held time during which the District Attorney failed to secure an indictment strictly chargeable to the People despite the presence of pending bench warrants on the defendant.

Summary of this case from People v. Ryff
Case details for

People v. Sturgis

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. RITA ROBERTA STURGIS…

Court:Court of Appeals of the State of New York

Date published: Feb 24, 1976

Citations

38 N.Y.2d 625 (N.Y. 1976)
381 N.Y.S.2d 860
345 N.E.2d 331

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