People v. Rosaia

2 Citing briefs

  1. R. (K.) v. S.C. (PEOPLE)

    Petitioner’s Petition for Review with Request for Stay

    Filed January 11, 2016

    (See Jn re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136, 139-140 [“In the absence of clear waiver, whenevera juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge,” fn. omitted]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 413, 418 [“The court in Arbuckle held that the defendantis entitled to be sentenced by the judge whoaccepts the guilty plea pursuantto plea bargain”; Peoplev. Pedregon (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 723, 725 [referring to “the Arbuckle court’s finding of an implicit term in every plea bargain that the sentence will be imposed by the judge who accepts the plea’’]; In re ThomasS. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 934, 937 [“Arbuckle held that an implicit term of a plea bargain is the trial judge who takes the plea will also be the sentencing judge”); People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832, 837 [referring to “the rule that a defendant whopleads guilty has the right to be sentenced by the same judge whoaccepted the plea”].) This line of cases gaverise to the term “Arbuckle right” (In re ThomasS., at p. 937) or sometimes, “Arbuckle rights” (Rosaia, at p. 838), which was 12 understoodasthe right of every defendant who enters a negotiated plea to be sentenced by the judge who acceptedthe plea.

  2. R. (K.) v. S.C. (PEOPLE)

    Real Party in Interest, The People, Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed May 11, 2016

    Following this shift, appellate courts that hadinitially adopted a categorical approach embraced the individualized determination of implied Arbuckle terms. (See People v. Horn, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 708 (Accordingly, this court disapprovesits previous opinions in Davis [(1988)] 205 Cal.App.3d 1305, Rosaia [(1984)] 157 Cal.App.3d 832, and In re Ray O., supra, 97 Cal.App.3d 136,to the extent they either hold or suggest the Arbuckle term is implied in all plea bargains even in the absence ofan affirmative showing on the record supporting a reasonable expectation that the judge who acceptedthe plea will also impose sentence.”].) As the court below noted, the 1989 decision in People v. Horn was the final nail in the coffin for . . . the idea that every defendant whoenters a negotiated plea has an Arbuckle rightto be sentenced by the same judge who acceptedthe plea, as no published case since Horn has deviated from the individualized approach under whichthe court examines the record to 12 determine what the defendant reasonably could have expected at the time the plea was entered (Slip opn.at p 15.)