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People v. Rapoza

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division
Aug 10, 2007
No. A110285 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2007)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDDIE RAPOZA, Defendant and Appellant. A110285 California Court of Appeal, First District, Fourth Division August 10, 2007

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC053584A

RIVERA, J.

Defendant Eddie Rapoza appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of one count of first degree murder and two counts of second degree murder, and finding true a multiple murder enhancement allegation. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder, and two consecutive terms of 15 years to life for the second degree murders. We affirm.

All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Crash and Aftermath

Defendant drove off a cliff in Moss Beach in a van containing his pregnant wife, Raye Rapoza, and four-year-old daughter, Tehani, on October 6, 2002. The van had accelerated quickly along the street leading to the cliff. It did not appear to brake or turn to avoid the cliff, instead turning slightly to follow a path to the cliff. The van landed in the ocean. Raye died almost immediately from injuries she suffered in the crash. The fetus she was carrying, which was viable and was at 30 to 32 weeks gestation, died with her. Tehani also suffered serious injuries, and died shortly after she was taken to hospital.

Because defendant and Raye Rapoza shared the same last name, we will refer to Raye by her first name. We mean no disrespect by this designation.

After the crash, defendant appeared distraught. He told a paramedic that his foot had become caught beneath the brake pedal and he could not get his foot off the accelerator, and he told a resident who had come to help that his foot had become stuck in the accelerator.

B. Defendant’s Statements

Joseph Farmer, a deputy sheriff for the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office, investigated the crash. Two days after the crash, he went with a detective, Gary Ramos, to visit defendant at the hospital. He first spoke with defendant’s nurse, who told him defendant had been carrying on conversations and had received a low dose of medicine for his pain, and with defendant’s pastor, who had been visiting defendant and told Farmer he had just spoken with defendant and defendant seemed alert and lucid. Defendant told the officers he and Raye had stopped at a lookout point off the road to watch the waves. They got back in the van, and his shoe became wedged between the gas pedal and the console or “firewall” when he put his foot on the gas pedal. When he tried to pull his foot out, the airbags deployed. He stepped on the brake, but could not stop the van from going over the cliff.

This evidence was admitted not for its truth, but for Farmer’s state of mind, that is, that he thought he could interview defendant.

Defendant later described the firewall as the lump at the middle of the car.

In a second interview the following day, defendant again told Farmer and Ramos his foot had become stuck in the accelerator. He denied having stopped the car or gotten out of the van, but said his foot had become stuck as he was driving, just before he was going to make a turn. He was wearing new shoes, which he thought might have been too wide. He initially told them he and Raye had a good relationship. Later, he admitted that the two of them had argued frequently, though not seriously. He had accused Raye of being unfaithful to him, he believed she was involved with another man, he did not believe he was the father of the baby she was expecting, and he thought she had been gathering money in preparation for leaving him.

DNA testing later showed that defendant was the father of the child Raye was expecting.

After reading defendant his Miranda rights, Ramos asked if it had become “too much for [him]” and he had “made a bad decision in the spur of the moment.” Defendant replied, “I think so.” He said he and Raye had been fighting because defendant thought she was unfaithful. He had tried to frighten Raye by driving toward the cliff, and his foot had become stuck. He was asking her to tell him the truth as he drove. The following exchange took place during the interview: “Q. Were you trying to hurt yourself, too? [¶] A. Yeah. [¶] Q. What’s that? [¶] A. Yes. [¶] Q. Did you want to die there? [¶] A. No, yes. All of us. [¶] Q. You wanted everybody to die? [¶] A. All my family *** [indicates unintelligible portions of tape-recorded interview] family *** [¶] Q. [W]hen did you make that decision that you wanted everybody to die? [¶] A. in that ***. The more evidence that came out. I mean, shit. [¶] Q. Are you talking about that morning or you’re talking— [¶] A. That, that previous morning . . . .” He told the officers he had wanted Raye to “tell [him] the truth and get out of the car.” Raye started talking, and he accelerated and drove off the cliff. He had decided to drive off the cliff, and he told Raye to get out and take Tehani with her because he was going to do so. She stayed in the car, trying to “call [his] bluff, ” according to defendant, because she did not believe he would drive off the cliff if she stayed in the car. The following discussion took place: “Q. . . . [W]hy did you take off if they were still in the car? [¶] A. ‘Cause I called her bluff. [¶] Q. Okay. So you knew all three of you were going to die? [¶] A. Somewhat. [¶] Q. What about, what about the baby that Raye was carrying? [¶] A. The baby wasn’t my baby. [¶] Q. Did you want to kill the baby, also? [¶] A. I wanted to kill the guy who made that baby. [¶] Q. What about, what about the baby? [¶] A. I just, like I said I wanted *** Tell me the truth ***. [¶] Q. So, when Raye didn’t get out of the car, you knew she was going to die with you? You knew Tehani was going to die with you? Were you thinking. [¶] A. All for one. One for all.” Defendant also told the officers, “I don’t want to go to jail. Can you guys give me the electric chair?”

Three days later, defendant was being taken from the jail to a hospital for treatment. The paramedic who was caring for him asked him why he had driven the van over the cliff. Defendant answered, referring to his wife, “ ‘The bitch was evil. She had to die, ’ ” or “ ‘Because she was a cheating bitch.’ ” The paramedic asked, “ ‘Why the little girl?’ ” Defendant called Tehani a “cunt” and said she was involved in the affair Raye was having, saying something like “ ‘the cunt was protecting [Raye].’ ”

C. The Accident Reconstruction

An automotive technician for the California Highway Patrol examined the van after the crash and found no problems that would have caused it to go off the cliff. Stein Husher, a research engineer specializing in automobile accident analysis and accident reconstruction, inspected the van, an exemplar vehicle, the site, the shoes defendant was wearing at the time of the crash, and a report analyzing the vehicle’s data recorder. He concluded the van’s airbags did not deploy until the van went off the cliff and struck the beach. Based on experiments he conducted with defendant’s shoes and the exemplar vehicle, Husher concluded it was not possible for defendant to get his foot stuck between the accelerator and the center console or firewall or for him to catch his foot under the brake pedal in a way that would cause acceleration. There was no record of any reports either to Chrysler, the manufacturer of the van, or to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Office of Defect Investigation of anyone getting a foot caught on an accelerator or pedal of the type of van defendant was driving.

D. Defendant’s Marriage with Raye

Defendant’s marriage to Raye had been rocky for some time before the crash. They grew up in Hawaii, and were living there when they met and married. At some point, apparently in the mid-1990’s, they moved to California, but visited Hawaii on vacations. Raye’s brother testified at trial that he lived with defendant and Raye for about eight months in Hawaii in 1993 or 1994. During that time, the couple would often quarrel while driving, and when they did so, defendant would drive recklessly. For instance, he would act as if he was going to drive through a red light or a stop sign, but stop at the last moment. When she told him to stop, he would only drive more recklessly.

Raye’s brother also testified that defendant normally drove with one foot on the accelerator and one on the brake. Her father corroborated this description of defendant’s driving.

After they moved to California, defendant and Raye lived with Raye’s brother-in-law, Gary Maganaris, and his wife, for about three years beginning in 1996. At the time, they did not argue an unusual amount. They moved to their own home in 1999. By the end of 2001 or 2002, Maganaris, who saw them regularly, noticed that their fights had become more frequent and louder. Defendant was using drugs, the cost of which was putting a financial strain on the couple.

Defendant was arrested in Hawaii in approximately February 2002 for assaulting Raye. Raye asked her father not to bail defendant out, so that defendant could think about the situation. She returned to the mainland without defendant. She told Maganaris defendant was in jail in Hawaii and she did not want to bail him out.

The trial court instructed the jury that Raye’s statements about defendant’s being in jail and about her not wanting to bail him out were only admitted to show her state of mind, not for the truth of the statements.

After defendant returned to California, the fighting became so bad that Raye took Tehani and moved in with Maganaris and his wife in April 2002, and stayed about a month. She told Maganaris she thought defendant would kill himself if she left him, and told him defendant had threatened to do so. During this time, defendant called Raye’s cell phone many times a day. He also called Maganaris’s home phone number over and over. There were nights defendant called so often Maganaris unplugged his telephone. He tried to have defendant’s number blocked. He and Raye both asked defendant to leave them alone, but defendant did not do so. More than once, Maganaris called the police because defendant showed up at his house. Raye told him defendant had threatened to burn Maganaris’s house down, and that he had threatened violence against her parents. Maganaris told Raye defendant was a danger to her and that she should get away from him. Raye told him she did not believe either she or Tehani was in danger, and that defendant would harm only himself. She did not want to leave defendant permanently, partly because she was pregnant and did not think she could afford to separate, and partly because she was afraid defendant would kill himself if she did so.

Maganaris met with defendant, who told him he believed Raye was taking money from the couple’s account in preparation for moving away. He also said he believed a gap was growing between him and Raye because Raye was receiving promotions in her job and getting new opportunities. Her job responsibilities sometimes kept her out in the evenings, and defendant was upset and insecure about the situation. He told Maganaris he would kill himself if Raye left him permanently.

In 2002, up until Raye’s death, Maganaris noticed that defendant was becoming increasingly possessive of Raye, calling incessantly and asking her to come home if she was out with Maganaris and his wife. Maganaris again suggested to Raye that defendant was unstable and dangerous, and she told him she did not believe defendant would harm her.

In April 2002, Raye told Maganaris defendant had called her and said something like, “ ‘I just wanted to say I love you before I end it, ’ ” then had hung up the telephone. She took his statement as a suicide threat and called the police.

Raye returned to defendant, hopeful that he would change. The couple’s problems continued, however. Raye moved out again on more than one occasion, but each time she returned to defendant.

A few months after she returned to California in 2002, Raye told her father the relationship was deteriorating due to defendant’s jealousy, mistrust, and paranoia, and that she intended to leave defendant. Matters appeared to improve after she became pregnant with her second child, but during the summer of 2002, she again told her father she planned to leave defendant.

Raye’s cousin, Joshua Torres, saw Raye and her family approximately every other weekend, and occasionally spent the night at their home. He noticed that defendant became jumpy and edgier during 2002, became verbally abusive to Raye, spoke to her in a mean or aggressive tone, and tried to know where she was at all times. About a year before the crash, at defendant’s suggestion, defendant and Torres went to the spot at Moss Beach where defendant later drove off the cliff. They parked and looked over the edge of the cliff. Defendant asked Torres, “Do you think you would live or die if you jumped off?” Torres was laughing, but defendant was not.

A friend and colleague of Raye, Angela Allen, also testified that defendant was jealous and checked up on Raye when she was out with friends. In 2002 Raye told Allen her relationship with defendant had gotten worse, and that he was possessive and jealous, and was insecure because of her success at her work. She was making plans to leave him. Allen became concerned for Raye’s safety, and offered to take her into her own home. Raye refused, saying she wanted to try to make the marriage work for the sake of Tehani and the baby Raye was expecting. Raye was concerned that defendant would carry out his threats to kill himself if she left him, and was also concerned she would not be able to manage financially on her own. However, she told Allen that she would not stay with defendant if she thought she or Tehani were in danger. The relationship repeatedly deteriorated and improved during 2002. When defendant told Raye that he thought she was having an affair and that he did not think he was the baby’s father, Raye thought his suspicions were ludicrous.

The trial court instructed the jury that Allen’s testimony regarding things Raye had told her were admissible only for Raye’s state of mind about her relationship with defendant.

A colleague of defendant recalled that defendant had told him he was having problems in his marriage, that he thought Raye was having an affair, and that he would kill himself if his marriage ended.

Ann Mendoza, a friend of Raye, testified that Raye had told her that whenever she and defendant argued, he told her that he would kill himself if she left him. In particular, when they were driving, he would threaten to drive off a cliff if she left him. In 1995, Raye called Mendoza, crying and upset. She told Mendoza that during an argument, defendant had put a knife into her hand and told her to kill him if she wanted to leave him. She stayed with Mendoza for two weeks after that. In 2002, Raye told Mendoza about the periodic difficulties in the couple’s relationship and about her desire to make the marriage work. Mendoza expressed her concern for Raye’s safety and advised her to leave defendant, but Raye told her she did not think defendant would hurt her or Tehani. She was concerned, however, that he would harm himself.

The court instructed the jury that this testimony was admitted not for its truth, but for Raye’s state of mind and concerns about the defendant.

After the crash, defendant called Raye’s father and asked him to write a character letter on his behalf. Raye’s father asked defendant if the crash had been an accident, and said that if defendant assured him it had been, he would write the letter defendant requested. Defendant did not answer Raye’s father’s questions. He did, however, tell Raye’s father that he thought Raye had been unfaithful to him.

E. The Defense

Defendant presented expert testimony that defendant’s foot could have become caught between the accelerator and brake pedals, resulting in the accelerator being depressed more than halfway. Such an event could lead to hypervigilance, or a panicked state in which the driver could not react in time to avoid an accident. Defendant also presented and elicited evidence that when he gave his statements after the crash, he was taking medications that caused depression, drowsiness, slowness in thinking, and confusion, and that he suffered cognitive impairment at the time.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Admissibility of Raye’s Statements

The jury heard evidence of various statements Raye had made regarding defendant’s suicide threats and her views of the couple’s marriage. In particular, Maganaris, Raye’s brother-in-law, testified that Raye had told him defendant would kill himself if she left him, that defendant had threatened to burn Maganaris’s house down, and that he had threatened physical harm to Raye’s parents; Allen, Raye’s friend, testified that Raye had told her defendant was possessive and had threatened to kill himself if she left him; and Mendoza, Raye’s friend, testified that Raye had told her defendant threatened to kill himself if she left him, that he had threatened to do so by driving off a cliff, that in 1995 he had given Raye a knife and told her to kill him if she wanted to leave him, and that Raye was afraid defendant would harm himself if she left him.

Defendant contends this evidence—much of which the jury was instructed was admitted not for its truth, but to show Raye’s state of mind—was irrelevant and inadmissible. According to defendant, neither Raye’s state of mind nor defendant’s belief about her state of mind tends to show that he acted with malice and deliberation.

Evidence Code section 1250 provides in part: “(a) Subject to Section 1252, evidence of a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation . . . is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when: [¶] (1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.”

Defendant’s own statement to the sheriff’s officers establishes that Raye’s state of mind and the reasons for her actions were at issue in the trial. Defendant told Farmer and Ramos that he had told Raye he was going to drive off the cliff and that she should get out and take Tehani with her, and that she stayed in the car anyway, “call[ing his] bluff, ” because she did not believe he would drive off the cliff if she was in the car. At trial, he took the position that these statements were inaccurate, and that at the time he made them, he was impaired by the medications he had taken. Raye’s fear that defendant was likely to kill himself and her belief that he would not harm her or Tehani were relevant to the credibility of defendant’s confession—including his admission that he expressed his intent to drive off the cliff—because it corroborates and explains defendant’s statement that even after he told Raye he planned to drive off the cliff, she stayed in the van with Tehani.

Our Supreme Court has made clear that evidence of a declarant’s statements can be used to prove the actions of the defendant. (See People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 404 (Majors); see also People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 577-579 (Griffin).) In Majors, for instance, a victim’s statement that he intended to meet people from Arizona to conduct a drug deal on the night he was killed was relevant, because his own conduct was one of the central issues of the case. (Majors, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 404-405.) Similarly, in Griffin, a murder victim’s statement that she intended to confront the defendant was found to be relevant—that is, it tended to prove what had transpired—and to fall within the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule because it suggested that the victim confronted the defendant in accordance with her expressed intent and that in response he murdered her. (Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 578.) Similarly, here, Raye’s decision to stay in the van even after defendant threatened to drive it off the cliff was relevant. We see no error in admitting evidence of her reasons for doing so.

Defendant also argues the evidence was more prejudicial than probative because the jury must inevitably have considered Raye’s statements not just as evidence of her state of mind, but as evidence that defendant had in fact threatened suicide and contemplated carrying it out by driving off a cliff. We see no reason to believe the jury did not follow the trial court’s instructions. In any case, the jury heard other evidence, which defendant does not challenge, that he had made suicide threats. As discussed earlier, both Maganaris and a colleague of defendant testified that defendant had said he would kill himself if Raye left him, and Torres testified that defendant took him to the cliff at Moss Beach and asked about what would happen “if you jumped off” the cliff. In the circumstances, we reject defendant’s contention that the probative value of Raye’s statements was “dwarfed” by the risk of prejudice.

Defendant also contends the trial court erred in applying the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine to certain of Raye’s statements. As defendant notes, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution bars the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements except where the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (Crawford).) The court, however, has made clear that a defendant may forfeit his right to confrontation by his own wrongdoing. (Id. at p. 62; see also Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. ____, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, 244, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2279-2280.)

The trial court here concluded that defendant had forfeited his right to confront Raye regarding testimonial statements she had made by his wrongful act in killing her. Defendant argues the court erred in doing so, contending that the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing applies only when a defendant kills or otherwise procures a witness’s unavailability for the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying. After briefing in this case was complete, our Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine should be applied even when the defendant’s intent was not to silence the witness. (People v. Giles (2007) 40 Cal.4th 833, 841-850.) Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contention.

There is some confusion about what evidence defendant challenges on confrontation clause grounds. He argued in his opening brief that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was erroneously applied to allow introduction of Raye’s statements to her family and friends about defendant’s suicide threats and her intent to end the marriage. The Attorney General pointed out in its respondent’s brief that Raye’s statements to family and friends were not testimonial and hence not protected by the confrontation clause. (See Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 579, fn. 19 [statement made by victim to friend at school not testimonial hearsay within meaning of Crawford].) In his reply brief, defendant agreed that the admission of nontestimonial statements did not violate the confrontation clause. Instead, he challenged in his reply brief only certain statements Raye made when applying for a restraining order in 1995, and statements she made to police officers in Hawaii in 2002 when she had defendant arrested for domestic violence. The parties draw our attention to the portions of the record at which the court considered whether these testimonial statements were admissible, but they do not point to the portion of the record in which such statements were actually introduced into evidence. Assuming they were introduced, we see no error in applying the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.

B. Vehicular Manslaughter as Lesser Included Offense

The trial court refused defendant’s request to instruct the jury on vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(1), (2)) as a lesser included offense of murder. A court must instruct on a lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense. (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 112, 118 (Birks).) However, a defendant is not entitled to have the jury instructed on lesser offenses that are related to the charged offense but not necessarily included in it if the prosecutor objects. (Id. at pp. 112-113, 136.) The question before us is whether the crime of vehicular manslaughter is included in the charged offense of murder.

The crime of murder is defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) The crime of vehicular manslaughter is “the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, ” committed when driving “a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act . . .; or driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner . . . .” (§ 192, subd. (c)(1), (2).)

“Under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.” (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 117.) Manslaughter has long been treated as a lesser included offense of murder. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 989 (Sanchez).) Here, however, the lesser offense at issue is not simple manslaughter, but vehicular manslaughter. In a similar case, the court in Sanchez considered whether gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a))—rather than simple manslaughter—was a lesser included offense of murder. The court concluded it was not, stating: “Unlike manslaughter generally, vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated requires proof of elements that are not necessary to a murder conviction. The use of a vehicle while intoxicated is not merely a ‘circumstance, ’ but an element of proof when the charge is gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is not merely a degree of murder, nor is it a crime with a lengthy pedigree as a lesser included offense within the crime of murder.” (Id. at p. 991.) Thus, “[t]he lesser offense contains crucial elements of proof that are absent from the greater offense, thereby making it possible to commit the greater offense without necessarily committing the lesser offense.” (Id. at p. 989.)

Here, the information charged defendant with the murders of Raye, the fetus she was carrying, and Tehani. It did not mention the use of a vehicle. Thus, the accusatory pleading did not contain all the elements of the crime of vehicular manslaughter. (See Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 117.) Similarly, the crime of murder does not contain all of the elements of vehicular manslaughter. Simply put, vehicular manslaughter involves the driving of a vehicle, and it would certainly be possible to commit murder without committing vehicular manslaughter. (See ibid.; see also Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 989.)

Defendant argues that the rule of Sanchez does not apply here because the lesser offense at issue is not vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, like the defendant in Sanchez, but simply vehicular manslaughter. The high court’s reasoning of Sanchez, however, appears to apply equally to the crime at issue here. In its decision, the court discussed and disapproved People v. Garcia (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 1832 (Garcia) and People v. Watson (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 313 (Watson), which had concluded vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated was a lesser included offense of murder. (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 990-991 & fn. 3.) According to Sanchez, the court in Garcia had concluded that “use of a vehicle is merely a circumstance relating to punishment, but not a separate element that is absent from a charge of murder.” (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 990, citing Garcia, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1854.) Likewise, the court in Sanchez stated, “the Court of Appeal in [Watson] held that use of a vehicle and intoxication are not elements of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, . . . but ‘merely . . . circumstances under which an unlawful killing constitutes manslaughter . . . .’ ” (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 990, quoting Watson, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 322.) The court in Sanchez concluded, “these decisions stray too far from the general principle that an offense is necessarily included within a greater offense when the greater offense cannot be committed without committing the lesser offense.” (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 990-991.) It went on to state: “Although it has long been held that manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, this tradition has not explicitly included offenses requiring proof of specific elements unique to vehicular manslaughter.” (Id. at p. 991.) Under the reasoning of Sanchez, the use of a vehicle is one such element. (Ibid.)

We note that although the defendant in Watson was intoxicated, the lesser offense under consideration was vehicular manslaughter. (Watson, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at pp. 320-323 & fn. 5.)

Accordingly, we conclude vehicular manslaughter was not a lesser included offense of murder. The trial court did not err in refusing defendant’s request for an instruction on vehicular manslaughter.

C. Autopsy Photograph of Fetus

Defendant contends in his briefs on appeal that the trial court should not have admitted an autopsy photograph of the fetus Raye was carrying at the time she died. At our request, the parties supplied supplemental briefing addressing whether the trial court ruled on the admissibility of the photograph at trial and whether the photograph was published to the jury. The parties now agree the record does not support a contention that the photograph was admitted into evidence at trial or that the jury saw it. Accordingly, we need not consider the issue.

Because we find no error in the rulings defendant challenges, we also reject his claim that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the errors.

D. Sealed Portions of Appellate Record

In his opening brief on appeal, defendant contends he was deprived of his right to a complete record on appeal because he had been denied access to certain transcripts and other documents. After the opening brief was filed, this court granted defendant access to all of the sealed documents except those relevant to his motion for discovery of the personnel records of Farmer and Ramos of the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. We have reviewed the sealed transcript of the hearing on the Pitchess motion and the personnel files that the trial court reviewed in camera, and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disclose any information from the files to the defense. (See People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1232.)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: REARDON, Acting P. J., SEPULVEDA, J.


Summaries of

People v. Rapoza

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division
Aug 10, 2007
No. A110285 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2007)
Case details for

People v. Rapoza

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDDIE RAPOZA, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division

Date published: Aug 10, 2007

Citations

No. A110285 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2007)