People v. Rodriguez

69 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. ROMERO (ORLANDO) & SELF (CHRISTOPHER)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed February 27, 2008

    Morrison, supra, 34 Cal4th at p. 731.) Nor does equal protection require that capital defendants be afforded the same sentence review afforded other felons underthe determinate sentencing law. (People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 940; People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d atp. 618; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1222.) Appellants further claim California’s death penalty law denies equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

  2. PEOPLE v. VALDEZ (RICHARD)

    Appellant's Opening Brief

    Filed June 27, 2007

    ” (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 191-192, quoting Peoplev. Rodriquez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 794.) As this Court said in Arias, supra, the trial court need not“recount every detail” of the matters it considers mitigating or aggravating, but must “indicate[] its clear understanding of its duty to weigh all the mitigating and aggravating evidence.”

  3. PEOPLE v. NELSON (SERGIO DUJUAN)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed April 17, 2006

    Underthe totality of the circumstances presentedin the instant case, the jury’s determination ofdeath as the appropriate penalty for appellant was not coerced by the trial court. (People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 538; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 265-266; People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 467; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 774-775.) 168 XVI. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISCHARGED JUROR HALL BECAUSE SHE MISREPRESENTED AND CONCEALED MATERIAL INFORMATION DURING VOIR DIRE In Argument 16 of his opening brief, appellant contendsthat the trial court erroneously discharged juror AnnoraHall after it was revealed that she had misrepresented information about her backgroundduring voir dire. (AOB 243-258.)

  4. PEOPLE v. CASE

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed April 11, 2011

    As such, evidence of the statements was barred by Evidence Codesection 1101, subdivision (a). (See People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 636 [if ? Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), provides: (continued...) defendant’s statement regarding possible future criminal conduct does not fit the relevancy criteria for statements of state of mind, its admission violates section 1101]; cf. People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1015- 1016 [because the defendant’s statement, “I’1l waste any mother fuckerthat screws with me,” wasrelevantto his intent to kill anyone whointerfered with him or thwarted his desires or plans, it was not barred by section 1101]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 756-757 [evidence of defendant’s statements did not violate section 1101 because it showed future intent to kill any police officer who arrested him].) In admitting the evidence,the trial court abusedits discretion.

  5. PEOPLE v. LOPEZ

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed September 13, 2010

    Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, this Court stressed the importance of a passage from the Rodriguez decision whichstates, “Nothing in our discussion is meant to imply that any evidence introduced by defendant of his ‘good character’ will open the doorto any andall ‘bad character’ evidence the prosecution can dredge up.” (/d. at pp. 1192-1193, citing People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 792, fn. 24.) Evidence that appellant committed welfare fraud was not responsive to any of the mitigation evidence presented by appellant and should not have been admitted. During his closing argument the prosecutor specifically cited the fact that appellant “conned the welfare department”as evidence that appellant was deceitful and connedothersfor personalprofit, oewhich wereindicative of appellant’s “anti-social personality or psychopathic disorder.”

  6. PEOPLE v. SATTIEWHITE (CHRISTOPHER)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed July 18, 2008

    Appellant's requested instruction properly stated the law, notwithstanding that once the defendant puts his general character in issue at the penalty phase, the prosecutor may rebut "with evidence or argument suggesting a more balanced picture of his personality." (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 791 .) Therefore, the trial court's error violated appellant's rights to: a fair, non-arbitrary, and reliable sentencing determination, to have the jury consider all mitigating circumstances (see, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 4; Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 604) and make an individualized determination whether he should be executed, under all the circumstances (see Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 879); and, constituted a deprivation of a state-created right (Hich v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 346).

  7. PEOPLE v. CLARK (WILLIAM CLINTON)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed June 17, 2005

    §190.3, subdivision(i) [“factor (i)provides that the fact-finder at the penalty phase of a special circumstances case may consider “the age of the defendant at the time of the crime.” The California Supreme Court first interpreted factor (i), the age of the defendant at the time of the crime, as a factor in capital sentencing in its decision in People v. Rodriguez 42 Cal.3d 730 (1986). The Rodriguez opinion held that “mere chronological age... should notofitself be deemed an aggravating factor.”

  8. PEOPLE v. DANIELS (DAVID SCOTT)

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed April 28, 2014

    This Court has also warnedofthe constitutional dangers of respondent’s approach: “if subdivision (e) were construed as precluding independent review of the death verdict by the trial judge, questions of federal constitutionality might arise.” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 794, citing Peoplev. 61 Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 178-179.

  9. PEOPLE v. CASE

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed June 14, 2013

    In sum,the relevance of appellant’s statements as other crimes evidence depended entirely on their first meeting the requirements for admission under the generic threats theory of Evidence Code section 1250: 7) that the statements pertained to contemplated future conduct ina hypothetical situation; and that other evidence brought the actual victim within the scope of threat. (People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 636; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 757.) Because the statements did not meet either of these requirements, as appellant establishedin his openingbrief, the statements were not relevant to any disputed issue in the case and should have been excluded as impermissible propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).

  10. PEOPLE v. CASE

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed March 20, 2012

    Statements by a defendant frequently are relevant to show intent for the charged crime. (Seee.g., People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1013 [first-degree murder defendant’s habit of carrying a gun and statements he would “waste” anyone who interfered with him were relevantto his state of mind]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 756-757 [in murder prosecution 137 defendant’s threat against victim is relevant to prove intent and a generic threat is admissible to show defendant's homicidal intent where other evidence brings actual victim within scopeof threat].) For these same reasons,the probative value of appellant’s statements were not outweighedbythe risk of prejudice. Appellant argues the statements were cumulative of other evidence ofintent to kill, such as the circumstancessurroundingthe killings themselves and his statements to Baker. (AOB 232-234.)