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People v. Palmer

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
May 29, 2015
A141174 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 29, 2015)

Opinion

A141174

05-29-2015

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIELLE PERRY PALMER, Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115 . (Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR301644)

Danielle Perry Palmer appeals her conviction for arson of a forest land. Palmer argues the judgment must be modified to reflect a conviction for the lesser included offense of arson of property since there is insufficient evidence to prove she set fire to a forest land, as that term is defined by Penal Code section 450, subdivision (b). We disagree and affirm the conviction.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2014, Palmer was charged by amended information with two counts: (1) arson of forest land (§ 451, subd. (c)), and (2) arson of property (§ 451, subd. (d)). The second count was dismissed on the district attorney's motion before the case was submitted to the jury, and the jury found Palmer guilty of the first count. The charges arose out of a fire in Vacaville. Palmer admitted to the police she intentionally started the fire because she was "overwhelmed and stressed out" and watching the flames helped her relax. The area set on fire was about half the size of a football field and located behind a commercial business. Frank Piro, the arresting officer, described it as "an open field, grassland, enclosed by a fence," with "a few trees interspersed throughout." According to Piro, the grass in the field was dead and about a foot high. Piro testified the "whole area" was on fire, including the tall grass and at least one tree. At trial, Palmer asserted the fire was an accident and thus the prosecution could not prove the requisite element of intent.

II. DISCUSSION

Palmer now argues there was insufficient evidence to support a finding the area to which she set fire constitutes a forest land. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we " 'must view the whole record in a light most favorable to the judgment, resolving all evidentiary conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the decision of the [jury].' " (DiMartino v. City of Orinda (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 329, 336.) " 'We may not substitute our view of the correct findings for those of the [jury]; rather, we must accept any reasonable interpretation of the evidence which supports the [jury]'s decision.' " (Ibid.) Though presented with a modest record, we do not find it was unreasonable for the jury to conclude the area was a forest land.

In interpreting the statutory provisions concerning the definition of forest land, our primary task is to determine the lawmakers' intent. (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.) In discerning intent, we start with the plain language of the statute. (Ibid.) Section 451 sets forth four types of arson punishable as felonies: (1) arson that causes great bodily injury, (2) arson that causes an inhabited structure or inhabited property to burn, (3) arson of a structure or forest land, and (4) arson of property. (§ 451, subds. (a)-(d).) Arson that causes great bodily injury carries the harshest penalty. (§ 451, subd. (a).) The second, third, and fourth types of arson each carry progressively lower penalties, and the maximum sentence for arson of a structure or forest land is double that of the maximum sentence for arson of property. (§ 451, subds. (b)-(d).) Under the statute, forest land is defined as "any brush covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods." (§ 450, subd. (b).)

We agree with Palmer that the mere presence of grass is not sufficient to make an area a forest land or grassland for the purposes of sections 450 and 451. That the statutes distinguish between arson of forest lands, including grasslands, and other types of uninhabited property suggests the Legislature intended forest lands to mean something other than any and all lands on which grass happens to grow. Had the Legislature intended to specifically punish grass fires of any kind, it is reasonable to conclude it would have drafted the statute differently. This reading of the statute is also consistent with the dictionary definition of grasslands. Webster's states a grassland is: "1 : farmland occupied chiefly by grasses and other forage plants (as clovers), used chiefly for grazing and hay, and often made part of the regular cultural rotation . . . 2 a : land on which the natural dominant plant forms are grasses and forbs . . . b : an ecological community in which the prevailing or characteristic plants are grasses and similar plants." (Webster's 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 991.)

To the extent the plain meaning of the section 450 is ambiguous, the legislative history of the arson statutes also supports a more limited interpretation of grasslands that emphasizes the natural character of such areas. Instead of punishing "arson of a forest land," the previous version of the arson statute prohibited the willful and malicious burning of any "growing or standing grain, grass or tree, or any grass, forest, woods, timber, brush-covered land, or slashing, cutover land." (Former § 449c; Stats 1976, ch. 1139, § 203, p. 5119.) In 1979, the Legislature amended the arson statutes, and enacted versions of sections 450 and 451 substantially similar to the current versions. (See Stats. 1979, ch. 145, §§ 6, 8, p. 338.) The transition from "grass" to "grassland" in the statute suggests the Legislature intended to narrow the types of grassy areas giving rise to heightened punishment for arson.

The author of the 1979 amendments confirmed the Legislature intended to narrow the scope of undeveloped property associated with heightened punishment for arson, stating: "In the reorganization [of the arson statutes,] grasslands and forest fires are more narrowly defined and are treated the same as arson fires of buildings . . . ." (David A. Roberti, Chairman, Joint Com. for Revision of the Pen. Code, letter to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., June 25, 1979.) Likewise, the former California Department of Forestry (now the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection) stated the revisions "would put wildland arson on the same basis penalty wise as arson of an unoccupied structure. This recognizes the fact that in many instances a person who sets fire to a wildland area creates a greater threat to life and property than many of the single building unoccupied structures that are the subject of arson." (Cal. Dept. of Forestry, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 116 (1979 Gen. Sess.) June 26, 1979.)

As Palmer points out, there is evidence the property at issue was not natural, wild, or used for grazing. Officer Piro testified there were a few trees and dead grass on the lot, and the area was enclosed by a fence and adjacent to a commercial business. On the other hand, Piro also described the area as a "grassland" and a "field," suggesting it fell within the statutory definition of forest land. Palmer did not object to this testimony, ask Piro to clarify what he meant by grassland, or offer contrary evidence. Moreover, we cannot conclude the terms grassland and forest land are so technical that a layperson, such as Piro, could not identify such areas without special training or experience. (See People v. Chapple (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 540, 547.) Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude Piro's description of the area was accurate and that his conception of the term grassland was consistent with the Legislature's.

III. DISPOSITION

Palmer's conviction for arson of a forest land is affirmed.

/s/_________

Margulies, J.
We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J.
/s/_________
Banke, J.


Summaries of

People v. Palmer

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
May 29, 2015
A141174 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 29, 2015)
Case details for

People v. Palmer

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIELLE PERRY PALMER, Defendant…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE

Date published: May 29, 2015

Citations

A141174 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 29, 2015)