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People v. Penaranda

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Aug 2, 2007
No. D046982 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2007)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALBERTO PENARANDA, Defendant and Appellant. D046982 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division August 2, 2007

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD160789, Charles R. Gill, Judge.

NARES, Acting P. J.

This case involves a criminal conspiracy to defraud two home mortgage lenders─Bank of America and Washington Mutual Bank─through a complicated real estate scheme of "flipping" 11 real properties in which the conspirators, acting together in different capacities, purchased distressed properties in the south central area of the City of Los Angeles, California, usually using false names, appraised the properties at values exceeding fair market value, prepared fraudulent loan documents, sold the properties at inflated prices to fictitious low-income homebuyers, defaulted on the loan payment obligations, and stole the loan proceeds.

"Flipping" real properties can be lawful or unlawful. At trial in this matter, Los Angeles Police Department Detective Erin Camphouse, who works in the Real Estate Fraud Unit of the Commercial Crimes Division of that police department, testified that lawful flipping is the sale of real property at a profit based on fair market value within a short period of time after purchase, usually following improvements to the property. Fraudulent flippings, such as those that occurred in this case, often involve "straw buyers, " who are either nonexistent persons or real persons whose identities are used without permission following identity theft.

The probation report for Penaranda's sentencing hearing indicates that although the crimes committed in this case involved properties in Los Angeles County, San Diego County had jurisdiction because codefendants Michelle Moore and Claudia C. Ramos, who acted as loan processors, operated out of a company called Home Loan Solutions in the City of Carlsbad in San Diego County.

The conspirators obtained many of the inflated appraisals through Alberto Penaranda and Oz David Martinez, who were partners at North by Northwest, a company founded by Penaranda. Penaranda personally prepared four of those appraisals.

In a second amended indictment (the indictment), the San Diego County District Attorney charged Penaranda, Martinez, loan processors Michelle Moore and Claudia Ramos (see fn. 2, ante), and Jose Luis Hernandez (collectively the defendants) with two counts of conspiracy to commit grand theft (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 487, subd. (a)). As to both counts, the indictment also contained an aggravated white collar crime enhancement allegation (Pen. Code, § 186.11, subd. (a)(2)), which alleged the defendants committed two or more related felonies, a material element of which was fraud and embezzlement, involving a pattern of related felony conduct and the taking of more than $500,000. Ramos and Hernandez pleaded guilty to the conspiracy counts and admitted the aggravated white collar crime enhancement allegations.

Another codefendant, Ernesto de la Fuente, who (like the defendants) was charged in the original indictment in this matter, testified at trial in the instant case on behalf of the People that he pleaded guilty in this matter to conspiracy to commit grand theft, multiple counts of grand theft of personal property, and money laundering; and admitted the aggravated white collar crime enhancement allegations. The record shows he was sentenced to an 11-year state prison term and was serving that term at the time he testified in this matter.

A jury convicted Penaranda, Martinez and Moore of both counts of conspiracy to commit grand theft and found true the aggravated white collar crime enhancement allegations. As to Penaranda, who is the sole appellant in this appeal, the court suspended the imposition of sentence for five years and granted him formal probation. The court ordered him to pay a $100,000 fine under Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (a). The court also ordered that Penaranda was jointly and severally liable with his five codefendants (Martinez, Moore, Ramos, Hernandez and de la Fuente) for the payment of restitution in the total amount of $597,168.51 ($382,129.07 to Bank of America and $215,039.44 to Washington Mutual Bank) plus interest.

Acknowledging on appeal that "[t]he evidence showed the existence of a criminal conspiracy and the use of appraisals with [his] name on them in furtherance of it, " Penaranda challenges his convictions of both counts of conspiracy to commit grand theft, contending (1) the court prejudicially erred in allowing the People's expert appraisal witness, Sarah Schwarzentraub, to opine that the errors she found in Penaranda's property appraisals purposefully misstated values and might be considered fraud; (2) the court prejudicially abused its discretion in allowing Schwarzentraub to testify that one of the bases for her opinion that Penaranda's conduct was purposeful was a report from the State of California Office of Real Estate Appraisers (OREA) reprimanding him for making the same kind of errors in appraisals he prepared a year or so before he prepared the four appraisals at issue in the instant case; and (3) while there was evidence of a fraudulent scheme, there was no direct evidence that he was aware of that scheme or participated in it with a fraudulent intent, and there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

For reasons we shall explain, we conclude the court erred in allowing Schwarzentraub to opine in effect that Penaranda was guilty, but such error was harmless. We also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Schwarzentraub to testify about Penaranda's prior reprimand, as her testimony was admissible under Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b) (hereafter referred to as section 801(b)), 802, 1101, subdivision (b) (hereafter referred to as section 1101(b)), and 352; and substantial evidence supports Penaranda's convictions in this matter. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise indicated.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because, as noted ante, Penaranda does not dispute the existence of the conspiracy involved in this case, and many of the details of the complex conspiratorial scheme and the conspirators' numerous overt acts are not relevant to the three issues Penaranda has raised in this appeal, our discussion of the factual background of this case will be brief. In connection with Peneranda's insufficiency of the evidence claim, additional relevant, substantiated facts supporting his convictions will be discussed in the discussion portion of this opinion.

Of the 11 subject fraudulent home loan transactions, six involved loans from Bank of America, and five involved loans from Washington Mutual Bank. An unidentified man who at times went by the names of David Lopez and Roberto Matias (hereafter referred to as Lopez) was the coordinator of the fraudulent scheme.

Count 1 of the indictment involved the loans funded by Bank of America for the fraudulent flipping of the following six properties in Los Angeles: 10315 Kalmia Street, 1451 and 14511/2 West 99th Street, 223 East 61st Street, 1707 East Imperial Highway, 6621 Holmes Avenue, and 2036 East 110th Street. Count 2 involved the loans funded by Washington Mutual Bank for the fraudulent flipping of the following five Los Angeles properties: 452 East Avenue 28th Street, 1609-1611 East 90th Street, 1234 East 91st Street, 11238 South Hooper Street, and 345 East Manchester Avenue.

Penaranda, who was the founder and chief executive officer of North by Northwest, an appraisal service company, is a licensed appraiser. Penaranda and Martinez were business partners at North by Northwest, and Martinez served as its chief operations officer.

Penaranda personally prepared the appraisals for the following four of the 11 fraudulently flipped properties: 10315 Kalmia Street, 223 East 61st Street, 1707 East Imperial Highway, and 2036 East 110th Street.

DISCUSSION

I. SCHWARZENTRAUB'S EXPERT OPINION

Penaranda first contends the court prejudicially erred in allowing the People's expert appraisal witness, Schwarzentraub, to opine that the errors and omissions she found in Penaranda's four property appraisals in this matter were purposeful, which Penaranda claims was tantamount to an opinion that he was guilty. We conclude that although the court did not err in allowing Schwarzentraub to opine that Penaranda's pattern of errors and omissions were purposeful, the court erred in permitting her to opine that Penaranda's conduct "might be considered fraud, " as such testimony constitutes an opinion that Penaranda was guilty of conspiracy to defraud the banks. We further conclude, however, that such error was harmless.

A. Background

Schwarzentraub testified that the prosecutor gave her copies of the 11 appraisals and asked her to review them to determine whether they met applicable standards and whether she agreed with the appraisals. The prosecutor asked her to look with particular scrutiny at the four appraisals that Penaranda prepared.

With respect to the 11 appraisals, Schwarzentraub opined there was a "pattern" of "using data that was not verifiable or that was improperly verified." She also concluded that incorrect sale prices were used, and sometimes the selected comparable properties "didn't match up" with the properties appraised.

After Schwarzentraub testified to the specific deficiencies she found in Penaranda's four appraisals, the prosecutor asked her whether she had come to an "overall conclusion" concerning those appraisals. Schwarzentraub stated: "[Y]es, I did. It looked to me like they were consistently above the true market value for the properties, and that there were, again, omissions and information that would have been more clarifying that would have, in all likelihood, drawn a reader to a different conclusion than what was on . . . these reports."

The following exchange, which is the basis for Penaranda's contention, then took place between the prosecutor and Schwarzentraub over defense counsel's objection:

"[Prosecutor]: Did you reach a conclusion or opinion as to whether the errors that you've called out or the omissions that you've spoken of were attributable to negligence or something more than that?

"[Penaranda's counsel]: Your Honor, . . . I think this is an area where an ultimate opinion -- I would object.

"The Court: Overruled.

"[Schwarzentraub]: Yes. I believe it was more than just negligence.

"[Prosecutor]: What do you think it was?

"A. Well --

"[Penaranda's counsel]: Again Your Honor, that's -- objection.

"The Court: Overruled.

"[Schwarzentraub]: Well, it looks like purpose -- purposely misstating values. I believe that might be considered fraud." (Italics added.)

B. Analysis

"A witness may not express an opinion on a defendant's guilt. [Citations.] The reason for this rule is not because guilt is the ultimate issue of fact for the jury, as opinion testimony often goes to the ultimate issue. [Citations.] 'Rather, opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the trier of fact. To put it another way, the trier of fact is as competent as the witness to weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of guilt.' [Citation.]" (People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 77.)

Here, as Penaranda acknowledges, the critical issue at trial regarding his guilt or innocence was whether he "intended his appraisals to be used in furtherance of the fraud." (Second italics added.)

We conclude that the court did not err by admitting Schwarzentraub's opinion testimony that the consistent deficiencies she found in Penaranda's four appraisals demonstrated more than negligence and "look[ed] like . . . purposely misstating values." Quoting section 801, subdivision (a), the California Supreme Court has explained that "expert opinion testimony is admissible only if the subject matter of the testimony is 'sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.'" (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617 (Gardeley).) The factual issue of whether the pattern of misstating values in Penaranda's appraisals demonstrated "sloppy" work or purposeful conduct under the standards applicable in Penaranda's profession is a matter that is "sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact" within the meaning of section 801, subdivision (a) that it is the proper subject of expert opinion testimony. This portion of Schwarzentraub's expert opinion testimony was not tantamount to an improper expression of opinion as to Penaranda's guilt or innocence because the factual question of whether Penaranda intended to further the conspiracy to defraud the banks by means of misstating of values in the appraisals was an issue left to the jury for determination.

However, Schwarzentraub's opinion testimony that Penaranda's conduct "might be considered fraud" (italics added) was tantamount to an expression of opinion that Penaranda was guilty of conspiracy to defraud Washington Mutual Bank and Bank of America, the offense for which he was being prosecuted. We thus conclude the court erred in admitting this improper opinion evidence over objections by the defense.

We also conclude the court's error was harmless. Errors found under the rules of evidence, which do not implicate federal constitutional rights, are reviewed under the Watson standard of prejudice articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, i.e., whether it is reasonably probable in light of the entire record that defendant would have received a more favorable outcome in the absence of the error. (People v. Vasquez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 47, 66.)

Penaranda claims that "[g]iven the prosecution's repeated amplification of [Schwarzentraub's] pronouncement of [his] guilt in argument, and the circumstantial character of the other evidence, " the court's error was prejudicial because it is reasonably likely the outcome of this case would have been more favorable to him had the court sustained his objections to Schwarzentraub's opinion testimony. Penaranda complains the prosecutor twice emphasized Schwarzentraub's improper opinion during his closing argument. He also complains that without Schwarzentraub's "unequivocal" opinion testimony, "there was only circumstantial evidence, none of which pointed necessarily to [his] guilt, " and "there was no . . . overwhelming evidence that [he] intentionally participated in the fraud." Penaranda's claim of prejudice is unavailing.

The trial transcript does show that during his closing arguments, the prosecutor paraphrased Schwarzentraub's opinion testimony by arguing Schwarzentraub had said that the "only conclusion" she could draw was that Penaranda's conduct "was purposeful; . . . it was intentional." The prosecutor then expressed agreement with Schwarzentraub's opinion, stating "I think that was the correct conclusion; that Mr. Penaranda knew precisely what he was doing." Later, the prosecutor again paraphrased Schwarzentraub's opinion testimony, arguing she had said, "I have to call it intentional. I have to call it a situation in which he was intentionally overstating the true value of the property in order to please the interest of the crook that he was dealing with, whose name was David Lopez, who also went by the name of Roberto Matias."

Penaranda's own appraisal expert, Burt Camp, opined that Penaranda's conduct might have been fraudulent. Specifically, during his cross-examination of Camp, the prosecutor presented a hypothetical situation based on facts related to Penaranda's appraisals in this case, and asked Camp, "[D]o you have an opinion whether the appraiser was acting fraudulently?" (Italics added.) Camp replied, without objection by defense counsel, "Well, it's either fraudulently or just or just not real good appraisal technique, you know." (Italics added.)

Furthermore, as we shall discuss post in connection with Penaranda's insufficiency of the evidence claim, the People presented substantial evidence, apart from Schwarzentraub's opinion testimony that Penaranda's misstating of values and other errors might be considered fraudulent, from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Penaranda participated in, and intended to further, the conspiracy. We conclude that Penaranda has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the erroneous admission of Schwarzentraub's opinion testimony that his conduct "might be considered fraud" was prejudicial under the Watson standard of prejudice.

II. EVIDENCE OF PENARANDA'S PRIOR OREA REPRIMAND

Penaranda also contends the court prejudicially abused its discretion in allowing Schwarzentraub to testify, over various defense objections, that one of the bases for her opinion that his conduct was purposeful was a report from OREA, the state agency that issues licenses and certifications for appraisers in California, reprimanding him for making the same kind of errors in appraisals he had prepared a year or so before he prepared the four appraisals at issue. We reject this contention and conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Schwarzentraub to testify about the OREA report and Penaranda's prior reprimand, as (1) under section 801, subdivision (b) (discussed, post), Schwarzentraub could reasonably rely upon the OREA report as a basis for her expert opinion; (2) under section 802, she could properly state the matter upon which her opinion was based; and (3) her testimony regarding that report was admissible under sections 1101(b) and 352 because (a) it was relevant to prove the absence of mistake in his preparation of the four subject appraisals, which (as discussed, ante) Schwarzentraub found to be purposely deficient; and (b) it was not unduly prejudicial within the meaning of section 352.

A. Background

Outside the presence of the jury, Penaranda's counsel informed the court that he had learned the prosecutor had received from OREA, by way of a subpoena, files showing that a civil administrative investigation and hearing had resulted in a finding that Penaranda had been negligent in preparing some appraisals prior to, and unrelated to, his preparation of the appraisals involved in this case. Defense counsel also stated he had learned the prosecutor had shown the files to the prosecution's appraisal expert (Schwarzentraub), who was going to use them at trial as part of the bases for her expert opinions.

Penaranda's counsel informed the court that Penaranda had not lost his license as a result of the OREA investigation and administrative proceeding, but had received a reproval and a fine and was required to take some classes. Defense counsel then objected, arguing that Schwarzentraub's testimony about the OREA report would be inadmissible because (1) it would contain hearsay, (2) the prejudicial effect of this evidence would outweigh its probative value within the meaning of section 352, and (3) it would constitute inadmissible character evidence.

The prosecutor responded that Schwarzentraub could reasonably rely on the OREA report, despite its hearsay nature, as a basis for her expert opinion that Penaranda's current appraisal errors were purposeful; and her testimony about the OREA report was admissible under section 1101(b) because it was offered to show that Penaranda's current appraisal errors were not the result of mistakes or negligence. The prosecutor also asserted that the findings in the OREA report indicated that Penaranda's conduct went beyond negligence, and the report contained statements by the OREA investigator that Penaranda's conduct was intentional, willful misconduct, and Penaranda should be "drummed out" of the profession.

1. Court's ruling

The court ruled it would allow Schwarzentraub "to testify to what the conclusion was of the investigation, but not bring in investigative statements of the investigator . . . to support that conclusion." The court clarified that Schwarzentraub "can state that [she] was aware of the conclusion and the ruling, for want of a better term, of this, but not the specifics, as to what resulted in that ruling. And if there is an opening of the door on either cross-examination that brings into it the discussion of the investigators, then obviously you can rebut it. In addition, if Mr. Penaranda is placed on the stand and responds in certain manners that you believe makes it relevant, we can address that issue. So, the conclusions can be identified by [Schwarzentraub], but not the supporting documentation."

2. Schwarzentraub's trial testimony

Schwarzentraub thereafter testified to the jury, on behalf of the People, that her opinion that Penaranda's conduct was purposeful was based in part on a report from OREA. Specifically, the following exchange took place between the prosecutor and Schwarzentraub:

"[Prosecutor]: Was there anything, other than what you have thus far told us, that led you to conclude that the conduct on the part of Mr. Penaranda was purposeful?

"[Schwarzentraub]: Yes.

"[Prosecutor]: What was that?

"[Schwarzentraub]: [A] report from the [OREA] regarding an investigation and conclusion of investigation regarding prior work that was done just in the year or so before the date of these properties' appraisals, that indicated that the same type of omitted information, and so on and so forth, was done in . . . those files that were under investigation." (Italics added.)

When the prosecutor, referring to the information in the OREA report, asked Schwarzentraub "what was it that was similar[?], " Schwarzentraub replied, "Well, again, . . . it was an indication that data couldn't be verified; that properties were misidentified on the sales; that there was missing information; sales histories were missing. All the sort of information that was incorrect and not properly reported on these files."

B. Analysis

Penaranda claims that (1) Schwarzentraub's testimony about what she read in the OREA report was inadmissible hearsay, and the court abused its discretion in failing to exclude her testimony "insofar as it referred to inadmissible evidence as part of the basis" for her expert opinion; (2) Schwarzentraub's testimony was not admissible under section 1101(b); and (3) even if it were admissible under section 1101(b), it should have been excluded under section 352. These claims are unavailing.

1. Hearsay

With respect to his hearsay claim, Penaranda specifically contends that when Schwarzentraub testified that the OREA report was one of the bases for her opinion that the errors in Penaranda's four appraisals were purposeful, the court prejudicially erred by permitting her to state--over his hearsay objection--that the report indicated he had previously made the "same type" of errors. We reject this contention.

a. Applicable legal principles

Hearsay evidence is statutorily defined as "evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." (§ 1200, subd. (a).) "Except as provided by law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible." (Id., subd. (b).)

By statute, an expert's opinion testimony may be based on inadmissible hearsay that is of a type the expert may reasonably rely upon. The California Supreme Court has explained that section 801(b) "limits expert opinion testimony to an opinion that is '[b]ased on matter . . . perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to [the witness] at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which [the expert] testimony relates . . . .' [Citation.]" (Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 617, italics added.) The Gardeley court further explained that under that subdivision, "[e]xpert testimony may . . . be premised on material that is not admitted into evidence so long as it is material of a type that is reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming their opinions. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 618.) "So long as this threshold requirement of reliability is satisfied, even matter that is ordinarily inadmissible can form the proper basis for an expert's opinion testimony. [Citations.]" (Ibid.) Thus, "[a]n expert witness . . . may base an opinion on reliable hearsay, including out-of-court declarations of other persons." (In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070.)

Our high state court has also explained that "because [section] 802 allows an expert witness to 'state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter . . . upon which it is based, ' an expert witness whose opinion is based on . . . inadmissible matter can, when testifying, describe the material that forms the basis of the opinion. [Citations.]" (Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 618, italics added, citing, among other authorities, People v. Shattuck (1895) 109 Cal. 673, 678 [holding a medical expert could testify about a patient's hearsay complaints in order to provide a clinical history of the case, understand the significance of the patient's symptoms, and form an opinion as to the nature of the disease], McElligott v. Freeland (1934) 139 Cal.App. 143, 157-158 [a certified public accountant could testify to hearsay information he relied on in a property valuation] & People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 251 [prosecution could elicit out-of-court statements by the defendant upon which the defense expert relied].)

Furthermore, "[a] trial court . . . has discretion 'to weigh the probative value of inadmissible evidence relied upon by an expert witness . . . against the risk that the jury might improperly consider it as independent proof of the facts recited therein.' [Citation.] This is because a witness's on-the-record recitation of sources relied on for an expert opinion does not transform inadmissible matter into 'independent proof' of any fact. [Citations.]" (Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 619.)

In Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1523-1524 (Korsak), this court explained that "when expert witnesses are called to testify to 'assist the trier of fact, ' (§ 801, subd. (a)), the courts have interpreted the Evidence Code to permit some latitude to experts in utilizing sources of information in forming an opinion. [Citations.] Although the courts have rejected expert opinions '[w]here the basis of the opinion is unreliable hearsay, ' [citation], nevertheless, hearsay information of a type reasonably relied upon by professionals in the field in forming an opinion on the subject may be used to support an expert opinion, even though not admissible in court. [Citations.]" (Original italics omitted.)

Furthermore, "[a]lthough experts are thus given considerable leeway as to the material on which they may rely, the rules governing actual communication to the jury of any hearsay matter reasonably relied on by an expert are more restrictive. Although experts may properly rely on hearsay in forming their opinions, they may not relate the out-of-court statements of another as independent proof of the fact. [Citations.]" (Korsak, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1524-1525, italics added.)

In Korsak, we also addressed the issue of how to assess the prejudicial effect, if any, of any hearsay that an expert has relied upon in forming his or her opinion, in the event such hearsay makes its way to the jury's attention. "Assuming that inadmissible hearsay utilized by an expert to form an opinion does make its way to the jury's attention, an inquiry into the prejudicial effect of such matter becomes necessary. The main consideration is the purpose for which the material was presented. Where the information is admitted for a purpose other than showing the truth of the matter asserted (e.g., notice to the defendant or as a basis of the expert opinion), prejudice is likely to be minimal and a limiting instruction under section 355 may be requested to control the jury's use of the information.[] [Citations.] However, where . . . the jury is allowed to consider the hearsay evidence presented by the expert in connection with proof of the matter asserted[, ] prejudice is apparent." (Korsak, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525, italics added.)

Section 355 provides: "When evidence is admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."

In some cases, a jury must consider the hearsay on which an expert's opinion is based in order to properly evaluate the opinion. Witkin notes that "where the jury cannot properly evaluate the expert's opinion without considering the hearsay on which it is based, the trial judge may protect a criminal defendant's interest in avoiding the substantive use of unreliable hearsay by instructing the jury that the evidence goes only to the basis for the expert's opinion and not to its truth. [Citation.]" (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Opinion Evidence, § 31, p. 563.) The California Supreme Court has explained that "[b]ecause an expert's need to consider extrajudicial matters, and a jury's need for information sufficient to evaluate an expert opinion, may conflict with an accused's interest in avoiding substantive use of unreliable hearsay, disputes in this area must generally be left to the trial court's sound judgment. [Citations.] Most often, hearsay problems will be cured by an instruction that matters admitted through an expert go only to the basis of his opinion and should not be considered for their truth. [Citation.]" (People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 919 (Montiel).) However, a trial court has no sua sponte duty to exclude such hearsay evidence or instruct the jury on specific evidentiary limitations. (Id. at p. 918.)

b. Analysis

We begin our analysis by noting that Penaranda does not dispute that the OREA report was a reasonably reliable basis for Schwarzentraub's expert opinion that his appraisal errors in this matter were purposeful. The record shows that OREA is the state agency that is authorized to bring disciplinary actions against California appraisers, such as Penaranda, when there are problems; Schwarzentraub was an experienced residential real estate appraiser; and she was qualified to testify as an expert in this case. We conclude that for purposes of section 801(b), the threshold requirement of demonstrating the OREA report was reasonably reliable was satisfied (see Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 617-618), and thus Schwarzentraub could reasonably rely on that report as a basis for her expert opinion.

We also conclude that the court properly permitted Schwarzentraub, over defense counsel's hearsay objection, to testify that her expert opinion that Penaranda's conduct in this case was purposeful was based in part on the OREA report, notwithstanding the fact that the information in that report was hearsay. (§ 801(b); Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 617-618; Korsak, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525.) As already discussed, section 801(b) permits an expert witness to base an opinion on reasonably reliable hearsay (In re Fields, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1070), and section 802 allows an expert witness to state on direct examination both the reasons for his or her opinion and the matter upon which it is based (Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 618). Furthermore, an expert witness whose opinion is based on inadmissible matter is also permitted to describe the material that forms the basis of the opinion. (Ibid.)

Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Schwarzentraub to describe the material in the OREA report that was the basis for her opinions that Penaranda had previously made the same type of errors that she found in the four appraisals at issue in this case, and that his errors in those appraisals were purposeful. As discussed, ante, when the prosecutor, during Schwarzentraub's direct examination, referred to the information in the OREA report and asked her "what was it that was similar[?], " Schwarzentraub stated that data could not be verified, properties were "misidentified on the sales, " and sales histories were missing. This testimony, although based on hearsay contained in the OREA report, was properly admitted because the jury needed to consider that information in order to properly evaluate Schwarzentraub's opinion testimony. (See Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 919; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Opinion Evidence, § 31, p. 563.) Without an understanding of the manner in which the errors Schwarzentraub found in Penaranda's four appraisals were similar to the previous errors that resulted in the civil administrative proceeding and the OREA report, the jury could not properly evaluate whether the report supported her opinion that Penaranda's errors in those four appraisals were purposeful.

Because the OREA report hearsay that Schwarzentraub utilized to form her opinion made its way to the jury's attention, an inquiry into the prejudicial effect, if any, of such matter becomes necessary. (Korsak, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525.) As already discussed, the main consideration is the purpose for which the material was presented, and where the information is admitted for a purpose other than showing the truth of the matter asserted, such as a basis of the expert opinion, "prejudice is likely to be minimal." (Ibid.)

Here, the record shows that the hearsay contents of the OREA report were not admitted for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted. Schwarzentraub testified that the OREA report showed that the previous appraisals prepared by Penaranda, which were the subject of the OREA proceeding, misidentified properties, contained data that could not be verified, and lacked sales histories. Schwarzentraub's testimony was not offered as independent proof that those asserted matters were true. Again, the prosecutor elicited Schwarzentraub's testimony as a description of the hearsay matters in the OREA report that served as one of the bases for her opinions that the two sets of errors were similar and that Penaranda's errors in the four appraisals at issue in this case were purposeful and not the result of negligence or "sloppy" work.

Penaranda claims, however, that "[t]he fact that there were the same or similar mistakes in earlier appraisals--appraisals done for transactions not otherwise shown to be fraudulent--showed nothing about whether he acted with fraudulent intent at either time, " and "[n]o matter how many appraisals with his name on them showed such errors, it remained as reasonable to believe that all the errors were unintentional as they were intentional." These claims are unavailing, as Penaranda acknowledges a jury could reasonably infer from Schwarzentraub's testimony that his errors in the four appraisals were intentional. As shown by defense counsel's closing arguments to the jury, Penaranda's defense at trial was that any errors he committed in the four appraisals resulted from mistakes and sloppy work rather than fraudulent acts. Schwarzentraub's testimony was highly probative with respect to the dispositive factual question of whether Penaranda negligently made mistakes in his preparation of the appraisals, or intentionally acted with fraudulent intent.

During his closing arguments, defense counsel alluded to Penaranda's defense that the deficiencies in his current appraisals were the result of mistakes or sloppy work, rather than intentional acts in furtherance of the admitted conspiracy to defraud the banks, stating: "[I]t strikes me that the real big issue, the crux of this case, in terms of Mr. Penaranda, is the numbers. It seems like everything is bottom line, I guess, in this world. It's bottom line. So, if you have -- it's got two rooms instead of three, but your bottom line is correct. That's dumb; it's sloppy; it's a mistake. Is that a crime?" (Italics added.)

The record shows that the court exercised discretion to minimize prejudice to Penaranda by limiting Schwarzentraub's testimony regarding the specific hearsay contents of the OREA report. The court properly excluded, for example, the details of the OREA investigator's statements in the. As already noted, the prosecutor had pointed out to the court, outside the presence of the jury, that the report contained statements by the OREA investigator that Penaranda's conduct was intentional, willful misconduct and that Penaranda should be "drummed out" of the profession. The court did not permit Schwarzentraub to testify to these hearsay statements by the investigator. In sum, the court permitted Schwarzentraub to explain why she believed the matter involved in the OREA investigation was similar, and we conclude the court did not err.

2. Sections 1101(b) and 352

We also reject Penaranda's claim that Schwarzentraub's testimony regarding the OREA report was not admissible under section 1101(b) and should have been excluded under section 352.

a. Applicable legal principles

Character evidence is inadmissible to show conduct on a specific occasion. (§ 1101, subd. (a).)

Section 1101, subdivision (a) provides: "Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion."

Section 1101(b), however, provides that nothing in that section "prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act." (Italics added.)

In Brown v. Smith (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 767, 791 (Brown), this court explained that under section 1101(b), "the admissibility of prior act evidence '"depends upon three principal factors: (1) the materiality of the fact sought to be proved or disproved; (2) the tendency of the [prior act] to prove or disprove the material fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence."' [Citations]" (Italics omitted.) We noted that the "rule or policy" referred to is "primarily found in the provisions of [section 352] and the weighing of the prejudicial effect of such evidence against its probative value." (Brown, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.)

We also explained in Brown that even where section 1101 does not require exclusion of the prior act evidence, a further inquiry under section 352 is required because such evidence is so prejudicial that "its admission requires extremely careful analysis." (Brown, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.) We further observed that since substantial prejudicial effect is inherent in such evidence, it is admissible only if it has substantial probative value. "Where the connection between the [prior acts] and the ultimate fact in dispute is not clear, the trial court should exclude the evidence." (Ibid.)

Section 352 provides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (Italics added.)

We review the trial court's rulings under sections 1101 and 352 for an abuse of discretion (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637) and will not reverse an evidentiary ruling unless the appellant demonstrates a manifest abuse of that discretion. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.)

b. Analysis

Schwarzentraub indicated in her testimony that the OREA report described the same kind of appraisal misconduct by Penaranda that was involved in his appraisals of the Kalmia Street property, the East 61st Street property, the East Imperial Highway property, and the East 110th Street property, which (as noted, ante) were four of the 11 fraudulently flipped properties involved in this case. The evidence of Penaranda's prior acts of appraisal misconduct was offered by the prosecution to disprove his defense at trial that the deficiencies in his current appraisals were the result of mistakes or sloppy work, rather than intentional acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

See footnote 8, ante.

Asserting on appeal that "[t]he question here is whether Schwarzentraub's testimony regarding the [OREA] report fell under section 1101(b) because relevant to [a] showing [of] intent, knowledge, or a common plan or design, " Penaranda contends "[i]t was not." (Italics added.) This contention is unavailing as Penaranda makes no attempt to show, nor can he demonstrate, that Schwarzentraub's testimony regarding the [OREA] report was not relevant to show "absence of mistake" within the meaning of section 1101(b). After initially quoting the pertinent provisions of section 1101(b), Penaranda thereafter wholly ignores the statutory language of that subdivision authorizing a trial court to admit prior bad act evidence "when relevant to prove . . . absence of mistake . . . ." (Italics added.)

In his opening brief, Penaranda states that "section 1101(b) makes an exception allowing the introduction of evidence of prior bad acts 'when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act."

From the OREA report evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that because Penaranda had been investigated and administratively reprimanded for committing appraisal errors and omissions similar to those that Schwarzentraub found in his four appraisals at issue, Penaranda's conduct was intentional. Such evidence was thus admissible under section 1101(b) to show that Penaranda's current errors and omissions were intentional, and not the result of mistake or sloppy work.

Citing People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 622, and reiterating his contention that Schwarzentraub's testimony about the OREA report was inadmissible hearsay, Penaranda maintains that "[t]here is no need to get to the question of whether evidence of prior acts testimony is admissible under section 1101(b) once it has been shown to be inadmissible hearsay." However, for reasons discussed, ante, we have concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Schwarzentraub's testimony. Penaranda's reliance on Noguera is misplaced, because that case did not involve testimony by an expert witness, and thus the special evidentiary rules that permit an expert witness to describe reasonably reliable hearsay matters on which his or her opinion is based were also not involved in that case.

In light of the substantial body of evidence (discussed, post) circumstantially showing that Penaranda knew about the conspiracy and acted in furtherance of it, we also conclude the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice within the meaning of section 352, and thus the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Schwarzentraub's testimony about the OREA report.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Last, Penaranda claims that, while there was evidence of a fraudulent scheme, there was no direct evidence that he was aware of that scheme or participated in it with a fraudulent intent, and the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that substantial evidence supports Penaranda's convictions in this matter.

A. Standard of Review

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319, italics omitted.) "[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence─that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value─such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)

The same standard of review applies in cases in which the People mainly rely on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792.) "'Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "'If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.'" [Citations.]' [Citation.] '"Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 792-793.)

B. Analysis

As noted, ante, Penaranda was charged and convicted under section 182, subdivision (a)(1) with two counts of conspiracy to commit grand theft. On appeal, he complains that the evidence on the "critical" questions of whether he knew the transactions were fraudulent, and whether he provided the appraisals with specific intent to defraud, was "entirely circumstantial." Specifically, he complains that "[t]here was no direct evidence that [he] ever communicated with─let alone met─Lopez, or that he knew that appraisals with his [Penaranda's] name on them were being used in fraudulent transactions." Penaranda also complains that "there was no direct evidence that [he] personally prepared the appraisals, or that the signature on them was truly his. There was only evidence that (1) [his] colleague in North by Northwest, Martinez, had direct involvement in the fraud, (2) a 'business plan' for North by Northwest found in Martinez['s] office included a proposal to 'flip['] properties in low-income neighborhoods, (3) . . . Penaranda's name was on four appraisals of properties involved in fraudulent transactions (which appraisals the prosecution expert [Schwarzentraub] found indicative of fraud), and (4) Penaranda may have benefited from some of the fraudulent transactions." Penaranda contends this circumstantial evidence against him was not "sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt from the mind of a reasonable juror as to whether [he] knew of and intended to further the fraud." Penaranda's contentions are unavailing.

The elements required to prove a criminal conspiracy are well established: "Pursuant to section 182, subdivision (a)(1), a conspiracy consists of two or more persons conspiring to commit any crime. A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant and another person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of the commission of an overt act 'by one or more of the parties to such agreement' in furtherance of the conspiracy. [Citations.]" (People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416, fn. omitted.) Commission of criminal conspiracy does not require the commission of the substantive offense that is the object of the conspiracy, and thus "'[i]t is not necessary that a party to a conspiracy shall be present and personally participate with his co-conspirators in all or in any of the overt acts.' [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 416-417.) "The evidence is sufficient if it supports an inference that the parties positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to commit a crime. Therefore, conspiracy may be proved through circumstantial evidence inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and during the alleged conspiracy." (People v. Prevost (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1399, italics added.)

Penaranda's complaint that the evidence presented by the prosecution was "entirely circumstantial" is unavailing. As discussed, ante, criminal liability for conspiracy may be proved by means of circumstantial evidence. (People v. Prevost, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399.)

Here, the People presented overwhelming circumstantial evidence and expert opinion testimony from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Penaranda knew about the conspiracy, knew the loan transactions were fraudulent, provided erroneous and inflated appraisals personally and through his company, and specifically intended to defraud Washington Mutual Bank and Bank of America. Penaranda, a licensed appraiser and the founder and chief executive officer of North by Northwest, acknowledges that substantial evidence showed his business partner, Martinez, who was not a licensed appraiser, "had direct involvement in the fraud."

The conspirators used the appraisal services of North by Northwest, as well as appraisers other than Penaranda, including two who had worked for North by Northwest and knew both Penaranda and Martinez. One of those appraisers, Steven Rogers, testified that Martinez told him he had purchased the property at 6621 Holmes Avenue─which is one of the 11 fraudulently flipped properties involved in this case─ for $50,000. Rogers stated that Martinez himself prepared the appraisal for that property, valuing the property at $120,000 as of December 2001, and then presented the appraisal to Rogers for Rogers's signature.

The second appraiser, Steven Hunt, testified he had worked for North by Northwest, but decided to start his own appraisal practice when he became certified. Hunt stated that he announced his decision to Martinez, who wanted Hunt to stay on at North by Northwest and offered to pay him $50 for each appraisal, saying that he (Martinez) would "take care of the appraisal, " and all Hunt would have to do was let Martinez use Hunt's name. When Hunt rejected Martinez's offer and turned in his keys in 2002, Martinez told him─in Penaranda's office─that one of the other people at North by Northwest was doing the same thing, and if Hunt did not do it, too, Martinez would find him and "cut [his] heart out." Hunt testified he tried to make a complaint against Martinez at the Pasadena Police Department, but the matter was dropped because Hunt did not want to swear out a criminal complaint against Martinez.

Hunt testified that no one else was present when he and Martinez had this conversation in Penaranda's office.

Hunt also testified that the signature of "Steve Hunt" was on the appraisal report for a property located at 1611 East 90th Street─which is also one of the fraudulently flipped properties─but he did not do the appraisal, which valued the property at $225,000, and the signature was not his.

Albert Fontes, an appraiser who had not worked for North by Northwest, indicated in his testimony that someone forged his signature on the appraisal reports for properties located at 1234 East 91st Street, 11238 South Hooper Avenue, and 345 East Manchester Avenue, all of which are among the 11 fraudulently flipped properties.

Penaranda personally prepared the appraisals for four of the 11 fraudulently flipped properties. As discussed, ante, the People's appraisal expert, Schwarzentraub, testified that she reviewed all 11 appraisals and opined there was a "pattern" of "using data that was not verifiable or that was improperly verified." She also concluded that incorrect sale prices were used and sometimes the selected comparable properties "didn't match up" with the properties being appraised.

After testifying to the specific deficiencies she found in the appraisals that Penaranda prepared, Schwarzentraub opined that Penaranda had purposely misstated the values of the properties. Schwarzentraub also testified that because Penaranda had earned the designation of "M.A.I., " which used to stand for "Member of Appraisal Institute, " it was her opinion that "[a] lot of the rules that were broken here are ones that [Penaranda] is very aware of, due to his designation. He would have been trained in it, and he also would have had education of what the proper procedures were."

The People presented evidence showing that Lopez was the coordinator of the fraudulent scheme. De la Fuente, who pleaded guilty to numerous felony offenses in this matter, including conspiracy to commit grand theft (see fn. 3, ante), testified that he worked with Lopez between 1998 and 2003 in a real estate scheme in which Lopez was buying properties in South Central Los Angeles, using fictitious names. De la Fuente served as the "banker" and sometimes would go to escrow companies and appraisal offices to pick up and drop off documents.

De la Fuente testified that, at Lopez's request, he opened up several bank accounts using fictitious names, such as Roberto Angarica and Alberto Arvelo. Also at Lopez's request, he would sign blank checks drawn on those accounts. De la Fuente stated that although he made both deposits and withdrawals, and sometimes made escrow deposits, he usually withdrew cash. Sometimes he withdrew cash from one account and deposited it into another account. A man named Jose Luis Hernandez also withdrew money from those accounts.

As noted ante, Hernandez pleaded guilty in this case to both conspiracy counts and admitted the aggravated white collar crime enhancement allegations.

De la Fuente testified he would sometimes go to the offices of North by Northwest to pick up and drop off documents. There he sometimes had contact with Martinez. During their conversations, the name "David Lopez" sometimes came up.

Ronald Shankles, an investigator for the San Diego County District Attorney's Office, testified he received a suspicious activity report from Bank of America in Los Angeles concerning suspected loan fraud. Shankles contacted the bank and obtained loan file information regarding six residential loans that had gone into default one to six months after the loans were funded. Based on information he obtained from Bank of America, Shankles conducted a warrant search at Home Loan Solutions, a mortgage brokerage company in Carlsbad (see fn. 2, ante), and obtained information about several escrow companies used in the allegedly fraudulent transactions. From his investigation of the escrow files, Shankles obtained the names of the banks to which the funds were sent after the escrows closed. Shankles used search warrants to obtain bank records from those banks.

In January 2003, as part of his investigation, Shankles executed a search warrant at the offices of Penaranda's company, North by Northwest, to look for information pertaining to the six Bank of America loans, particularly the six appraisals. There, Shankles contacted both Penaranda and Martinez.

Martinez told Shankles he purchased the Holmes Avenue property for about $50,000 and put between $15,000-$20,000 into the property to refurbish it, but he could not sell the property because it was a "bad investment." Martinez said he later received a telephone call from a David Lopez, who said he could sell the house for Martinez. Martinez told Shankles that he followed up on the phone call from Lopez and later sold the property for about $120,000. Martinez told Shankles he never met Lopez or the buyers of the Holmes Avenue property. Martinez said he could not explain how Lopez was able to sell the property for $120,000 when Martinez had been unable to sell it at a lower price. Martinez told Shankles he thought David Lopez was not a true name. A facsimile transmittal from Lopez to Martinez dated February 20, 2002, and an executed written request dated the next day for the wire transfer of escrow funds in the amount of $37,000 to North by Northwest's bank account, indicated that Martinez received $37,000 from Lopez on the sale of the Holmes Avenue property.

Shankles asked Penaranda for the original appraisals of the six properties, but Penaranda said the appraisals were not in North by Northwest's offices, and it would be a hassle to get them that day. About a month later, Shankles obtained those appraisals from Martinez's and Penaranda's defense attorneys in this matter.

Shankles seized all of the documents from Martinez's desk. One of those documents was titled "North by Northwest Business Plan for Investment Properties." The first paragraph of the business plan described a goal to flip properties in low-income neighborhoods to establish a cash flow. The business plan stated that "[w]hen we have a sizable portfolio, where it has enough passive income coming in, then we can each begin to look for a property on our own that is not in the partnership. It should be understood that Al will help Ozzie and vice versa when the time comes." (Italics added.) "Al" referred to Penaranda, and "Ozzie" referred to Martinez.

Shankles testified that the first page of the appraisal report for the Kalmia Street property was a facsimile transmittal from Lopez to Martinez that referred to the Kalmia Street property and stated the "estimated value" of that property was $165,000. The appraisal report listed Penaranda as the appraiser and indicated that Penaranda's opinion of the value of the Kalmia Street property was $165,000, the same as Lopez's estimated value.

Shankles also identified an appraisal order fax sheet for the East 110th Street property, which referred to North by Northwest, indicated that Lopez and Luis Hernandez were contacts, and stated that the estimated value of the property was $165,000. Shankles testified that the appraisal portion of the same file indicated that Penaranda was the appraiser of the East 110th Street property on behalf of Home Loan Solutions, and Penaranda's opinion of the value of the property was $165,000, the same as the estimated value provided by Lopez.

Shankles identified another appraisal order sent by Lopez to North by Northwest, for the East 61st Street property, which identified Penaranda as the appraiser and indicated the value of the property was $165,000. Shankles testified that one of the pages in the same file indicated that Penaranda's opinion of the value of the property was $155,000, the same as the estimated value provided by Lopez.

After Shankles executed the search warrant at the offices of North by Northwest, he became aware of the five fraudulent Washington Mutual Bank loan transactions. Shankles testified that, with the exception of Martinez, the names of the buyers in the 11 transactions were fake names. Shankles called some of the purported employers listed in the borrowers' loan applications and learned the telephones had been disconnected and the addresses were phony or belonged to unrelated parties.

As Penaranda acknowledges on appeal, the evidence also shows that Martinez paid to Penaranda the sum of $15,868 shortly after the closing on the South Hooper Avenue property, from which Martinez received a payment of $33,736.

We conclude that the foregoing substantial evidence supports Penaranda's convictions. From the circumstantial evidence and expert opinion testimony the People presented, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Penaranda knew about the conspiracy, knew the loan transactions were fraudulent, provided erroneous and inflated appraisals personally and through his company North by Northwest based on estimated values provided by Lopez, specifically intended to defraud Washington Mutual Bank and Bank of America, and financially gained from the fraudulent scheme.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: HALLER, J. O'ROURKE, J.


Summaries of

People v. Penaranda

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Aug 2, 2007
No. D046982 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2007)
Case details for

People v. Penaranda

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALBERTO PENARANDA, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Aug 2, 2007

Citations

No. D046982 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2007)